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Preface 
 
The study presented here is the attempt to shed light on an aspect of conscious 
perception that has often been conflated with other issues in the literature: 
representation of low-level dimensions of conscious perception. The question is not, 
what background conditions enable us to become aware of stimuli. Nor is the focus on 
processes that enable or prevent access to complex representations in visual cortex. 
Rather, the question is, where certain dimensions of conscious perception are 
represented in the brain. This question is of special importance, because it attempts to 
directly answer the age-old question, which brain areas encode which dimensions of 
our perceptual space. As such it can only be a starting point in a long series of 
experiments, and should be thought of more as an exemplification of a specific 
methodological and conceptual approach. The reader who is not interested in the 
general framework can confine himself to reading the last 3 chapters which present a 
study on perceived contrast that can stand alone as a contribution to the field of 
contrast perception. I chose to present the entire framework here – perhaps unusual 
for an experimental thesis – because it makes the models and assumptions underlying 
my research more transparent and summarizes my proposal how to scientifically 
attempt to bridge the gap between conscious perception and brain processes. 
 
Several formal notes should be made in advance. First, the spelling of citations was 
used exactly as it appears in MEDLINE. This means, that German names may be 
occasionally spelt in an unusual way (e.g. ”Struber” instead of “Strüber” but “Goebel” 
instead of “Göbel”). This was done to increase the clarity for readers who wish to 
search for the articles in online databases. To maintain a common style, also the 
names of other German authors were “anglicised” according to common rules 
(“Koehler” instead of “Köhler”). Second, a considerable number of pilot experiments 
were performed in order to increase the signal to noise ratio of the evoked 
neuromagnetic signal, to optimise the trade-off between psychophysics and 
physiology and to calibrate the nonlinearities of the visual stimulation system. I 
decided not to present these pilot experiments here, simply because they in 
themselves do not directly contribute to the question posed in this study. On the other 
 v
hand some preliminary data from other studies I have performed with Prof. Jochen 
Braun and Prof. Hans-Jochen Heinze will be presented in the section on shapes and 
objects. This is “work in progress” and thus cannot be presented in full detail. 
 
Before starting I would like to thank several people for their support. The academic 
climate at the universities of Bremen and Magdeburg has brought me in contact with 
numerous people who have greatly influenced this work. Prof. Gerhard Roth and Prof. 
Michael Stadler, the two reviewers, have strongly supported my academic 
development and have also presented me with an environment that has strongly 
shaped my ideas. Prof. Hans-Jochen Heinze has strongly supported my studies and 
has also provided me with an infrastructure without which the present study would 
never have been possible. Furthermore I wish to thank (without regard of role and title 
and in the order of appearance): Margarete Haynes, David Haynes, Daniel Strüber, 
Peter Kruse, Canan Basar-Eroglu, Günter Vetter, Manfred Stöckler, Sven Schütt, 
Harald Schmidt, Thomas Metzinger, Achim Stephan, Klaus Pawelzik, Uwe Opolka, 
Tillman Hagner, Claus Tempelmann, Max Hopf, Stefan Knape, Udo Ernst, Jochen 
Braun, Manfred Herrmann, Nina Nönnig, Claudia Grubich, Geraint Rees and Elliot 
Freeman. Some people may be surprised to find themselves on this list, but I believe 
this to be a good place to let them know that interaction with them has influenced me. 
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Abstract 
 
This study investigates which neural populations represent low-level dimensions of 
conscious perception. First, a general framework is presented that will allow the 
separation of different aspects of the study of visual awareness. A set of six criteria is 
developed that allows one to assess whether a neural population could in principle 
represent a dimension of conscious perception. These criteria are then applied to 
previous studies on the neurophysiology and neuropsychology of conscious 
perception. It is demonstrated that the conscious perception of the dimensions of 
colour, motion and object identity is represented in extrastriate visual cortex in a 
modular fashion. Then it is demonstrated that currently available data indicate that 
brightness and perceived contrast are likely to be represented in primary visual cortex. 
In the following empirical section a study on the relationship between perceived 
contrast and activity in primary visual cortex is performed using a combination of 
EEG, MEG and psychophysics. The perceived contrast of flashed stimuli was 
measured and compared to synchronously recorded neuromagnetic responses. When a 
target grating is flashed into a larger, surrounding grating, its contrast was perceived 
to be lower when both gratings are oriented collinearly rather than orthogonally. This 
effect can be used to dissociate the physical and the perceived contrast of the target 
grating. Transient potentials and magnetic fields evoked by the flashed target gratings 
were recorded and compared to psychophysical judgements of perceived contrast. 
Both early (100 ms) and late (150 ms) transients were reduced in amplitude when 
targets were flashed into a collinear rather than orthogonal surround, mimicking the 
situation for perceived but not physical contrast. At all investigated contrast levels, the 
amplitudes of electrophysiological transients correlated better with perceived than 
with physical target contrast. This holds especially for the late transient. Source 
localisation indicated that the transients in question are likely to originate in primary 
visual cortex. The study presented here is the first ever to study perceptual constancy 
by recording psychophysics and physiological responses synchronously. The results 
identify the activity of primary visual cortex as the most likely neural basis of 
perceived contrast. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 
An empirical framework for studying visual awareness 
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Introduction 
Consider the picture in Fig. 1A. Simply observing its different features can 
demonstrate the complexity every study of visual awareness is confronted with. When 
focussing at a small spatial scale of analysis one can see local variations of brightness, 
hue and saturation. At an intermediate level of analysis one can see local elements 
grouped to surfaces such as the uniform texture of the hair. At a shape based level of 
processing different objects are segmented such as the eyes or the nose, each enclosed 
by contours. And at an object based level of processing one recognizes the entire 
spatial configuration shown as a female face. Although it is possible to attend 
preferentially to one level of analysis (say the object category) aspects of all other 
levels jointly contribute to the perceptual experience. The different levels can be 
emphasised by transforming the picture using a set of Gabor wavelets (Fig. 1B,C). 
This shows how this left image may be represented in simple cells in V1. Although 
the image is composed of isolated elements of varying orientation and contrast these 
are still spatially integrated into contours and the overall face shape is still 
recognisable. Again it is possible to focus on different levels of integration – the 
elements, the contours or the entire object – but our perception is jointly determined 
by these multiple levels of analysis.  
 
 
Fig. 1: (A) A chromatically distorted image of a female face. Figure B shows a 
transformation of this image that is obtained by only showing a Gabor wavelet with 
best matching orientation and contrast. Figure C is obtained from B by decreasing the 
contrast of one element (see arrows). 
 
Many studies of visual awareness have focussed on the high-level aspect of this 
multilevel percept (Farah, 1994, 1995; Kanwisher, 2001; Logothetis, 1998; Milner & 
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Goodale, 1995; Rees & Lavie, 2001). It has been shown that the representation of 
different high-level features such as colour, motion or shape occurs in a modular 
fashion in different areas of the visual cortex. Perceptual deficits after brain lesions 
can be highly selective and affect specifically one subclass of high-level category, 
depending on where the lesions occur (Damasio, Yamada, Damasio, Corbett, & 
McKee, 1980; Farah, 1996; Farah, McMullen, & Meyer, 1991; Heywood, Wilson, & 
Cowey, 1987; Zihl, von Cramon, & Mai, 1983). Also brain imaging studies have 
revealed that similar areas are selectively activated when different feature classes are 
processed (Bartels & Zeki, 2000; Culham, He, Dukelow, & Verstraten, 2001; Grill-
Spector, Kourtzi, & Kanwisher, 2001; Hadjikhani, Liu, Dale, Cavanagh, & Tootell, 
1998). Some studies have demonstrated that this activity nicely correlates with 
perception (Grill-Spector, Kushnir, Hendler, & Malach, 2000; He, Cohen, & Hu, 
1998). However little has been said about the conscious representation of the most 
elementary, local1 features of such an image, such as brightness and contrast. 
Consider the difference between Fig. 1B and 1C: The contrast of one of the oriented 
elements composing the left cheek has been reduced. This difference can be readily 
perceived but it does not seem to have an effect on the perceived continuity of the 
contours or on recognition of the object as a face. Perception can change along the 
high-level dimensions and the low-level dimensions independently.  
 
The key question in this study is which areas in the brain directly encode our 
conscious perception of these most elementary spatial features. Specifically the 
question will be if low-level visual dimensions of conscious perception such as 
brightness, contrast or even spatial patterns and contours are represented in primary 
visual cortex. This question was chosen for several reasons. First, there are 
controversial positions as to whether primary visual cortex could represent any 
dimension of conscious experience at all (Block, 1996; Crick & Koch, 1995; Koch & 
Braun, 1996a, 1996b; Lennie, 1998; Pollen, 1995; Rees, Kreiman, & Koch, 2002; 
Stoerig, 2001). However several recent results point towards a close correlation 
between V1 activity and conscious perception (Kosslyn et al., 1999; Macknik & 
Haglund, 1999; Macknik & Livingstone, 1998; Pascual-Leone & Walsh, 2001; 
Polonsky, Blake, Braun, & Heeger, 2000; Rossi, Rittenhouse, & Paradiso, 1996; 
Super, Spekreijse, & Lamme, 2001). Concentrating on feature dimensions that are 
more likely to be represented in extrastriate visual areas may have misled previous 
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authors to doubt that any feature dimension could be represented in V1. Second, of all 
visual areas primary visual cortex is that about which most is known. This will allow 
an analysis to build upon a large set of empirical data. Third, there is a strong 
advantage in studying dimensions of perceptual magnitude such as brightness and 
contrast. In contrast to dimensions such as colour hue or direction of motion perceived 
magnitude is believed to be represented by the mean activity of cortical cells. If this is 
the case then differences in perceived magnitude will result in absolute differences in 
spike rates in a population, whereas differences in say motion direction are more 
likely to be encoded by changes to population vectors without changing average 
activity (Treue, Hol, & Rauber, 2000). Because all current methods for extracranial 
recording of neural activity in humans (electroencephalography, 
magnetoencephalography, positron emission tomography, functional magnetic 
resonance imaging and near infrared spectroscopy) average across large populations 
of neurons and measure their mean level of activity, perceived magnitude is very 
suitable for correlation studies. 
 
How do we proceed empirically in order to find out which brain areas represent 
certain feature dimensions of conscious perception2 (such as brightness, contrast or 
hue)? A large number of paradigms have been considered to be relevant to visual 
awareness, but only a limited number can specifically contribute to this problem of 
representation. The implications of discrimination studies for visual awareness for 
example are not straightforward, because it is known that subjects can perform above 
chance on discrimination tasks without subjectively perceiving differences between 
stimuli (Kolb & Braun, 1995; Stoerig & Cowey, 1997). A first strategy could be to 
attempt to correlate our perceptual experience with neural processes. If we were 
interested in perceived brightness we could present a bright and a dark stimulus, and 
correlate the different perceptual states with the physiological state of the brain. One 
could assume that perceived brightness must be represented exactly where the brain 
responds differently to the two stimuli. However there is a severe problem with this 
approach: The resulting set of correlates is far too large. Even the luminance 
distribution on the CRT monitor correlates nicely with our perception, as does the 
graded receptor potential of retinal cones, the spike rate of cells in lateral geniculate 
nucleus, and also (if we let the subject press one of two buttons in response to either 
the dark or bright stimulus) the subpopulation of neurons in motor cortex executing 
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our behavioural response. Many of these correlates are not relevant. The correlating 
luminance distribution of the CRT monitor certainly does not represent perceived 
brightness. Not only because we believe that our brain states are sufficient to account 
for perceptual experiences, but also because the CRT monitor is not necessary for our 
perception of brightness. Brightness sensations can also be caused by exerting 
mechanical force on the eye. We can also exclude the retina from representing any 
visual feature because it is possible to evoke sensations by directly stimulating visual 
cortex and thus bypassing the retina as will be shown later in more detail (Brindley & 
Lewin, 1968). Thus, the CRT monitor and the retina cannot be necessary conditions 
of visual experiences. So simply searching for empirical correlation does not help. We 
are interested in the subset of correlates that are necessary for a perceptual experience 
to occur, rather than those that happen to be merely accidental.  
 
A different strategy could be to search for necessary conditions of visual experiences. 
However the entire set of necessary conditions is again far too large because it 
includes all unspecific background conditions. It includes conditions that are 
necessary for any type of experience such as activity of the brainstem reticular 
formation producing wakefulness (Moruzzi & Magoun, 1949; Parvizi & Damasio, 
2001). One of the meanings of the word “consciousness” relates to this necessary 
condition: being awake, aware of the environment and responsive, as opposed to 
sleeping or being in coma. However the requirement of wakefulness is far too general 
because it applies to experiences of every modality. A second necessary condition is 
representation. This refers to some property of a neural population (such as mean 
spike rate or phase coherency) that encodes a specific dimension of visual experience. 
This can be compared to a “dataset” that is able to encode every perceptually different 
state along a feature dimension by adopting a different state. A third necessary 
condition refers to our ability to access this representation. In clinical patients with 
neglect syndrome (Driver & Vuilleumier, 2001) or in certain experimental paradigms, 
such as attentional blink (Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell, 1992), visual brain areas can 
have a highly complex representation of a stimulus without the subjects being aware 
of it (Rees et al., 2000; Vogel, Luck, & Shapiro, 1998). The rest of this chapter will 
present a brief review of the two main background conditions: wakefulness and 
access. The following chapters will be concerned only with the issue of 
representation. First formal and empirical criteria will be presented that will help 
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decide if a neural population can be said to represent a certain dimension of conscious 
experience. These criteria will be applied to high-level and low-level visual features 
separately. Then a study will be presented that aims at answering the question whether 
perceived contrast is encoded in primary visual cortex. 
 
Background conditions: Wakefulness and access 
Wakefulness 
“Consciousness” in one of its meanings refers to a very unspecific state where the 
individual is awake, perceives, responds to the environment and shows at least 
rudimentary signs of cognitive processing. This requires wakefulness, a form of 
general arousal that affects all modalities alike. Originally wakefulness was believed 
to reflect activation by a unitary “ascending reticular activation system” (ARAS), 
projecting from the reticular formation of the brainstem to the thalamus and from 
there diffusely to cortex (Jasper, 1949; Moruzzi & Magoun, 1949)3. Subsequent 
research has revealed that the ARAS is not a unitary system but consists of a complex 
network originating from various functionally distinct brainstem nuclei with different 
neurotransmitters and projecting to both intralaminar and reticular nuclei of the 
thalamus, as well as the basal forebrain and directly to cortex (Parvizi & Damasio, 
2001; Steriade, 1996; Steriade, McCormick, & Sejnowski, 1993).  
 
Besides the brainstem reticular formation the thalamus also plays a major role in 
arousal. During sleep for example signal transfer through the thalamic lateral 
geniculate nucleus is reduced by about 50 % (Coenen & Vendrik, 1972) and cells 
switch from “transmission mode” to “burst mode” (McCormick & Bal, 1997). This 
greatly attenuates afferent signals reaching visual cortex via the LGN. Functional 
brain imaging studies show that a transition from conscious to unconscious in humans 
(such as during sleep, anaesthesia or clinically during the persistent vegetative state) 
is accompanied by global decreases of cerebral activity. The strongest decreases are 
observed in the brain stem and in the thalamus, which is in accord with the special 
role of reticular formation and thalamus (especially its reticular and intralaminar 
nuclei) in the control of arousal (Alkire, Haier, & Fallon, 2000; Bonhomme et al., 
2001; Braun et al., 1997; Fiset et al., 1999; Hofle et al., 1997; Maquet, 1997, 2000)4. 
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An important distinction has to be made between wakefulness and awareness. 
Wakefulness does not imply that subjects are aware of anything. Epilepsy patients for 
example can show all criteria of wakefulness despite being completely unconscious. 
During petit mal or “absence” epileptic seizures patients can be capable of complex 
automatic behaviour, which involves representing and responding to external events, 
in absence of any awareness (Young & Wijdicks, 1998)5. A similar distinction 
between wakefulness and awareness can be found in patients in the so-called 
persistent vegetative state (PVS). These have a normal sleep-wake cycle and open 
their eyes spontaneously during the wake phases (Jennett & Plum, 1972; Kinney, 
Korein, Panigrahy, Dikkes, & Goode, 1994; Kinney & Samuels, 1994; Laureys, 
Lemaire, Maquet, Phillips, & Franck, 1999; Zeman, 1997). However they show no 
sign of awareness of the environment, no sign of cognitive activity and no 
reproducible voluntary responses to external events. This syndrome has been termed 
“wakefulness without awareness” (Andrews et al. 1996). In PVS the brainstem 
typically remains intact, which explains why vegetative functions and sleep-wake 
cycles still function. However cortical processing is severely reduced, which points 
towards the importance of neocortical processing for awareness, as has been 
previously pointed out (Roth, 1994)6. 
 
In many clinical cases it is difficult to distinguish between unconscious but awake 
patients and patients who are fully conscious but unable to respond due to motor 
paralysis. These latter cases of “locked-in” syndrome occur most frequently after 
brainstem lesions at the level of the pons (Patterson & Grabois, 1986). Similar to 
PVS-patients locked-in patients exhibit wakefulness without responses to external 
stimuli, but they are consciously aware of their environment (Bauer, Gerstenbrand, & 
Rumpl, 1979; Boyce, 2000; Patterson & Grabois, 1986; Plum & Posner, 1980). These 
patients are unable to communicate with the external world due to a lack of motor 
efferents. Often the only method for communication is the use of vertical eye-
movements and the upper eyelids7, which can be used to communicate via Morse 
code and often reveal a near-to-normal cognitive status (Feldman, 1971). In rare cases 
even the voluntary control over eyelids and eye-movements is lost, a syndrome called 
“total locked-in” (Bauer et al., 1979). Because it is difficult to assess whether awake 
but unresponsive patients lack awareness of external events or lack the ability to 
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communicate (Bernat, 2002; Giacino et al., 2002; Menon et al., 1998; Schiff & Plum, 
1999) many patients suffering from locked-in syndrome have been incorrectly 
diagnosed as having the vegetative state syndrome, despite consciously perceiving 
and processing their environment for many years (Andrews, Murphy, Munday, & 
Littlewood, 1996; Childs, Mercer, & Childs, 1993). This was only discovered after 
offering more adequate forms of communication that do not rely on eye movements 
(Andrews et al., 1996; Childs et al., 1993; Kmietowicz, 2000).  
 
It was originally believed that the higher neocortical blood flow level of locked-in as 
compared to PVS patients could differentiate between the two groups (Levy et al., 
1987). However several studies have provided evidence for activity in neocortical 
areas even in clear cases of persistent vegetative state (Laureys et al., 1999; Menon et 
al., 1998; Schiff et al., 2002). Most strikingly cortical areas typically related to high-
level processing have shown to be activated in PVS patients as indicated by mismatch 
negativity and P300 evoked responses (Kotchoubey, Lang, Bostanov, & Birbaumer, 
2002). Even high-level visual processing has been demonstrated in one PVS patient. 
Despite the complete lack of any sign of consciousness her EEG showed an auditory 
evoked P300 to oddball stimuli and when presented with face stimuli (Menon et al., 
1998) she showed increased blood-flow in the right fusiform gyrus, the cortical locus 
of high-level face-processing (Haxby et al., 1994; Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 
1997; Puce, Allison, Gore, & McCarthy, 1995). This leaves one with a dilemma: 
Either one trusts the physiological data and believes that the patients are minimally 
aware because ventral visual areas show a high depth of visual processing. Or one 
trusts the lack of behavioural responses and believes that the rudimentary cortical 
activity in high-level visual areas is not sufficient for visual awareness. The decision 
as to whether a patient is believed to be aware but unresponsive or completely 
unaware has immense consequences. Life supporting systems can be withdrawn from 
a patient who is unaware, whereas this is not the case for conscious patients. This has 
lead to methodological and ethical debates8, which demonstrates that a clear 
physiological index of awareness is of greatest clinical relevance.  
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Access 
Some patients who are clearly awake, responsive and have no sensory deficits can 
nonetheless fail to become aware of certain external stimuli. This failure of access 
mostly occurs in patients with unilateral brain damages to the inferior parietal lobe 
(especially right-hemispheric lesions) and has been termed the neglect syndrome 
(reviewed in Driver & Vuilleumier, 2001). Neglect patients fail to notice stimuli 
spontaneously if they are presented in the visual field contralateral to the side of the 
lesion. However they can perceive them when explicitly cued to their position9. 
 
Neglect is a prime example of a dissociation between the perceptual representation of 
a stimulus and its accessibility. It is not due to an impairment in the depth of stimulus 
processing and representation but to a postperceptual lack of access. This is 
demonstrated by a number of findings. Whether a stimulus is perceived or not does 
not depend only on its retinotopic coordinates. The neglected region of visual space 
can be modulated by direction of gaze, so that a retinotopic position from which 
information was previously inaccessible becomes accessible (Nadeau & Heilman, 
1991). Turning of the trunk without change in the position of the stimulus in 
retinotopic space can also counteract neglect (Nadeau & Heilman, 1991). Also, the 
impairment does not abruptly stop at the vertical meridian (as would be expected if it 
were a failure of selection from the damaged hemisphere), but shows a gradual, 
continuous decrease (Pouget & Driver, 2000).  
 
Further evidence that neglect is a failure of selection comes from a phenomenon 
called “extinction”. In some patients stimuli presented in isolation to the 
contralesional visual field are readily perceived and only fail to reach awareness when 
presented together with a stimulus on the normal side. In these cases a “conflict” 
occurs and only the stimulus on the unaffected side is perceived, whereas the other 
stimulus appears to be extinguished. The failure to reach awareness also depends on 
high-level attributes of the stimulus such as object category. A fear-related stimulus is 
less likely to be extinguished than a neutral stimulus (Vuilleumier & Schwartz, 2001), 
suggesting that the extinguished stimulus is processed up to the level of object 
recognition. Evidence for this also comes from brain imaging studies showing that 
extinguished object stimuli nonetheless specifically activate object-selective modules 
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in inferior temporal cortex (Driver, Vuilleumier, Eimer, & Rees, 2001; Rees et al., 
2000). Further evidence for extensive sensory processing in neglect is that extinction 
can be counteracted by perceptual grouping processes (Gilchrist, Humphreys, & 
Riddoch, 1996; Ward, Goodrich, & Driver, 2001), as demonstrated by the fact that 
extinction of bisected lines depended strongly on whether the two lines could be 
perceptually grouped (Mattingley, Davis, & Driver, 1997). Failures of accessibility 
have also been demonstrated in other cases. Patient D.F. of Milner and coworkers was 
unable to consciously access shape information after lesions to the ventral visual 
stream (Milner et al., 1991). However she could use shape information to guide 
actions of her hand. This again demonstrates a dissociation between representation 
and availability for awareness. 
 
Deficits of accessibility can also be studied in normal subjects using experimental 
paradigms such as “inattentional blindness” (Mack & Rock, 1998; Simons, 2000), 
“change blindness” (Rensink, 2002; Simons & Levin, 1997) and “attentional blink” 
(Raymond et al., 1992). In inattentional blindness a subject does not become aware of 
a stimulus when it is presented unexpectedly, spatial attention is deployed elsewhere 
in the visual field and the event does not lead to attentional capture. In these cases the 
target is often not perceived (Mack & Rock, 1998; Simons, 2000). This has been 
studied using low-level visual stimuli (Mack & Rock, 1998) as well as natural image 
sequences (Fig. 2)(Simons & Chabris, 1999) and has been taken as a prime example 
that attention is the gatekeeper to visual awareness.  
 
In change blindness a subject does not become aware of a small change between two 
different presentations of a visual image, despite explicit expectation and knowledge 
that something does change (Rensink, 2002; Simons & Levin, 1997). Interestingly an 
fMRI study has shown that even an undetected change can nonetheless be 
unconsciously registered by ventral stream visual areas, suggesting that object 
processing is available up to the degree of change detection (Beck, Rees, Frith, & 
Lavie, 2001).  
 
In the attentional blink paradigm subjects are presented with rapid sequences of 
stimuli, some of which contain potential targets and have to be responded to 
(Raymond et al., 1992). If a target is followed within short time (400-600 ms) by a 
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second target the probability that the latter is detected is decreased, a phenomenon 
termed “attentional blink”. This can clearly not be due to sensory degradation by 
forward or backward masking effects, because the first target is easily perceived. 
Evidence from visual evoked potentials shows that the locus of selection is likely to 
be “postperceptual”. Components indicating both early sensory processing (P1, N1) 
and semantic analysis (N400) are not attenuated, whereas the P300 component is 
completely suppressed (Luck, Vogel, & Shapiro, 1996; Vogel et al., 1998). 
 
 
Fig. 2: The famous “monkey-event” used to study inattentional blindness: Subjects 
view a video in which two teams play basketball. They are instructed to count the 
number of passes. After about 45 seconds a person wearing a gorilla suit walks 
through the scene. 73 % of subjects engaged in the counting task fail to notice the 
“gorilla event” (Simons, 2000; Simons & Chabris, 1999). 
 
It is important to notice that accessibility is a more general requirement than selective 
attention. If subjects perform a complex foveal feature discrimination task leading to a 
complete engagement of selective attention at the point of fixation they can 
nonetheless perceive (detect) target stimuli outside the focus of attention if they are 
expected to occur, despite partly losing information on their spatial properties (Lee, 
Koch, & Braun, 1997). Similarly it has been demonstrated that the perceived 
brightness of stimuli does not change under conditions of inattention (Prinzmetal, 
Nwachuku, Bodanski, Blumenfeld, & Shimizu, 1997). On the one hand this questions 
whether the crucial variable in inattentional blindness is really attention, or possibly 
rather expectation (Braun, 2001). But it also suggests that selective attention is not a 
necessary condition for awareness, simply because we are often aware of stimuli that 
fall outside our focus of attention. 
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Chapter 2 
Formal and empirical criteria 
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Empirical criteria for conscious representation 
If one is interested in the question of representation it is important to ensure that one 
is really studying representation and not access. As shown in the previous chapter 
given that a subject is awake his failure to become aware of a stimulus can be due to 
problems of representation or of access. The brain can have very complex 
representations of a stimulus despite one’s being unaware of it. In order to empirically 
assess whether a brain area is involved in representing a dimension of conscious 
perception rather than in accessing it, it is necessary to show that this area responds to 
small perceivable differences along that dimension with different states. Otherwise 
the area cannot be said to have a “representation”, simply because we cannot explain 
differences in perception by different states of this area. For example changes in the 
physical contrast of stimuli lead to changes in their perceived contrast. Activity in 
parietal and frontal visual areas does not correlate with changes in physical contrast, 
but in several early visual areas it does (Boynton, Demb, Glover, & Heeger, 1999). 
This means that parietal and frontal areas cannot represent the dimension of perceived 
contrast. Representation requires that certain mapping requirements on the co-
occurrence of perceptual and neural states be fulfilled. Furthermore it is important to 
separate necessary from accidental correlations between perceptual and neural states. 
In what follows a simple heuristics is followed. If a property of a neural population N 
is to represent a dimension of conscious perception Q then we have to assess both, 
that it fulfils certain mapping requirements so that every different qualitative state can 
actually be represented and that it is a necessary condition for a percept of the class Q 
(Fig. 3). 
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Fig. 3: At least two criteria will have to be fulfilled in order to support a claim that a 
property of a neural population represents a dimension of conscious perception. On 
the one hand activity in that neural population has to be a necessary condition for 
percepts of this type. On the other hand certain mapping requirements will have to be 
fulfilled (see below), so that the neural population can be said to “represent” a 
dimension of conscious perception. The union of the neural processes that fulfil both 
criteria certainly includes the neural representation of a dimension of conscious 
perception. It could possibly also include other neural processes (indicated by the 
question-marks), which also fulfil both criteria, but it will provide a first framework to 
discard a large number of neural processes that certainly do not fulfil these 
requirements. 
 
Mapping requirements for representation  
In most previous studies the mapping criterion employed was simple “correlation”, 
which was used rather intuitively. The neural population representing a dimension of 
conscious experience was called a “neural correlate of consciousness” (Block, 1996; 
Chalmers, 1996; Crick & Koch, 1995, 1998). However correlation as an empirical 
criterion is too weak. In the statistical sense correlation suggests simply that some part 
of the variance of the neural state can be explained by the variance in the qualitative 
state (and vice versa because correlation is a symmetric measure). On the other hand 
requiring a perfect correlation as criterion is too strong because it pre-supposes a 
linear relationship between the neural and qualitative dimensions. If we want to speak 
of a “representation” we will have different requirements. Ideally one should be able 
to infer the exact qualitative state from the neural representation. On the one hand we 
want the same qualitative state to always lead to the same neural representation. At 
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the same time we do not want two qualitative states to share the same representation. 
This can be cast in more formal terms that mathematically define an “injective 
function”. Let Q be the set of all perceivably different percepts (qualia) with respect 
to a certain feature dimension. Let N be the set of possible states of a certain neural 
population10. 
 
The function f: Q → N mapping qualitative states onto neural states can only be a 
representation of Q in N if the following three requirements are fulfilled: 
 
1. Totality: nqfNnQq =∈∃∈∀ )(::  
 
2. Single-valuedness )()(:, 212121 qfqfqqQqq =⇒=∈∀  
 
3. Injectivity: )()(:, 212121 qfqfqqQqq ≠⇒≠∈∀  
 
The first two conditions ensure that we can actually speak of a “function”, which is 
defined as a subclass of all relations NQR ×⊆  that fulfil these two criteria. The first 
ensures that for every perceptual state there is a neural state assigned to it. The second 
condition means that only one neural state is assigned to every perceptual state. When 
conditions 1 and 2 are met then exactly one neural state will be assigned to each 
perceptual state. Condition 3 is necessary to ensure that the same neural state does not 
“represent” two different perceptual states (Fig. 4). However we can allow for some 
neural states not to represent any perceptual state, which means that we do not have to 
require our function to be surjective11. Note that these three conditions are necessary 
but not sufficient for the neural population N to represent dimension Q. They 
formulate a minimal requirement for the mapping. 
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Fig. 4: Top row: Formal mapping criteria for the co-occurrence of qualitative states 
and neural states that have to be fulfilled if the state of a neural population N is to 
represent a qualitative state Q. Totality (left) refers to the fact that a neural state is 
assigned to every qualitative state. Single-valuedness (middle) refers to the fact that 
the same qualitative state cannot be assigned to two different neural states. Injectivity 
(right) means that the same neural state cannot represent two different qualitative 
states. Bottom row: Violations of the formal mapping criteria (dotted lines) can occur 
as failures of totality, for example when one qualitative state does not have a neural 
state assigned to it (left), of single-valuedness, if a qualitative state is assigned to more 
than one neural state, and of injectivity, if two qualitative states are assigned to the 
same neural state.  
 
These three formal mapping criteria are rather abstract, so the next step is to ask for 
empirical ways to test these criteria. The first criterion (totality) is easy to meet, 
because it only means that the state of the neural system has to be defined whenever a 
conscious perception occurs. This is independent of our knowledge of this state and 
thus does not require that we have actually measured it12. The criteria of single-
valuedness and injectivity however will require more extensive discussion. 
 
Single-valuedness 
The requirement of single-valuedness can be empirically tested by examining the state 
of the neural population for repeated occurrences of the same qualitative state. Testing 
for single-valuedness can be done in different ways. For some features this can be 
studied by matching paradigms where a feature is modulated by its context. For 
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example perceived colour hue of a region in the visual field is influenced by its 
chromatic context (Judd, 1940; Land, 1959a, 1959b). This is a highly useful feature, 
which enables us to discard for the spectral composition of the illuminating light by 
taking into account the spectral statistics of the context. Under different illumination 
conditions stimuli with very different spectra can be perceived to have the same 
colour hue. This can be exploited to test for single-valuedness. If the state of a neural 
system is to represent the perceived colour hue then it will have to show the same 
response to these stimuli that are physically different, but perceived to be the same. 
This is a very powerful paradigm to test whether a representation is based on physical 
or perceptual properties because it allows dissociating the two. The same logic will be 
applied to develop the empirical paradigm for contrast perception used in this study.  
 
For high-level features single-valuedness can be studied using invariance paradigms. 
High-level features such as motion or object identity can be defined by different sets 
of low-level features (Fig. 5). The same shapes and motion patterns can be defined by 
contrasts of luminance, colour, contrast, texture or even direction of motion. Single-
valuedness is fulfilled if a neural population responds invariantly of the different low-
level realisations of the complex feature (Fig. 6). 
 
 
Fig. 5: Cue invariance of shape (A) and motion processing (B). Borders between 
areas of different luminance, colour, contrast, texture and direction of motion can be 
used to evoke highly similar shape or motion percepts. The stimuli in the bottom row 
are generated by movement of the local borders. 
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Empirical criterion of single-valuedness 
The mapping of a perceptual dimension to states of a neural population can 
justifiably be assumed to be single-valued (according to the best currently 
available scientific knowledge) if in every case studied so far identical 
perceptual states were mapped to identical neural states. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6: In order to fulfil the criterion of single-valuedness, repeated occurrences of the 
same perceived object shape defined by different low-level cues (here luminance and 
colour contrast) should lead to the same neural activation vector in a population of 
neurons representing shape (indicated by the shapes in the bottom row). The 
representation should be invariant with respect to the low-level visual features. 
 
Injectivity 
Injectivity requires that every perceptual state be mapped to a different neural state. 
This is hard to assess for the entire set of perceptual states, but certain empirical 
approaches allow one to at least falsify this by testing for two consequences of 
injectivity. First, if injectivity holds, the state of the neural system will change for 
every change in the perceptual state. This will be termed “covariance”. Second, if 
injectivity holds, the neural system will have the resolution or grain to provide a 
different neural state for each perceptual state. This will be termed “grain”. Note that 
these two criteria are necessary but not sufficient for injectivity. This means that we 
can only falsify injectivity by testing for these criteria. If covariance, grain or both 
conditions fail then the mapping is not injective and thus a candidate neural 
population cannot represent that perceptual dimension. 
 
 19 
 
Empirical criterion of injectivity 
The mapping of a certain perceptual dimension to states of a neural 
population can justifiably be assumed to be injective (according to the best 
currently available scientific knowledge) if in every case studied so far (1) 
the state of the neural population changes when the perceptual state changes 
(“covariance”) and (2) the resolution of responses in the neural population is 
sufficient to account for all different perceptual states (“grain”). 
 
Covariance 
Intuitively this condition ensures that the neural population is not an unspecific 
background condition of any type of perception (such as wakefulness), but actually 
changes with our specific feature. In most studies this criterion is the only one studied 
at all. If a percept is only varied along a single feature dimension necessary 
background conditions such as wakefulness or attentional selection will remain 
constant. A large number of paradigms, each with specific strengths and weaknesses 
allow one to assess covariance. 
 
Covariation with stimulus features 
The easiest way to study perceptual covariance is to selectively stimulate the visual 
system with stimuli changing along only one feature dimension. As in the example 
above, one could present stimuli with varying luminance or contrast and record which 
parts of the visual system also change their response properties. Although this will 
yield a rather large set of correlates, including early sensory processing stages that are 
not directly related to conscious representation, it can nonetheless be used to rule out 
certain candidates, namely those that fail to correlate with the specific feature 
dimension. For example neurons in inferior temporal cortex respond strongly to 
different shapes of stimuli, but are largely invariant as to the local features by which 
these are defined (Sary, Vogels, Kovacs, & Orban, 1995; Sary, Vogels, & Orban, 
1993; Vogels & Orban, 1996). These inferior temporal neurons cannot represent low-
level visual features, because they do not covary with them. Selective stimulation is 
very suitable for studies of high-level visual representation. The strategy here is to 
change only the high-level properties of the stimuli and at the same time keep the 
low-level feature statistics constant13, as is done in studies of representation of objects 
(Grill-Spector et al., 2001).  
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Perceptual changes without changes in stimulation 
Covariance can also be studied in situations where perception changes but stimulation 
does not. One paradigm that follows this strategy is multistable perception, which has 
historically been considered one of the most important paradigms for visual 
awareness (Logothetis, 1998). Reversible figures (reviewed in Kruse & Stadler, 1995) 
and binocular rivalry stimuli (Leopold & Logothetis, 1999; Levelt, 1965; Wheatstone, 
1838) have the property of leading to changes between different perceptual 
interpretations despite constant stimulation. These stimuli have the advantage that all 
exogenous, early sensory processes remain in a steady state due to the constant 
stimulation. If perception changes, activity in early areas that do not participate in 
representation will stay constant whereas areas encoding the percept will change their 
activity. Multistable stimuli can help to narrow down the candidates for perceptual 
representation by giving a hint at the earliest point at which a visual process correlates 
with a perceptual change.  
 
However one has to be careful when interpreting perceptual alternations during 
multistable perception. Reversible figures, such as the Necker cube (Necker, 1832) 
have the problem that the perceptual change occurs for a high-level feature (such as 
3D perspective) but the elementary, local spatial pattern does not change (Fig. 7, left). 
So perceptual reversals in reversible figures can only shed light on perceptual 
representation of high-level visual features. With binocular rivalry the situation is 
even more difficult. The perceptual change occurs at many feature levels in parallel, 
such as the object category and the local spatial pattern (Fig. 7, right). Theoretically 
this can be overcome when the two stimuli differ along a simple visual dimension 
(brightness or contrast) rather than object category (Polonsky et al., 2000). Multistable 
stimuli also have the caveat that it is difficult to assess whether a perceptual change 
was due to a change in a perceptual representation, or due to a change in the access of 
a perceptual representation14.  
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Fig. 7: The left shows perceptual changes when viewing the Necker cube. A change 
occurs in 3D perspective but the perceived local brightness pattern remains identical. 
The right shows perceptual changes during binocular rivalry. Here both the high-level 
features (monkey versus sun) and the local spatial patterns change. Simply finding a 
neuron that follows the perceptual changes in binocular rivalry will not say if this 
neuron represents a high or a low-level visual feature. 
 
Visual masking 
One method to study a graded change in a perceptual dimension without changing the 
stimulus with respect to that dimension is visual masking. Masking of a target occurs 
when it is presented in close spatial or temporal vicinity of a second stimulus. In 
backwards pattern masking a target is followed after a short time by a mask that is 
presented to the same position in the visual field and is typically some form of noise 
pattern. Variation of the time between the two stimuli can change perceivability of the 
target from complete invisibility to complete visibility (Fig. 8). Using this method it 
has been demonstrated that activity in human object processing areas exactly follows 
the perceptual threshold. In metacontrast masking (Breitmeyer & Ogmen, 2000), 
where the target and mask only share a contour, the target remains visible but its 
perceptual representation is degraded with respect to certain perceptual dimensions. 
The perceived brightness can be reduced (Bridgeman & Leff, 1979) or the spatial 
extent of the stimulus can be misjudged (Macknik & Livingstone, 1998).  
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Fig. 8: (A) Stimulus design used for backwards masking of object recognition (Grill-
Spector et al., 2000). The target is presented for a variable duration between 20 and 
500 ms and followed by a mask. Recognition performance increases with target 
duration in a way shown by the solid line in (B). The dashed and dotted lines in B 
show the responses of visual areas lateral occipital (LO) and V1 respectively. LO 
which is the major cortical site of human object processing (Grill-Spector et al., 
2001), correlates closely with the perceptual threshold. 
 
Direct cortical stimulation 
Direct cortical stimulation can also be used to provide evidence for covariance. If we 
activate a neural population by directly stimulating it, we can set the starting point of 
a causal chain directly and thus observe the effects of a change in neural state on the 
perceptual dimension of interest. It has been known since the earliest studies 
(Foerster, 1929; Krause, 1924; Penfield & Rasmussen, 1950) that electrical 
stimulation of occipital visual areas during surgical operations can elicit visual 
hallucinations ranging from simple colourless points of light, so called “phosphenes”, 
to complex hallucinations of motion, colour hues and objects (coloured balls, 
butterflies, human figures), depending on the site of stimulation. However these 
reports were restricted by the limited time available during neurosurgery. Brindley 
and Lewin (1968) performed the first extensive study on a 52-year-old patient who 
was blind after loss of major parts of both retinae. They implanted a prosthesis 
consisting of 80 platinum electrodes that spanned the medial wall covering the parts 
of the cuneus and lingual gyrus directly surrounding the calcarine sulcus (Fig. 9).  
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Fig. 9: (A) Coronal X-ray picture of Brindley and Lewin’s (1968) device for 
independent stimulation of different locations of the medial wall representation of V1 
in a blind subject. (B) Schematic drawing of A (T=radio transmitter; R=radio 
receiver; Es=stimulation electrode; Ei=indifference electrode; Cu=cuneus; GL=gyrus 
lingualis; CS=calcarine sulcus). The electrodes were controlled by radio receivers 
implanted outside the skull beneath the skin, which in turn were stimulated by radio 
transmitters above the skin. Stimulation could thus be applied by each electrode 
separately and consisted of high frequency alternating current (6.0 or 9.5 MHz) pulsed 
in packages of variable frequency. (C) Demonstration of stimulation timing and 10 % 
and 90 % duty cycles (U=voltage; T=time; fP=pulse frequency; fR=radio frequency). 
Perceived brightness correlates with the duty cycle, being stronger for the 10 % than 
for the 90 % stimulus. 
 
Upon stimulation the patient perceived very small spots of light “like a star in the 
sky” or like “the size of a grain of sago at arm’s length” (ibid. p. 483). Recently a 
study by Lee and coworkers combined a large sample size of epilepsy patients with 
precise localisation of electrodes to perform the most comprehensive study on 
electrocortical stimulation of subjects with largely normal vision (Lee, Hong, Seo, 
Tae, & Hong, 2000). They studied 23 patients using a magnetic resonance imaging 
(MRI) and computer tomography (CT) coregistration technique for precise individual 
localisation. They classified the sensations as (1) Simple forms (uncoloured small 
flashing light points); (2) Intermediate form (uncoloured or coloured geometric shapes 
such as triangles, diamonds and stars); (3) Complex forms (animals, people, 
landscapes and sequences from autobiographic memory). They also localised sites 
leading to colour and motion percepts, temporary scotoma, visual illusions and visual 
experiences accompanied by sounds. While stimulation of the striate cortex and 
occipital pole resulted in only simple form sensations, stimulation of cuneus and 
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lingual gyrus (corresponding to visual areas V2 and V3) results in mainly 
intermediate form sensations. Complex form sensations and colour and motion 
sensation are evoked by stimulation of various extrastriate regions, according to what 
would be expected from functional specialisation of visual areas. 
 
Grain 
This condition supplements the condition of covariance to ensure that for every 
perceivably different state the neural population adopts a different state. Grain means 
that the resolution of the neural population has the capacity to represent the grain of 
perception. It implies a lower bound for the resolution of the neural representation, 
but not necessarily an upper bound. If we are able to perceive 150 different colour 
hues between 430 and 650 nm (Halsey & Chapanis, 1951) then our neural 
representation of colour hue will have to be different for each one in order to allow a 
representational mapping. The grain of perceptual resolution is very difficult to 
measure. One may assume that this question can be answered by studying the 
discriminability of visual features. But it has long been known that discrimination has 
a finer grain than perception, because subjects can make many discriminations 
without subjective confidence that they are performing above chance (Kolb & Braun, 
1995; Stoerig & Cowey, 1997). However we can use discrimination as a first estimate 
of perceptual grain because if anything it will overestimate the required resolution. If 
a neural population can be shown to be able to account for discrimination it will have 
sufficient grain to account for conscious perception15. 
 
Isomorphism and perceived magnitude 
The abovementioned criteria are a minimum set of requirements on the co-occurrence 
of perceptual and neural states. It is only possible to explain a perceptual state by the 
occurrence of a neural state if the same perceptual state is mapped to the same neural 
state on repeated occurrences and if different perceptual states are mapped to different 
neural states. These basic requirements allow one to treat different classes of 
perceptual states by a general methodological approach. It allows one to treat 
perceived object identity in a similar way to perceived magnitude of brightness or 
contrast. The latter two are real perceptual “dimensions” in the sense that for example 
states of perceived brightness are ordered according to their perceived magnitude. 
Perceived object identity however is more complex, because different perceptual 
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states are not ordered along a single dimension but are represented in a high-
dimensional feature space.  
 
A minimal requirement for a dimension of perceived magnitude16 is that the 
perceptual states are ordered in a transitive fashion, which means that if q2 is (say) 
brighter than q1 and q3 is brighter than q2 then q3 is also brighter than q1. Ideally we 
would want this transitive relation also to be preserved by the neural representation. If 
brightness were represented by mean response amplitude of a neural population and 
one stimulus is perceived as brighter than another then we also want its neural 
response amplitude to be higher: 
 
Representation of perceived magnitude: ))(),((),(:, 212121 qfqfBqqAQqq ⇒∈∀  
 
where A is a relation defined over the perceptual dimension (such as for example “is 
brighter than”) and B is a relation defined over the neural population (e.g. “has a higher 
response amplitude than”). This requires the preservation of a relational property of a 
perceptual dimension by the neural dimension and goes beyond the mapping requirements 
formulated above. It postulates an isomorphism to hold between a dimension of perception 
and a property of the neural dimension representing it. The idea that the neural population 
representing a perceptual dimension has to preserve its order has a long history (Fechner, 
1860; Mueller, 1896) and has been especially propagated by Gestalt theory (Koehler, 1920; 
Metzger, 1963; Stadler & Kruse, 1994). 
 
Representation and strong necessity 
After having assessed that a neural population N can fulfil the mapping requirements 
the second criterion will need to be tested: Is activity in N necessary for a certain 
dimension of conscious perception? Testing this is not as easy as it may seem. As 
stated above an intact retina can be thought of as “necessary” for visual experiences, 
because destroying both retinae results in peripheral blindness. But visual experiences 
can be caused even in blind people without retinae by directly stimulating visual 
cortex, as shown above (Brindley & Lewin, 1968). So intact retinae are necessary 
only for a specific way of causing visual percepts, namely via distal stimuli. This 
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“necessity” may be thought of as an insufficient but necessary part of an unnecessary 
but sufficient condition (Mackie, 1965). This is known as an INUS-condition17. The 
unnecessary but sufficient condition here is simply one way to cause visual percepts, 
namely by visual stimulation through the retina. In this causal chain the retina is 
necessary, but not in others. When we are interested in perceptual representation, 
however, we want activity in that neural population to be a necessary part of every 
sufficient condition. Necessary in the sense used here means absolutely or strongly 
necessary. We require that there is no sufficient condition that does not have the 
necessary condition as part of it.  
 
Definition: Weak necessity 
Activity in a neural population is weakly necessary for a certain class of 
visual percepts if activity in that neural population is a necessary but 
insufficient part of at least one unnecessary but sufficient condition under 
which such percepts can be produced. 
 
Definition: Strong necessity 
Activity in a neural population is strongly necessary for a certain class of 
visual percepts if activity in that neural population is a necessary but 
insufficient part of all sufficient conditions under which such percepts can 
be produced. 
 
Strong necessity involves weak necessity, namely weak necessity in the entire set of 
sufficient conditions. The former (weak) necessity is easy to prove. All one has to do 
is for example destroy the retinae and observe if visual perception is disrupted. But 
how do we assess strong necessity? This is very difficult because it is a statement 
about the set of all possible sufficient conditions, which may be infinite and thus does 
not lend itself to empirical testing. All we can do is assume that a certain neural 
population is strongly necessary if under all conditions so far studied it has been 
weakly necessary, i.e. there has never been a case where a visual percept occurred 
without activity in that neural population. This can be tested by two different research 
strategies. On the one hand we can test if this particular visual percept could occur 
despite disrupting activity in the neural population, either by lesions or by temporal 
inactivation, say using transcranial magnetic stimulation. On the other hand we can 
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test if it is possible to evoke a certain percept by stimulating a different area when we 
can be sure that the neural population under investigation is not affected. In either 
case we could falsify the claim of strong necessity. So we can formulate an empirical 
criterion of strong necessity that splits up into two empirical sub-conditions: 
 
Empirical criterion of strong necessity 
Activity in a neural population can be justifiably assumed to be strongly 
necessary for a certain class of visual percepts (according to the best 
currently available scientific knowledge) if (1) in every case studied so far 
the disruption of activity in that population has lead to a loss of percepts of 
that class (“selective disruption”) and (2) no case has been shown where it 
was possible to evoke this class of percepts without activating that neural 
population (“selective stimulation”). 
 
Selective disruption 
To test the first condition that selective disruption of the neural population does not 
spare perceptual dimension Q one would in theory have to examine every case where 
a candidate area was lesioned and show that visual percepts of a specific class were 
always lost. This will lead to a set of areas of varying specificity. On the one hand we 
will find areas that are highly selective because they are strongly necessary only for 
certain subclasses of visual percepts. In all cases so far studied MT lesions have 
always lead to deficits in motion perception (akinetopsia), certain fusiform lesions 
have always lead to deficits in face perception (prosopagnosia) and lesions of V1 and 
V2 have always lead to visual field deficits such as scotoma and hemianopias 
(Heywood & Cowey, 1998; Heywood & Cowey, 1987; Heywood, Gadotti, & Cowey, 
1992; Holmes & Lister, 1916; Horton & Hoyt, 1991a, 1991b; Kitajima et al., 1998; 
McFadzean & Hadley, 1997; Spalding, 1952; Zeki, 1991; Zihl et al., 1983)18. On the 
other hand we will find conditions that are strongly necessary for more general classes 
of percepts, such as activity in the brainstem reticular formation. The background 
conditions wakefulness and access have been discussed in chapter 1. Although these 
are strongly necessary they are ruled out because they do not fulfil the mapping 
requirements stated above. 
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A different, less dramatic method to study selective disruption is transcranial 
magnetic stimulation (TMS)(Fig. 10). TMS was first introduced by Barker in 1985 
and is a non-invasive and painless method to induce cortical currents through the 
intact skull (Barker, Jalinous, & Freeston, 1985). In contrast to electrocortical 
stimulation TMS has the advantage of being available for normal subjects19. TMS can 
be used to disrupt visual processing with great temporal and acceptable spatial 
precision. Fig. 11 shows an experiment where TMS pulses are applied above the 
occipital pole at varying intervals after a target stimulus was presented. At a time 
delay of around 100 ms target processing is strongly disrupted, suggesting that 
processing at this time in the region of V1/V2 is necessary for perception. 
 
 
 
Fig. 10: In TMS short pulses of electrical current of up to 8000 A are induced in a 
stimulation coil (A) for less than 1 ms. This induces a magnetic field surrounding the 
coil which in turn induces an electric field which induces an intracortical current 
(Walsh & Rushworth, 1999). Here a double coil is shown with its coil current (dashed 
white arrows) and tissue current (black arrows)20. (B) Relative positions of coil and 
primary and secondary visual cortices are shown here on a sagittal T1-weighted 
anatomical MR image. The position of the foveal representation of V1 is on the 
posterior surface of the brain and can be reasonably well estimated as 2 cm above the 
Inion (In)21. 
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Fig. 11: Disruptive effects of a TMS pulse applied over the occipital pole on 
perception of a target (T) as a function of time between target and magnetic pulse 
(reproduced after Amassian et al., 1993). The exact cause of the disruptive effect is 
not clear to date but it is typically considered to be caused by inhibitory post synaptic 
potentials due to the induced current, which is supported by the finding of decreases 
in regional blood flow with increased magnetic stimulation (Paus & Wolforth, 1998). 
 
Selective stimulation 
The second condition (that it is not possible to evoke the class of visual experiences 
by stimulation of a different neural population without at the same time stimulating 
the area of interest) can be addressed by direct cortical stimulation. As mentioned 
above with this method it is possible to set the starting point of a neural cascade of 
events more precisely than by distal stimulation22. In this way it is possible to activate 
certain cortical areas directly, bypassing the afferent pathways. It can be used to 
assess whether an early visual area (cortical or subcortical) is a necessary condition by 
stimulating successively higher visual areas and checking whether a sensation along 
the visual dimension of interest can still be evoked. If it is possible to evoke a certain 
class of visual experiences by stimulating area Vn in the visual hierarchy then it could 
be argued that areas V1 to Vn-1 are not necessary, as long as signal spread backwards 
to these areas can be excluded23. The main strength is that it can be used to falsify a 
hypothesis that an area is strongly necessary for a specific class of visual percepts. For 
example the retina is not strongly necessary because direct electrical stimulation of 
the visual cortex also leads to visual sensations. Data on direct (intracranial) cortical 
stimulation is rare because it is only available from clinical studies24. An alternative 
for studies in normal subjects is TMS, which can also be used to elicit phosphenes 
when applied over visual areas (Cowey & Walsh, 2001).  
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Summary 
Two formal criteria have been developed to assess whether basic mapping 
requirements between perceptual and neural states are fulfilled. The first requires that 
the same perceptual state must co-occur with the same neural state under repeated 
occurrences, even if the perceptual state is produced by very different stimuli. The 
second requires that different perceptual states always co-occur with different neural 
states. An additional formal criterion is relevant for dimensions of perceptual 
magnitude. It assesses whether isomorphism holds between relations defined on 
perceptual states and relations defined on the neural states representing them. 
Furthermore the criterion of strong necessity has to be met.  
 
This has lead to 6 empirical criteria that are summarized in Tab. 1. These criteria can 
be used to test and falsify the hypothesis that a neural population represents a certain 
dimension of conscious perception. In the following two chapters these criteria will be 
applied to re-examine data from previous studies on representation of several feature 
dimensions. Chapter 3 will present evidence that the feature dimensions perceived 
colour, perceived motion and perceived object identity are likely to be represented in 
extrastriate visual cortex. Chapter 4 will demonstrate that primary visual cortex is the 
most promising candidate for the representation of the low-level visual feature 
dimensions perceived brightness and perceived contrast. In chapter 5 a study on 
perceived contrast will be presented. This study will demonstrate that for perceived 
contrast all criteria formulated here are fulfilled by neural processes in primary visual 
cortex. 
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Formal criterion Empirical falsification criteria 
 
Single-valuedness 
 
 
Repeated occurrences of the same percept (e.g. in a constancy 
paradigm) lead to different activation patterns in neural 
population N 
 
 
Injectivity 
 
Failure of covariance of neural population N when a percept 
changes along a dimension of interest 
 
Lack of grain or resolution of neural population N to 
represent differences between percepts 
 
 
Isomorphism 
 
Lack of preservation of a relational property between two 
perceptual states in their neural representation 
 
 
 
Necessity 
 
 
Any percept including dimension Q after lesioning or 
disrupting processing in neural population N 
 
Any percept including dimension Q by stimulation of a 
different population than N when it can be excluded that 
neural population N was activated 
 
 
 
Tab. 1: Summary of empirical falsification criteria. The postulate that neural 
population N represents the conscious feature dimension Q would be falsified if any 
of the empirical criteria (right) were answered with “yes”. 
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Chapter 3 
Representation of high-level features in 
extrastriate visual cortex 
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Colour 
Human brain imaging studies have shown that many cortical visual areas (V1, V2, 
V3/VP, V4, V4α/V8) respond strongly to pure colour stimuli, i.e. their activity 
covaries with stimuli changing only in colour contrast where luminance contrast is 
kept zero or constant (Beauchamp, Haxby, Jennings, & DeYoe, 1999; Chao & Martin, 
1999; Engel, Zhang, & Wandell, 1997; Hadjikhani et al., 1998; Kleinschmidt, Lee, 
Requardt, & Frahm, 1996; Lueck et al., 1989; McKeefry & Zeki, 1997). Even the MT 
complex can be driven by isoluminant colour stimuli (Seidemann, Poirson, Wandell, 
& Newsome, 1999; Wandell et al., 1999). Monkey single-cell studies originally 
suggested that V4 is the main cortical colour processing module because it was shown 
to have a large number of colour selective cells (Zeki, 1973). In humans an area on 
the border of the inferior occipital and temporal lobes also responded stronger to 
colour-defined than to luminance-defined Mondrian stimuli in early PET studies and 
was subsequently believed to be the human homologue of monkey area V4 (Bartels & 
Zeki, 2000; Lueck et al., 1989; Zeki et al., 1991).  
 
However as research progressed the colour sensitivity of monkey V4 was questioned 
because subsequent studies often failed to show an abundance of colour sensitive cells 
in this area (Dean, 1979; Heywood et al., 1992; Schein, Marrocco, & de Monasterio, 
1982). Also V4 was shown to be strongly involved in other visual processes such as 
form perception and spatial attention (Allison et al., 1993; Gallant, Braun, & Van 
Essen, 1993; Gallant, Connor, Rakshit, Lewis, & Van Essen, 1996; Moran & 
Desimone, 1985; Schiller, 1993; Walsh, Butler, Carden, & Kulikowski, 1992). In 
subsequent research regions further anterior on the monkey temporal lobe were 
demonstrated to have a high population of colour selective cells (Cowey & Heywood, 
1995; Heywood, Gaffan, & Cowey, 1995; Komatsu, Ideura, Kaji, & Yamane, 1992). 
Furthermore several functional imaging studies demonstrated that a region anterior to 
the purported human V4 was strongly activated by colour stimuli (Bartels & Zeki, 
2000; Beauchamp et al., 1999; Hadjikhani et al., 1998; Lueck et al., 1989). There was 
great debate as to the precise location and nomenclature of this region (V4α or V8), 
especially as it was defined by different authors either on anatomical considerations or 
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by retinotopic mapping (Fig. 12). Hadjikhani and coworkers (1998) for example 
found no colour sensitivity in V4 but only in the more anterior retinotopically defined 
V825.  
 
V8 activity is more closely correlated to conscious colour perception than V4, 
because it is the only area that has been demonstrated to respond to perceived colour-
aftereffects (Hadjikhani et al., 1998). Direct cortical stimulation studies show that 
colour sensations are mostly evoked by sites at the fusiform and lingual gyri, again 
matching both V4 and V8. Stimulation at other sites (such as V1, V2 or MT) does not 
lead to colour sensations (Brindley, Donaldson, Falconer, & Rushton, 1972; Brindley 
& Lewin, 1968; Dobelle, Mladejovsky, & Girvin, 1974; Lee et al., 2000)26.  
 
 
Fig. 12: The two proposed colour areas (overlaid on a retinotopic map taken from 
Tootell et al. 2000): V4 is the first colour area of Zeki and V8 refers to the second 
colour area termed by other authors V4α (Bartels & Zeki, 2000; Hadjikhani et al., 
1998). 
 
The phenomenon of colour constancy can help assess the criterion of single-
valuedness by examining whether physically different stimuli that are perceived to 
have the same colour hue are neurally encoded in the same way. It is known that the 
perceived colour hue of an area in the visual field depends on the spectral statistics of 
the surrounding areas (Judd, 1940; Land, 1959a, 1959b)27. This reflects the ability of 
the visual system to discard for the effect of the spectral composition of the 
illumination. Several studies have indicated that a subpopulation of cells in V4 exhibit 
colour constancy whereas neurons in V1 and V2 do not (Kusunoki, Moutoussis, & 
Zeki, 2001; Moutoussis & Zeki, 2002; Zeki, 1983)28. 
 
It has long been shown that intact cortex around the border of fusiform and lingual 
gyri is necessary for colour perception, because lesions of this region in human 
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subjects always lead to impaired colour perception up to the complete loss of colour 
vision (Damasio et al., 1980; Zeki, 1990)29. Also, lesions to this region that spare V1 
typically lead to a loss of colour perception (Le et al., 2002). Due to the extent of most 
lesions it is not possible to say whether this “achromatopsia” is due to a loss of area 
V4 or V8. The fact that direct cortical stimulation in the region of V4/V8 leads to 
colour perception whereas stimulation of other areas typically does not, could mean 
that early visual areas V1 and V2 are not strongly necessary for colour percepts, as 
long as backflow of signals from V4/V8 can be excluded. Furthermore lesions in area 
MT+ of the dorsal visual stream typically have no effect on colour perception (Vaina, 
1994). 
 
Summary 
Areas V8 and V4 show a tight covariation with purely chromatic stimulus changes. 
Some evidence also points towards the fact that V4 responds to perceived colour hue 
independent of illumination conditions, indicating that the single-valuedness criterion 
may be met in V4. V8 but not V4 responds to perceived colour after-images. Little is 
known about whether V8 shows colour-constancy and whether responses in either V4 
or V8 can account for the grain of colour space. Lesion studies and direct cortical 
stimulation studies reveal that the area around the human fusiform and lingual gyri is 
most likely to be the only colour sensitive area that is strongly necessary for conscious 
colour perception. Thus, V4 and V8 are the only regions in which perceived colour 
hue could be directly represented, but between these two the matter is still open. A 
study of colour constancy in V8 could help resolve this issue. 
 
Motion 
Functional brain imaging studies in humans have shown that a number of visual areas 
(V1, V3A, V4, MT+, KO, LOC) respond strongly when stimulated with moving as 
compared to stationary or flickering stimuli (Fig. 13)(Albright, 1992; Culham et al., 
2001; Dupont et al., 1997; Dupont, Orban, De Bruyn, Verbruggen, & Mortelmans, 
1994; Greenlee, 2000; Smith, Greenlee, Singh, Kraemer, & Hennig, 1998; Tootell et 
al., 1997; Tootell, Reppas, Dale et al., 1995; Zeki et al., 1991)30. In monkeys the most 
specialised areas for visual motion processing are MT and MST, where most cells are 
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direction selective (Lagae, Maes, Raiguel, Xiao, & Orban, 1994)31. In most human 
brain imaging studies MT and MST have not been separated and are combined to the 
so-called motion complex MT+, which is located in the region between inferior 
temporal sulcus and lateral occipital sulcus (Dumoulin et al., 2000)32.  
 
 
 
Fig. 13: Major cortical areas involved in motion processing (overlaid on a retinotopic 
map taken from Tootell et al. 2000): MT+ is buried in the inferior temporal sulcus and 
is only visible after inflating the surface. 
 
Monkey MT/MST and human MT+ show the closest level of covariance with 
conscious motion perception. During binocular rivalry MT responds to purely 
perceptual changes of motion direction (Logothetis & Schall, 1989) and in humans it 
responds to purely perceptual changes of motion direction in multistable stimuli 
(Sterzer, Russ, Preibisch, & Kleinschmidt, 2002). MT/MT+ also responds to apparent 
motion stimuli, precisely within the displacement limits for which humans perceive 
apparent motion (Goebel, Khorram-Sefat, Muckli, Hacker, & Singer, 1998; Kaneoke, 
Bundou, Koyama, Suzuki, & Kakigi, 1997; Mikami, Newsome, & Wurtz, 1986). 
When two gratings drifting in different directions are superimposed, human observers 
perceive motion in the direction of the compound pattern rather in the direction of the 
component gratings (Fig. 14). In accord with human perception a percentage of cells 
in MT/MT+ is known to respond to the direction of pattern rather than component 
motion (Adelson & Movshon, 1982; Huk & Heeger, 2002; Stoner & Albright, 
1992b). MT+ even responds in cases where motion is perceived without a moving 
stimulus. It responds during perception of illusory motion figures (Zeki, Watson, & 
Frackowiak, 1993), during imagined motion (Goebel et al., 1998), during perceptual 
motion aftereffects (Culham et al., 1999; He et al., 1998; Huk, Ress, & Heeger, 2001; 
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Tootell, Reppas, Dale et al., 1995) and even during perception of stimuli with implied 
motion (Kourtzi & Kanwisher, 2000).  
 
Cortical microstimulation of MT can also induce a perceptual bias in motion direction 
judgement tasks in monkeys (Celebrini & Newsome, 1995; Salzman, Britten, & 
Newsome, 1990; Salzman, Murasugi, Britten, & Newsome, 1992). Transcranial as 
well as direct cortical stimulation of MT+ in epilepsy patients can induce motion 
hallucinations (Lee et al., 2000; Pascual-Leone & Walsh, 2001; Penfield & 
Rasmussen, 1950). However movement sensations can also be induced by direct 
cortical stimulation of V1 (Lee et al., 2000), which could be due to signal flow from 
V1 to MT+, which have strong mutual projections (Felleman & Van Essen, 1991). 
Stimulation of other areas rarely leads to motion perception (Lee et al., 2000) 
indicating that motion perception fails to correlate with activity in these areas. 
 
 
Fig. 14: Component versus pattern motion. The plots show the responses of direction 
selective neurons to motion as a function of angle. The distance from the centre 
indicates the response amplitude. The small circle outside the large circle symbolises 
to the receptive field. When a human observer views the patterns through the circular 
aperture he will perceive the direction indicated by the broken arrow. (A) Response 
profile of a direction selective neuron shows preferred direction of approx. 315°. (B) 
A component motion cell with a direction preference of 315° when measured with 
single gratings will respond to a superposition of two gratings that are drifting in 
orthogonal directions maximally when either of the components drifts in the preferred 
direction. (C) A pattern motion cell responds maximally when the pattern (to be 
precise its crossings) drifts in the preferred direction. Neuron B cannot be said to 
represent perceived direction of pattern motion, whereas neuron C can. (Movshon, 
Adelson, Gizzi, & Newsome, 1986). 
 
In monkeys individual and pooled single unit responses in MT and MST have been 
shown to have a sensitivity comparable to psychophysical performance (Britten, 
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Shadlen, Newsome, & Movshon, 1992; Celebrini & Newsome, 1994; Mikami et al., 
1986; Newsome, Mikami, & Wurtz, 1986; Shadlen, Britten, Newsome, & Movshon, 
1996), suggesting that they can account for the grain of perceived motion. A fact that 
may question whether the grain is available is that motion trajectories are clearly 
localisable in visual space whereas MT+ is only coarsely retinopic (Gattass & Gross, 
1981).  
 
Other cortical areas have been demonstrated to play a major role in motion 
processing, but it is not clear how they relate to conscious motion perception. Among 
these are V3A, which is involved in direction discrimination (Cornette et al., 1998), 
motion imagery (Goebel et al., 1998), and perception of second order motion (Smith 
et al., 1998), 3D shape from motion (Paradis et al., 2000) and presumably also flow 
fields (de Jong, Shipp, Skidmore, Frackowiak, & Zeki, 1994)33. A further area was 
identified by different authors as kinetic occipital (KO) (Dupont et al., 1997; Orban et 
al., 1995; Van Oostende, Sunaert, Van Hecke, Marchal, & Orban, 1997) or V3B 
(Smith et al., 1998). It lies very close but slightly posterior to MT+34 and is sensitive 
to borders where coherent motion fields change direction35. This could be used to 
segment borders of objects (Dupont et al., 1997; Orban et al., 1995; Paradis et al., 
2000; Van Oostende et al., 1997). Surprisingly areas in the ventral visual stream that 
are specialised for shape and object processing (Milner & Goodale, 1995; Ungerleider 
& Mishkin, 1982) also contain motion sensitive neurons. Among these areas are V4, 
which contains cells that are selective to direction of motion (Desimone & Schein, 
1987; Tolias, Smirnakis, Augath, Trinath, & Logothetis, 2001) and the so-called 
lateral occipital complex (LOC) that responds strongly to objects defined by motion 
cues (Grill-Spector, Kushnir, Edelman, Itzchak, & Malach, 1998) and to motion 
coherence (Braddick, O'Brien, Wattam-Bell, Atkinson, & Turner, 2000). Although 
these other motion areas covary with certain aspects of motion perception their role in 
representation of perceived motion is not clear. 
  
Perceived motion can be evoked by movement of borders defined by various low-
level cues (see Fig. 5, chapter 2). Area MT+ responds to motion defined by most cues 
such as luminance (Smith et al., 1998; Tootell, Reppas, Kwong et al., 1995), colour 
(Saito, Tanaka, Isono, Yasuda, & Mikami, 1989; Seidemann et al., 1999; Tootell, 
Reppas, Kwong et al., 1995; Wandell et al., 1999), contrast (Albright, 1992; Smith et 
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al., 1998) and even illusory contours (Seghier et al., 2000). Even responses to 
coherent motion are form-cue invariant in MT (Stoner & Albright, 1992a). This may 
be a first hint towards single-valuedness. However to fully support this hypothesis it 
would be necessary to demonstrate that the population response in MT+ is the same 
when the same perceived direction of motion is evoked by different cues. A result 
pointing in this direction is that population responses in monkey MT can be used to 
account for the perceived direction of movement of “motion metamers”. Observers 
cannot distinguish more that two sets of superimposed random dot patterns moving in 
independent directions and perceive only two sets. This means that physically very 
different stimuli can lead to the same motion percept. This can be explained by the 
specific mechanisms with which MT recovers motion directions from population 
activity (Treue et al., 2000; Williams, Tweten, & Sekuler, 1991).  
 
Using electrocortical stimulation in epilepsy patients and TMS in normal subjects it 
has been shown that disruption of processing in MT+ leads to a reduction or even 
complete loss of motion perception (Beckers & Homberg, 1992; Beckers & Zeki, 
1995; Blanke, Landis, Safran, & Seeck, 2002; Hotson, Braun, Herzberg, & Boman, 
1994), whereas stimulation over V1 only has weak effects (Beckers & Zeki, 1995). 
Using direct cortical stimulation over human MT+ it is possible to disrupt motion 
perception as selectively as single motion directions (Blanke et al., 2002). Patients 
with lesions in the region of the occipito-parieto-temporal junction, corresponding to 
the location of MT+, often have cortical motion blindness or “akinetopsia” (McLeod, 
Heywood, Driver, & Zihl, 1989; Plant, Laxer, Barbaro, Schiffman, & Nakayama, 
1993; Rizzo, Nawrot, & Zihl, 1995; Zeki, 1991; Zihl et al., 1983; Zihl, von Cramon, 
Mai, & Schmid, 1991). However a closer look at these cases reveals that even for the 
prototypical and clearest case of akinetopsia demonstrated so far, patient L.Y. (Baker, 
Hess, & Zihl, 1991; Hess, Baker, & Zihl, 1989; McLeod et al., 1989; Rizzo et al., 
1995; Zihl et al., 1983; Zihl et al., 1991), the loss of motion perception is far from 
absolute and is better characterised as partial and highly selective (“semi-
akinetopsia”). Although she can be assumed to have bilateral lesions in MT+ (Zihl et 
al., 1983; Zihl et al., 1991) she still has considerable residual motion vision, especially 
at lower velocities, below approx. 15 deg/s (Rizzo et al., 1995; Zihl et al., 1991). No 
patient has been reported so far to have a complete loss of motion perception with an 
intact visual field for detection and acuity36. There is also evidence for spared 
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perception of biological motion after MT+ lesions (Vaina, Lemay, Bienfang, Choi, & 
Nakayama, 1990). 
 
It is clear that several visual areas are not necessary for motion perception. Patients 
with severe deficits in perception of colours, shapes and objects after lesions to areas 
in the occipito-temporal areas show normal performance on motion tasks (Gallant, 
Shoup, & Mazer, 2000; Vaina, 1994; Vaina, Cowey, Eskew, LeMay, & Kemper, 
2001), providing evidence that the ventral stream is not strongly necessary for motion 
perception. Evidence that primary visual cortex is not necessary for motion perception 
comes from patients with Riddoch syndrome. This refers to patients who are blind due 
to lesions in V1 (and possibly parts of V2) and show no residual object discrimination 
but nonetheless report to see pure objectless motion qualia, perhaps similar to 
Wertheimer’s “pure phi” motion (Wertheimer, 1912)37. Riddoch syndrome was first 
described in the early 20th century (Riddoch, 1917; Zeki & Ffytche, 1998). Residual 
motion perception in Riddoch patients is different from blindsight because subjects 
report to consciously perceive motion rather than just perform above chance with the 
subjective impression of guessing. The Riddoch syndrome shows that visual 
awareness of motion is possible without V138.  
 
 
Summary 
There is strong support for a direct link between neural processes in MT+ and visual 
awareness of motion. Lesions to MT+ as well as disruption of MT+ lead to disruption 
of motion perception. Lesions to most other visual areas (even V1) can leave motion 
perception selectively spared, meaning that they are not strongly necessary for motion 
percepts. Processing in MT+ is not a necessary condition for every type of motion 
perception, simply because lesions to MT+ can spare perception of slow motion and 
of biological motion. This is in contrast to colour perception that can be completely 
disrupted by very local lesions in the fusiform gyrus. However MT+ is strongly 
necessary for perception of fast movement. Furthermore MT+ is the region that fulfils 
the mapping criteria best. It produces motion sensations that most closely match 
perception and can even account for the grain of motion perception. MT+ shows the 
strongest invariance as to the low-level cues by which motion is defined and can even 
account for the perception of “motion metamers”, meaning that it may also fulfil the 
 41 
 
criterion of single-valuedness. It seems that no single visual area can account for all 
motion qualia, but MT+ can account well for perception of fast motion39. 
 
Shape and objects 
The main cortical sites of object processing reside in temporal cortex between the 
occipito-temporal junction and the inferior temporal lobe (Fig. 15). The main areas 
are V4, TEO and TE in monkeys (TEO and TE are often jointly named IT) and V4, 
lateral occipital (LO) and posterior fusiform gyrus (pFs) in humans40. These areas are 
typically labelled the “what” or “ventral” stream of visual processing (Livingstone & 
Hubel, 1988; Milner & Goodale, 1995; Ungerleider & Mishkin, 1982). Outside the 
ventral visual stream object selective activity can also be found in the kinetic occipital 
area (KO), which is also located around the occipito-temporal junction (Dupont et al., 
1997; Orban et al., 1995; Van Oostende et al., 1997) and processes shapes defined by 
motion borders; furthermore in MT+ (Kourtzi, Bulthoff, Erb, & Grodd, 2002), the 
parietal lobe around area V7 (Grill-Spector et al., 2001), and in hippocampus and 
amygdala41. However, very little is known about the role of these other visual areas in 
object perception. 
 
Local contours 
Processing of shapes and objects involves a succession of stages, each with an 
increasing level of abstraction. For this reason successive areas covary with 
increasingly abstract properties of shapes and objects as one proceeds down the 
ventral processing stream. First of all the visual field has to be segmented into areas 
separated by contours. These contours can be defined by texture or motion borders 
and even by remote inducers as in the Kanizsa triangle. Single cells respond to most 
of these contours (even to illusory contours) as early as V1 (Grosof, Shapley, & 
Hawken, 1993; Lamme, Rodriguez-Rodriguez, & Spekreijse, 1999; Lee & Nguyen, 
2001; Reppas et al., 1997; Sheth, Sharma, Rao, & Sur, 1996) and V2 (Reppas et al., 
1997; Sheth et al., 1996; von der Heydt, Peterhans, & Baumgartner, 1984).  
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Fig. 15: The major cortical areas involved in processing objects (overlaid on a 
retinotopic map by Tootell et al. 2000). The lateral occipital complex LOC is mapped 
differently by several groups. Grill-Spector and coworkers subdivide it into lateral 
occipital (LO, black and white dashed line) and posterior fusiform (pFs, black and red 
dashed line). Sometimes LOa (lateral occipital anterior) is used instead of pFs but that 
is slightly misleading because the pFs is located on the temporal and not on the 
occipital lobe (Grill-Spector et al., 2001). PFs is believed to contain further 
subdivisions, e.g. regions processing mainly faces (fusiform face area, FFA) or letters. 
It is to date not clear how the functionally defined LOC relates to the retinotopically 
defined areas such as V4 and V8. The kinetic occipital area (KO, also mapped by 
other authors as V4d on retinotopic grounds) is strongly involved in processing 
motion boundaries (Dupont et al., 1997; Orban et al., 1995; Van Oostende et al., 
1997). 
 
With Jochen Braun from Plymouth University I have recently conducted a study that 
allowed to study contour processing without changing any local feature statistics 
(Braun, Haynes, & Heinze, 2002). These stimuli were introduced by David Field and 
consist of fields of randomly oriented Gabor patches within which the perception of 
contours is evoked purely by changing the orientation of the elements (Fig. 
16A)(Field, Hayes, & Hess, 1993). Long snake-like figures can be generated as long 
as the angle between the axes of successive elements does not exceed 60°. This type 
of contour integration can be explained by the contextual modulation of receptive 
field properties of cells in primary visual cortex. A receptive field (RF) is defined as 
the region in the visual field that – when stimulated with a “suitable” stimulus - can 
directly lead to a change in a cell’s spike rate. It was found however, that stimuli 
placed beyond this “classical” receptive field could modulate spike rates when the 
classical RF was already stimulated by an optimal stimulus, although they could not 
drive the classical RF directly (Allman, Miezin, & McGuinness, 1985; Fitzpatrick, 
2000; Kapadia, Westheimer, & Gilbert, 2000; Maffei & Fiorentini, 1976; Nelson & 
Frost, 1978, 1985; Sengpiel, Sen, & Blakemore, 1997). In most studies these 
influences “from beyond the classical receptive field” are found to be inhibitory for 
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surround stimuli iso-oriented to the classical RF’s preferred orientation and neutral to 
excitatory at orthogonal orientations (Blakemore & Tobin, 1972; Levitt & Lund, 
1997; Nelson & Frost, 1978; Sengpiel et al., 1997; Walker, Ohzawa, & Freeman, 
1999), although there are occasional deviations from this pattern (Kapadia, Ito, 
Gilbert, & Westheimer, 1995; Maffei & Fiorentini, 1976) 42. Several authors (Kapadia 
et al., 1995; Kapadia et al., 2000; Nelson & Frost, 1985) have demonstrated that the 
effect for iso-oriented stimuli is not isotropic but instead is excitatory if the surround 
stimulus in on the main axis of the receptive field and inhibitory at the sides (Fig. 
16B). This is a natural candidate to explain contour integration for the snake-stimuli, 
because contours are perceived precisely when successive contours fall within each 
other’s enhancement fields. 
 
 
Fig. 16: (A) “Snake” contour stimuli: Array of randomly oriented Gabor-patches into 
which a curved contour was inserted (connecting the two white dots) by constraining 
the orientation difference of successive elements to a maximum of 60°. (B) Fields of 
surround suppression and enhancement for a simple cell in primary visual cortex 
(schematically reproduced from Kapadia et al. 2000). The greyscale plot in the centre 
shows the linear response profile of the classical receptive field, in this case with a 
horizontal orientation tuning. The dashed white line shows the border of the classical 
RF. The fields in the surround show regions where a surround stimulus that is iso-
oriented to the classical RF and does not change the cell’s spike rate when presented 
alone nonetheless exerts an excitatory (+) or suppressive (-) influence upon the 
response when the classical RF is optimally stimulated. 
 
We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to assess the involvement of 
extrastriate and striate cortex in contour integration. Stimuli were Gabor stimuli 
matched to the V1 receptive field properties (Daugman, 1985; Marcelja, 1980) (Fig. 
17, left). Stimuli were presented in two ways: (A) In a mini-block design as 
alternating sequences of 9 random and 9 contour stimuli with an inter-stimulus 
interval (ISI) of 1 second; (B) As a randomised sequence spaced by randomised 
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(exponentially distributed) inter-stimulus intervals of 1 to 5 seconds (Hinrichs et al., 
2000). In both experiments contour stimuli evoked stronger activation as random 
stimuli in large areas of cortex previously related to contour and object perception 
(LO, LOa, V4v and V4d/KO), shown in Fig. 17 (right) for the mini-block condition. 
However we found only weak enhancement in primary visual cortex.  
 
 
Fig. 17: Visual responses to contour integration: Lateral occipital areas. The two 
figures on the left are Gabor stimuli designed to match the receptive field properties 
of primary visual cortex. In the “random” stimulus orientations were chosen 
randomly, whereas in the “contour” stimulus they were chosen to yield integrated 
contours. The figure on the right shows how several visual areas typically involved in 
shape perception (LO, V4 and weaker LOa) respond stronger to the uniform stimulus 
than the random stimulus. 
 
A closer inspection of the activation time-courses of single striate voxels revealed a 
strong saturation effect, most likely due to saturation of the BOLD-signal rather than 
neural adaptation effects. So we chose to change the timing parameters to a spaced 
event-related design with an ISI of 16 seconds. We also ran “localiser-scans” using 
high-contrast checkerboard annuli and mapped the horizontal and vertical meridians 
in order to be able to restrict our analysis to primary visual cortex. This revealed a 
clearly stronger activation of primary visual cortex by contour stimuli (Fig. 18A,B). 
We also recorded EEG and MEG evoked responses, which revealed that the contour-
integration response builds up in V1 only at a later stage of processing (Fig. 18C). At 
an early stage of processing the random stimuli evoked stronger responses. This could 
be due to either feedback from extrastriate cortex or propagation of neural signals 
along horizontal connections linking iso-oriented orientation columns  (Gilbert, 1992; 
Gilbert & Wiesel, 1979; Malach, Amir, Harel, & Grinvald, 1993; Martin & 
Whitteridge, 1984; Mitchison & Crick, 1982; Rockland, Lund, & Humphrey, 1982; 
Schmidt, Kim, Singer, Bonhoeffer, & Lowel, 1997).  
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This study presents evidence that contour integration without any corresponding 
changes in low-level features (such as luminance) is present as early as primary visual 
cortex. Thus “pure contours” could be represented in V1, although at this point it 
cannot be said if the V1 representation is an epiphenomenal feedback effect from 
higher visual areas. 
 
 
Fig. 18: Visual responses to contour integration in primary visual cortex (averaged 
across 6 subjects). (A) Event-related time-courses of BOLD-fMRI signal change in 
the region of primary visual cortex shown in (B). Red and green are the responses to 
random and uniform stimuli respectively (see Fig. 17, left). The stimulus containing 
the integrated contour clearly evokes a stronger response in V1. (Error bars = +/- 1 
SEM). (C) Event-related MEG response to a left occipital sensor. The arrows point to 
the early feed-forward and late feedback responses presumably generated in V1. As 
can be seen during the first processing stage the random stimulus evokes stronger 
activity in V1, whereas at the feedback stage (which shows an inverted topology to 
the early response) the response to the collinear stimulus is stronger. 
 
Intermediate shapes 
Following the major projections of the monkey ventral stream the next major area is 
V4, which is generally considered a site of intermediate shape processing (Desimone 
& Schein, 1987; Gallant et al., 1993; Gallant et al., 1996; Pasupathy & Connor, 1999). 
On the one hand V4 neurons respond well to typical V1 stimuli such as gratings 
(Desimone & Schein, 1987). On the other hand they also show a selectivity to stimuli 
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defined in other than Cartesian basis systems such as polar or hyperbolic stimuli 
(Gallant et al., 1993; Gallant et al., 1996; Wilkinson et al., 2000)(Fig. 19).  
 
 
Fig. 19: Complex shape processing in V4: Cartesian, polar and hyperbolic gratings 
similar to those used by Gallant and coworkers (1993). 
 
Complex shapes and objects 
In monkeys, representation of complex shapes begins with inferior temporal areas 
TEO and TE. These areas are still ordered into columns where neighbouring cells 
show similar response profiles for complex geometrical shapes (Fujita, Tanaka, Ito, & 
Cheng, 1992; Tanaka, 1996)43. In human PET and fMRI studies a large cortical area 
covering the lateral occipital cortex and fusiform gyrus can be selectively activated 
during complex shape and object perception which is referred to as the lateral 
occipital complex (LOC)(Grill-Spector et al., 2001; Haxby et al., 1991; Malach et al., 
1995).  
 
LOC is identified functionally (rather than retinotopically) by comparing responses to 
objects versus scrambled objects, a method designed to keep low-level features 
identical and only manipulate the presence or absence of a complex shape (Lerner, 
Hendler, Ben-Bashat, Harel, & Malach, 2001). LOC can be further subdivided into 
the two main areas LO (lateral occipital) and pFs (posterior fusiform) or lateral 
occipital anterior (LOa), which roughly correspond to monkey TEO and TE. Because 
LO and pFs are defined functionally rather than retinotopically it is not clear if in 
some studies LO also includes areas V4v and V8 (see for example Lerner, Hendler, & 
Malach, 2002).  
 
 47 
 
Besides the subdivision into LO and pFs the lateral occipital complex also shows 
subregions that are selective to specific object categories. The most prominent 
example of these submodules is the so-called fusiform face area FFA, which is 
selectively activated by faces versus other objects (Gauthier, Tarr et al., 2000; Haxby 
et al., 1994; Kanwisher et al., 1997; Puce et al., 1995). An additional occipital face 
area (OFA) was also found (OFA, Gauthier, Skudlarski, Gore, & Anderson, 2000) 
and other temporal areas have been found that are selective to different categories 
such as letters (Puce, Allison, Asgari, Gore, & McCarthy, 1996), chairs (Ishai, 
Ungerleider, Martin, Schouten, & Haxby, 1999) or views of houses (Aguirre, Zarahn, 
& D'Esposito, 1998; Epstein & Kanwisher, 1998). More recent functional imaging 
studies have questioned this strong object modularity by demonstrating that the 
fusiform face area is also strongly activated by overlearned novel categories 
(Gauthier, Skudlarski et al., 2000; Gauthier & Tarr, 1997, 2002; Gauthier, Tarr, 
Anderson, Skudlarski, & Gore, 1999; Rossion, Gauthier, Goffaux, Tarr, & 
Crommelinck, 2002; Tarr & Gauthier, 2000)44. Also different categories of objects do 
not activate mutually exclusive regions of cortex, but rather differ in their specific 
pattern of activation in a number of temporal areas (Ishai et al., 2000; Ishai et al., 
1999). This provides evidence that inferior temporal cortex may be rather organized 
in a “featurotopic” fashion holding a “dictionary of complex shapes” (Riesenhuber & 
Poggio, 2000; Tanaka, 1996).  
 
Activity in monkey IT and human LOC correlates not only closely with high-level 
features of objects but also with object perception. When subjects view thresholded 
black and white images as in Fig. 20 (left) they will perceive a complex spatial pattern 
but are often not able to recognize the depicted object. However after exposition to a 
non degraded version of the stimulus (learning phase, Fig. 20, middle) they will 
recognize even a degraded object without problem. This is a prototypical rapid 
perceptual learning process and allows comparison of processing of the same stimulus 
with and without recognition. Dolan compared stimuli before and after recognition 
learning in a PET study (Dolan et al., 1997). The same stimuli evoked stronger 
activity in inferior temporal cortex after recognition learning. A possible 
interpretation of this result is that neurons in inferior temporal cortex respond not only 
to the complex shapes but also to the objects these shapes resemble. Unrecognised 
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stimuli are processed up to the level of complex shape processing, but because they 
are unfamiliar they cannot be assigned to an object category.  
 
However the interpretation is not so straightforward. It can be demonstrated 
behaviourally and physiologically that even unrecognised stimuli are processed up to 
a categorical level. Behaviourally there is evidence for repetition priming for 
unrecognised objects (Bar & Biederman, 1999; James, Humphrey, Gati, Menon, & 
Goodale, 2000).  
 
Rather than using an all-or-nothing rapid learning design the border between 
unrecognised and recognised objects categories can be crossed more gradually by 
employing backward masking designs (Fig. 8, chapter 2). Backwards masking of 
objects has been studied at the level of single cells in monkeys IT (Kovacs, Vogels, & 
Orban, 1995; Rolls, Tovee, & Panzeri, 1999). Kovács and coworkers (1995) recorded 
from shape-selective neurons in macaque area IT with pattern masking stimuli. Even 
for stimuli with strongly reduced discriminability due to masking they found clear 
shape-selective responses. But these responses were temporally brief and were 
interrupted by presentation of the mask. Grill-Spector and coworkers (2000) however 
have shown that in humans the activity in LOC (but not in V1 and in the dorsal 
stream) covaries closely with the perceptual threshold of object awareness. Following 
an interpretation by Kovács et al. (1995) one could assume that awareness requires the 
activity to be integrated over a certain temporal duration in able to be accessed. Thus, 
pattern backwards masking may not be a problem of representation but a problem of 
access. 
 
Further evidence for a close correlation between activity in inferior temporal cortex 
and conscious object perception comes from studies of binocular rivalry. When 
conflicting (non-fusible) stimuli are presented to both eyes (e.g. using prisms, shutter 
glasses or chromatic filters), one of the two inputs will be temporarily suppressed and 
the observer will perceive an alternation between the images presented to the 
individual eyes. In monkeys it has been demonstrated that inferotemporal areas show 
the strongest correlation with the current percept (Leopold & Logothetis, 1999). 
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Fig. 20: Degraded (thresholded) image presented during pre-learning phase that is not 
recognized at the first exposure by most subjects (left). Then in a learning session 
subjects view a non-degraded version of the stimulus (the reader has to turn the page 
upside down to view the stimulus). Afterwards the degraded stimulus is easily 
recognized. 
 
In humans it has been demonstrated that this perceptual alternation occurs in a highly 
category specific fashion. As mentioned above there is a certain degree of categorical 
specialisation in inferior temporal cortex, which is most pronounced for faces and 
houses. If conflicting face and house stimuli are presented to both eyes the dominance 
phases of face and house percepts are strongly correlated with increased activity in the 
corresponding specialised areas (Fig. 21)(Tong, Nakayama, Vaughan, & Kanwisher, 
1998). Further evidence for a close correlation comes from direct cortical stimulation 
of the region of the LOC. In humans this leads to hallucinations of complex objects 
such as animals, faces, body parts and landscapes (Lee et al., 2000; Penfield & 
Rasmussen, 1950). Direct cortical stimulation of regions other than LOC does not 
result in complex object percepts (Lee et al., 2000). 
 
For shape processing there is an increasing tendency towards invariance over local 
cues as one processes down the ventral stream in both monkeys and in humans. It has 
been demonstrated that object representations in monkey inferior temporal cortex are 
largely invariant of cue type (Sary et al., 1993). Human LO and pFs also respond well 
to objects regardless of whether they are defined by texture, colour or motion borders, 
lines or illusory contours (Grill-Spector et al., 1998; Kastner, De Weerd, & 
Ungerleider, 2000; Mendola, Dale, Fischl, Liu, & Tootell, 1999).  
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Fig. 21: (A) Tong et al.’s (1998) binocular rivalry scenario: A green filtered face 
picture and a red filtered house picture are presented superimposed. When left and 
right eyes view the picture through red and green filters respectively only one object 
can be seen in either eye. After a (mostly short) phase of fusion an observer’s 
perception will select only one of the objects and stochastically alternate between the 
two (B). (C) Transition from a dominant face percept to a house percept leads to a 
decrease in activation in face processing areas (FFA) and an increase in house / scene 
processing areas (PPA)(schematically reproduced from Tong 1998). (D) As in C but 
for a transition from house to face. 
 
For shape and object perception even complex types of spatial invariances can be 
found (Fig. 22A). As single-cell recording is practically unavailable in humans the 
generalisation characteristics of single neurons in temporal cortex have to be 
estimated indirectly using an fMRI selective adaptation paradigm. The logic 
employed is that if a neuron generalises across multiple views of an object then 
repeated stimulation with different views of the object should lead to a reduced 
response due to neural adaptation or due to priming (Buckner et al., 1998; for a more 
elaborate interpretation see James et al., 2000; Schacter & Buckner, 1998). Thus the 
degree of response reduction can be taken as a measure of generalisation. Using such 
a repetition paradigm it has been shown that cells in human LOC are largely invariant 
to changes in size and position of objects (Grill-Spector et al., 2001; Grill-Spector et 
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al., 1999)45. Invariance to more complex manipulations was nicely demonstrated in 
monkey inferior temporal cortex (Baylis & Driver, 2001) (Fig. 22B). Baylis and 
Driver examined invariance of IT neurons to contrast polarity, mirror inversion and 
figure-ground reversal. They found a strong correlation between the responses of IT 
neurons to the original stimulus and the contrast inverted and mirror stimuli, but not 
between response to original stimulus and figure-ground inverted stimulus. Invariance 
has also been demonstrated for lighting conditions in monkeys (Hietanen, Perrett, 
Oram, Benson, & Dittrich, 1992), but not in humans (Grill-Spector et al., 1999). 
While there is a strong tendency towards most types of invariance in the inferior 
temporal lobes there is only weak (if any) generalisation over different viewpoints, 
especially over rotations in depth. This has been shown for monkeys (Logothetis & 
Sheinberg, 1996; Perrett, Hietanen, Oram, & Benson, 1992; Tanaka, 1996) and 
humans (Grill-Spector et al., 1999)46. This finding is paralleled by behavioural 
demonstrations of high costs of object rotation (Bulthoff & Edelman, 1992; Bulthoff, 
Edelman, & Tarr, 1995; Logothetis et al., 1994). Thus, there is hardly any evidence of 
object-centred representations in the visual system. 
 
Lesions to the temporal lobes constantly lead to deficits in object processing (Farah, 
1995; Humphreys, 1999). Large lesions typically lead to a general loss of object 
perception whereas small lesions can highly selectively affect single object categories, 
the best studied of which is face perception (Damasio et al., 1980; McNeil & 
Warrington, 1993; Sergent, Ohta, & MacDonald, 1992; Sergent & Signoret, 1992). 
Other selective object recognition deficits have also been found. In one extreme case a 
farmer was reported to be unable to recognize his cows despite intact recognition of 
human faces, a deficit coined “zooagnosia” (Assal, Favre, & Anderes, 1984). Further 
evidence that activity in LOC is necessary for conscious perception of shapes and 
objects comes from transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) and direct cortical 
stimulation of the temporal lobe. TMS pulses applied over Brodman’s area 37 can 
deteriorate performance in picture naming tasks (Stewart, Ellison, Walsh, & Cowey, 
2001). Direct cortical stimulation of the temporal lobes has been shown to interfere 
with object processing in monkeys (Goldrich & Stamm, 1971) and humans (Fried, 
Mateer, Ojemann, Wohns, & Fedio, 1982). Lesions in the region of MT+ do not lead 
to deterioration of shape discrimination and object recognition (Vaina, 1994). 
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Fig. 22: Principles of invariance in shape and object perception. (A) Spatial 
invariances of location, size and rotation: Invariance of location refers to 
representations that do not depend upon where in the visual field an object is 
presented. Invariance to size means that the mapping of visual features is independent 
of the scaling of the object. Viewpoint invariance is the trickiest of all and refers to 
the fact that the representation of an object is invariant to rotation in the frontal plane 
or in depth. Invariance over rotation in the plane is easier to achieve than rotation in 
depth. One instance of an object can be matched to an in-plane rotated exemplar by 
pure 2D rotation of the projection. However rotation in depth can reveal completely 
different parts of object that were previously occluded requiring either exemplars 
from multiple viewpoints or a 3D model for matching (Riesenhuber & Poggio, 2000). 
(B) More complex types are invariances to contrast polarity, mirror image and figure-
ground used by Baylis and Driver (2001). 
 
Summary 
To summarize, the human visual area LOC covaries with conscious perception of 
abstract shape and object properties strongest of all visual areas. In many cases it is 
the only area to covary with object perception. Furthermore there is strong evidence 
for an independence of inferior temporal responses from low-level features, position, 
scale, contrast polarity and mirror-inflection. This is a first hint towards single-
valuedness because it implies that the abstract properties of shapes defined by 
different cues are represented by the same neural population activity. Lesions and 
disruptions in the region of LOC lead to selective deficits of object perception. Little 
can be currently said on the grain of representation, because no discrimination studies 
are available. Together these results strongly support the claim that conscious 
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representation of complex shapes and objects occurs in the human lateral occipital 
complex. 
 
Summary: High-level features and extrastriate visual cortex 
In this chapter the use of the framework presented in chapter 2 has been demonstrated 
by using it to re-analyse results from previous studies on perception of high-level 
visual features. Is has been demonstrated that V1 is not necessary for perception of 
colour hue, motion and complex shapes and objects. Although under normal 
circumstances V1 is an important stage in processing of these stimulus categories it is 
possibly to by-pass V1 and evoke high-level percepts by stimulating the according 
areas directly (Lee et al., 2000). The different high-level features are represented in a 
distributed fashion and conscious perception can break down selectively for each of 
these feature categories after lesions in the regions representing them. Interestingly, 
the strong invariance of areas specialised in motion and shape processing with respect 
to low-level visual features means that these areas cannot represent the low-level 
visual features by which the complex features are defined. The involvement of V1 in 
processing local contour information has already been demonstrated. The next 
chapters will investigate whether V1 can possibly encode our conscious perception of 
the low-level visual features of brightness and perceived contrast. 
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Chapter 4 
Representation of low-level features in 
primary visual cortex 
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Perceived brightness  
Due to the predominance of research on luminance contrast the responses of visual 
cortex to homogenous illumination have only rarely been directly studied47. In the few 
studies available it was demonstrated that a substantial proportion of cells in cat and 
monkey striate cortex can be characterized as “luxotonic” in showing a modulation of 
their responses by homogenous changes in illumination (Bartlett & Doty, 1974; 
Kayama, Riso, Bartlett, & Doty, 1979; Kinoshita & Komatsu, 2001; Komatsu, 
Murakami, & Kinoshita, 1996; MacEvoy, Kim, & Paradiso, 1998; Maguire & Baizer, 
1982; Rossi & Paradiso, 1999; Rossi et al., 1996). Luxotonic cells also give a 
sustained measure of luminance level rather than a transient measure of luminance 
change, which matches the fact that perceived brightness48 remains elevated after 
sustained increments in luminance49 (Bartlett & Doty, 1974).  
 
Photergic and scotergic cells in V1 
Kinoshita and Komatsu (2001) performed the most extensive study so far on 
luminance representation in monkey V1. They investigated the luminance dependency 
of responses to uniform stimuli of varying luminance on a uniform grey background. 
They found the modulation to be strongest for later, sustained phases of processing. 
Three different profiles were observed: 67 % of luxotonic cells increased their 
response rate monotonously with luminance (photergic or “bright type”); 25 % of 
cells monotonously increased their spike rate with decreasing luminance (scotergic or 
“dark type”)50. If primary visual cortex were to represent perceived brightness one 
might expect that the spike rate increases monotonously with luminance, which would 
only fit to the “bright type” cells of Kinoshita and Komatsu (2001). An alternative 
explanation would be that the visual system employs a double strategy and explicitly 
signals darkness and brightness separately. It has long been known that retinal 
ganglion cells can be subdivided into two subclasses, the on-centre and off-centre 
type (Kuffler, 1953). This provides evidence for a bipolar rather than unipolar 
processing of luminance. Also, there is evidence that grey rather than black may be 
the zero-point of brightness perception. In the absence of visual stimulation in the 
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state of dark adaptation observers typically perceive the visual field in a homogenous 
grey (“Eigengrau”) rather than black (Aubert, 1865). 
 
Phosphenes 
Brindley and Lewin (1968) used the electrocortical stimulation device shown in Fig. 9 
to stimulate the region of primary visual cortex. Their subject perceived small, bright, 
isolated, point-like flashes (phosphenes) that were reproducibly localised in 
retinotopic space (Brindley & Lewin, 1968)(Fig. 22). The phosphenes were mainly 
elicited around the vertical meridian (12 o’clock and 6 o’clock positions) as would be 
expected from stimulating the cortex just outside the calcarine sulcus according to 
retinotopic mapping of visual field onto cortex. The size of phosphenes increases with 
eccentricity as would be expected due to the cortical magnification factor (Cowey & 
Rolls, 1974). Phosphenes were restricted to the area immediately surrounding the 
calcarine sulcus and stimulation from more distant electrodes (most parts of V2) did 
not evoke phosphenes. Others have reported that stimulation of extrastriate visual 
areas leads to complex phosphenes, such as intermediate and complex shapes, colours 
and motion, but not to localised points (Lee et al., 2000). 
 
 
Fig. 22: Schematic drawing of the relationship between stimulation site along the 
sulcus calcarinus of the right hemisphere (dashed line) and perceived visual field 
location and size of phosphenes elicited by Brindley and Lewin (1968) 
(HM=horizontal meridian; VM=vertical meridian). The size of phosphenes scales 
with cortical magnification factor (Cowey & Rolls, 1974). 
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Brindley and Lewin (1968) were able to evoke well-defined spatial dot-patterns by 
stimulating multiple sites in V1 simultaneously. Their aim was to transmit pixelated 
letter patterns in order to develop artificial visual prostheses for retinally blind 
patients. V1 is the only cortical site from which high-resolution stationary phosphenes 
can be reliably evoked. This has led this field of research to focus on V1 as the most 
promising site for an implant grid providing a “scoreboard-like” display matrix for 
transmission of information (Dobelle & Mladejovsky, 1974; Dobelle, Mladejovsky, 
Evans, Roberts, & Girvin, 1976; Dobelle et al., 1974; Girvin, 1988; Stensaas, 
Eddington, & Dobelle, 1974). If the sensations produced by V1 stimulation were 
merely epiphenomenal and due to passing on of activation to extrastriate areas such as 
V2 and V3 one would expect to be able to produce the same small localisable 
sensations by stimulation of V2 or V3 directly, which is not the case51.  
 
Metacontrast masking 
One method that allows varying the perceived brightness of a target independent of its 
physical luminance is metacontrast masking. This occurs when a target stimulus 
(typically a disk of uniform luminance) is presented upon a dark background and is 
followed by a mask stimulus, that shares a contour with the target (typically an 
annulus or ring). For a certain time delay between offset of the target and onset of the 
mask (typically around approx. 50-100 ms) the perceived brightness of the target 
stimulus is strongly reduced (e.g. Bridgeman & Leff, 1979), but detection is normally 
not affected (Kahnemann, 1968). Thus the subject is aware of the presence of the 
stimulus but it appears to be darker (Bridgeman & Leff, 1979). The detailed 
mechanisms of metacontrast masking are not understood to the present day52. 
Psychophysical data suggest a locus in early retinotopic visual cortex. Metacontrast 
masking is possible even when target and mask are presented dichoptically (Kolers & 
Rosner, 1960; Schiller, 1968) suggesting that it does not occur before binocular 
processing in visual cortex. The fact that metacontrast masking scales with 
eccentricity similar to cortical magnification factor (Bridgeman & Leff, 1979) and 
that it falls rapidly with the distance between target and mask contours (Alpern, 1953; 
Kolers & Rosner, 1960; Werner, 1940), suggests that it occurs in early retinotopic 
cortex, presumably in an area with small receptive fields.  
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Several single-cell studies point towards V1 as the major site of metacontrast 
masking53. In V1 effects of metacontrast masking have been found on the transient 
onset responses (Macknik & Haglund, 1999; Macknik, Martinez-Conde, & Haglund, 
2000), on secondary (possibly feedback) discharges (Bridgeman, 1975, 1980) and on 
off-responses (Macknik & Livingstone, 1998). The modulation of late striate 
responses fits to the fact that luminance-dependency of luxotonic cells is strongest at 
the late response phases (Kinoshita & Komatsu, 2001). It also presents a 
straightforward account of the paradox that reaction times for detection are not 
influenced by metacontrast masking. Detection may be mediated by a low criterion 
and could be based on the earliest striate responses, whereas judgement of perceptual 
magnitude may depend on the later stages of processing. A nice demonstration of the 
effects of metacontrast masking in V1 can be seen in Fig. 23. Optical imaging 
responses to target stimuli are strongly suppressed under masking conditions in a 
highly retinotopic fashion. Although these results provide a possible correlate of 
perceived brightness reduction in primary visual cortex a direct link has not yet been 
demonstrated. 
 
 
Fig. 23: The effect of metacontrast masking on the retinotopic representation of a 
target bar in primary visual cortex as demonstrated using optical imaging (Macknik & 
Haglund, 1999). Presentation of the target alone (left) or mask alone (middle) 
alternating with empty frames leads to retinotopic representations of these stimuli in 
area V1. If target and masks are alternated with timing parameters for which the target 
is invisible in human observers (right) the representation of the target in V1 is 
strongly suppressed. 
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V1 signals brightness and not luminance 
A different way to study changes in perceived brightness without changing physical 
luminance is to exploit surround effects. It is known that human brightness ratings are 
strongly influenced by the luminance distribution of contextual stimuli (Adelson, 
1993, 1999). In the simplest case this occurs over very small angular distances and 
leads to border enhancement (Mach-bands), illusory dots (in the Hermann grid 
illusion) or illusory lines (Fig. 24A). There are also contextual modulations across 
large angular distances as in the “simultaneous contrast effect”. A uniform surface 
with fixed luminance on a uniformly illuminated background is perceived to have 
lower brightness the higher the luminance of the background is as would be expected 
if the visual system took into account the mean background luminance to discount for 
the illuminant (Fig. 24B). There are also more complex variants of such long range 
contextual modulations such as the border-induced Craik-O’Brien-Cornsweet illusion 
(Cornsweet, 1970), or the corrugated plaid illusion (Adelson, 1999) the latter even 
revealing the involvement of 3D geometry and lighting interpretation (Fig. 24C). 
 
 
Fig. 24: Contextual influences on perceived brightness. (A) Top: A 2-dimensional 
variation on the Hermann grid illusion (Adelson, 1999). Bright lines are seen on the 
diagonals that have no physical correlate in the stimulus and can be explained by the 
surround-surround organisation of cells in optic nerve (Kuffler, 1953), LGN (De 
Valois & Pease, 1971) or of concentric cells in striate cortex (Spillmann, Ransom-
Hogg, & Oehler, 1987). The inhibitory surrounds of cells centred on the corners 
receive less luminance than those centred on the sides (bottom). (B) Simultaneous 
contrast: The left central square is perceived as brighter than that on the right although 
both have the same luminance. This demonstrates that contextual effects occur over 
much larger distances than the receptive field sizes of retinal and LGN cells (circle). 
(C) Corrugated plaid effect (Adelson, 1993, 1999): Interpretation of reflectance 
characteristics, geometry and lighting condition leads to a perceived difference in 
brightness between the two surfaces indicated by the arrows although both are 
isoluminant. 
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Whereas contextual modulation of perceived brightness over small spatial scales (as 
in Fig. 24A) can be accounted for by the receptive field properties of the optic nerve, 
of LGN and striate cortex of cats (Spillmann et al., 1987; Syrkin, Yinon, & Gur, 
1994) and LGN of monkeys (De Valois & Pease, 1971), simultaneous contrast, 
integrating over larger areas of the visual field, was not found to operate at that early 
level, possibly due to the small size of receptive fields (De Valois & Pease, 1971; 
Rossi & Paradiso, 1999). Several studies have been performed on the 
neurophysiology of surround influences on striate responses to luminance. Rossi and 
coworkers (1996) demonstrated that surround modulation of cat striate cortical 
responses to luminance shows a complex profile similar to human perception. They 
used a dynamic variant of the simultaneous contrast stimuli in Fig. 24B. Luminance 
of either surround or surround was sinusoidally modulated (Rossi & Paradiso, 1999; 
Rossi et al., 1996). When the luminance of the surround is sinusoidally modulated 
both perception and luxotonic cells correlate in-phase with this modulation (Fig. 
25A). If the surround luminance is modulated and the surround luminance remains at 
a medium grey level, both perceived brightness of the centre and luxotonic cells 
respond in counter-phase this modulation (Fig. 25B). This is due to the fact that a grey 
stimulus on a dark surround is perceived to be brighter than on a bright surround. If 
the centre is dark surround modulation neither leads to a change of perceived 
brightness of the centre nor to a modulation of responses of luxotonic cells (Fig. 
25C)54. 
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Fig. 25: Close physiological correlation between contextual modulation of perceived 
brightness and responses of luxotonic units in cat primary visual cortex (Rossi & 
Paradiso, 1999; Rossi et al., 1996). The top row shows the stimulation applied. (A) 
Central stimulation of an area covering the receptive field (dark ellipse) and its 
immediate surround. The luminance in that area is modulated sinusoidally at 1 Hz and 
5 Hz as shown in the rows labelled “stimulus”. The surrounds are kept at a constant 
medium luminance level (“grey”). Human observers perceive a sinusoidal modulation 
of the centre at both frequencies and in-phase with the stimulation. Luxotonic units in 
cat V1 closely parallel human perception. (B) Sinusoidal stimulation of the surround 
only where the centre remains at a constant medium luminance. At 1 Hz human 
observers perceive the centre to change brightness in counter-phase with the surround 
modulation. The same holds for luxotonic cells in V1 (note that both show the same 
phase-shift). At 5 Hz both the perceptual as well as the luxotonic responses are absent 
due to the low-pass characteristics of the effect (Rossi & Paradiso, 1996, 1999; Rossi 
et al., 1996). (C) If the centre is kept at a very low constant luminance level (“black”) 
the perceptual and physiological responses are absent at both frequencies. 
 
In a follow-up study MacEvoy and Paradiso (2001) could even demonstrate lightness 
constancy for luxotonic units using achromatic Mondrian stimuli composed of 
multiple rectangles with different luminances, similar to those used to study colour 
constancy (Fig. 26). If luminance values in the whole display (including the square 
covering the cell’s receptive field) were changed multiplicatively in accordance with 
an overall increase in illumination the cell’s response remained practically constant, 
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as does the perceived brightness of the square. If however only the luminance in the 
square covering the receptive field was changed the cells clearly responded with a 
change in spike rate. This provides evidence for single-valuedness, because physically 
very different luminances elicit identical V1 responses when they are perceived to be 
equally bright.  
 
There are several other studies showing a close relationship between brightness 
perception and striate cortical activity. Some authors have demonstrated a close 
relationship between monkey psychophysics and striate physiology for brightness 
filling-in of dark fields covering the blind spot (Komatsu et al., 1996)55. There is also 
a close relationship between the perception of luminance flicker and striate activity, 
which is more controversial and will thus be discussed in a separate chapter56. 
 
 
 
Fig. 26: (A) Achromatic Mondrian stimulus. The local luminance change stimulus 
was obtained from the baseline stimulus by increasing the luminance of the central 
rectangle only. The global illumination stimulus was obtained by multiplying all 
luminance values with a constant factor as would occur in case of a change in global 
illumination. (B) Schematic responses of a luxotonic cell with a receptive field 
centred on the central rectangle (dashed ellipse in A). Circle: Response to the baseline 
stimulus. Square: The increase of local luminance alone leads to an increase in spike 
rate. Human observers perceive the central rectangle to become lighter. Diamond: The 
same increase in local luminance that does not lead to an increase in perceived 
lightness (because it is perceived to be the consequence of a global change in 
illumination) does not lead to an increase in spike rate (MacEvoy & Paradiso, 2001). 
 
Visual field deficits 
Lesions to striate cortex lead to visual field deficits that show a close retinotopic 
correlation to the region destroyed (Holmes & Lister, 1916; Horton & Hoyt, 1991b; 
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Kitajima et al., 1998; McFadzean, Brosnahan, Hadley, & Mutlukan, 1994; Spalding, 
1952). These visual field deficits range from small localised scotoma to the complete 
loss of left or right visual hemifield (hemianopia). In these parts of the visual field any 
conscious perception of brightness, contrast and form is lost57 and cannot even be 
artificially induced by TMS stimulation anywhere over the visual cortex (Cowey & 
Walsh, 2000). Many early studies on visual field deficits lack a detailed 
neuroanatomical localisation (e.g. Spalding, 1952) and many recent studies report 
lesions that are not confined to a single cortical lesion but also involve extrastriate 
visual areas (Barbur, Watson, Frackowiak, & Zeki, 1993; McFadzean et al., 1994). 
Using high-resolution anatomical imaging methods such as CT and MRI it has 
recently been possible to demonstrate that highly isolated lesions confined to V1 
cause localised scotoma (Horton & Hoyt, 1991b; Kitajima et al., 1998; Spector, 
Glaser, David, & Vining, 1981) (Fig. 27). Patients who have lesions to V4, MT or 
even the complete temporal lobes58 lose specialised high-level visual perception but 
not their capacity for perceiving low-level visual features (Gallant et al., 2000; Huxlin 
& Merigan, 1998). Spared perception of low-level features after lesions to these areas 
has also been demonstrated in monkeys (Merigan, 1996; Schiller, 1993). Lesions to 
V2 and V3 can also lead to visual field deficits, which often affect exactly one 
quadrant of the visual field (Horton & Hoyt, 1991a; Jones, Waggoner, & Hoyt, 1999; 
McFadzean & Hadley, 1997). In a study by Merigan and coworkers lesions of V2 in 
monkeys did not lead to a blind region. Injections of ibotenic acid in V2 did not lead 
to significant changes of visual acuity and contrast sensitivity. Lesions to V1 on the 
other hand severely disrupted visual acuity in the position of the visual field 
represented in the damaged cortex (Merigan, Nealey, & Maunsell, 1993). 
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Fig. 27: Retinotopic map of a right visual hemifield in left striate cortex. (A) Location 
of V1 (stippled), V2 (triangles) and V3 (hatched) along the calcarine sulcus, cuneus 
and lingual gyrus. V1 is only partly visible because its main extent lies within the 
depth of the calcarine sulcus, but it becomes visible in a coronal section (B). (C) 
Shows a detailed map of the visual hemifield onto the polar-coordinate representation 
in a flattened striate cortex. Eccentricity is mapped as the depth in the 
interhemispheric fissure. The fovea is at the occipital pole and the periphery is at the 
crossing between calcarine sulcus and parieto-occipital sulcus. Angle is mapped as 
shown in B and C: The horizontal meridian is in the base of the calcarine sulcus. The 
lower vertical meridian is on the lower cuneal surface and marks the border between 
V1 and the lower right quadrant of V2. The upper vertical meridian is mapped to the 
upper lingual gyrus and marks the border between V1 and the upper right quadrant of 
V2. The foveal region occupies a far larger region of cortex than the periphery: The 
central 10° are mapped to approx. 50% of the striate cortex. The arrows indicate the 
border between representations of the binocular and monocular (peripheral) field. The 
grey inset in (D) shows a scotoma after a selective lesion to the region highlighted in 
(C). The lesion was localised using anatomical T1-weighted MRI scans (modified 
from Horton & Hoyt, 1991a, 1991b). 
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TMS over V1 disrupts brightness perception 
Brightness processing in V1 can also be disrupted by TMS (Amassian et al., 1989). In 
the typical experiment a foveal target is presented and after a variable delay a TMS 
pulse is given. If the pulse occurs within a window of around 60 to 140 ms after 
stimulus onset (Fig. 28A) the perception of the target is severely degraded (“blurred”) 
or it is even completely invisible. Interestingly the disruptive effect can even be used 
to make stimuli visible: In a backwards-masking setting where a target is followed by 
a mask after 100 ms the target is rendered invisible. If however a TMS pulse is 
applied in a time windows estimated to disrupt the V1 processing of the mask 
(approx. 120 ms after the mask and 220 ms after the target) the target is again visible 
(Fig. 28B). The time window in which performance is deteriorated is typically 
considered to reflect disruption of the striate stage of feed-forward visual processing 
of the target or mask. However recent experiments have revealed a further, earlier 
time window around 30 ms during which also disrupts visual processing (Corthout, 
Uttl, Walsh, Hallett, & Cowey, 1999; Corthout, Uttl, Ziemann, Cowey, & Hallett, 
1999)(Fig. 28C). This is interpreted as interfering with the earliest afferent volley 
reaching V1 through the geniculostriate pathway and is in accord with earliest onset 
latencies in primary visual cortex (Bullier, 2001). The second disruptive time window 
around 60 to 140 ms with a much stronger detrimental effect could be operating at a 
feedback stage of visual processing (Lamme et al., 1998), suggesting that feedback 
from extrastriate activity is necessary for the subject to become aware of the target 
stimulus. These late effects also match the properties of luxotonic cells (Kinoshita & 
Komatsu, 2001) and of metacontrast masking (Bridgeman, 1975, 1980; Macknik & 
Livingstone, 1998). 
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Fig. 28: Disruptive effects of a TMS pulse applied over the occipital pole on target 
perception as a function of time between target and magnetic pulse (reproduced after 
Amassian et al., 1993). (A) A target (“T”, for example a set of characters or a light 
flash) is presented at T = 0 ms. The performance rate (e.g. rate of correct detection) 
remains at maximum for pulses with onset simultaneously to the target up to approx. 
80 ms. If the pulse is given between 80 ms and 140 ms after target onset (depending 
on stimulus intensity and type of stimulus used) the performance drops due to cortical 
disruption of target processing. If the pulse occurs beyond approx. 140 ms after target 
onset the performance is not altered. (B) Unmasking of backwards masking: 
Recognition of a target presented at –100 ms is disrupted by a backwards pattern 
mask (“M”) occurring at 0 ms and performance is low. If a magnetic pulse is given 
around 80 to 140 ms after mask onset the cortical processing of the mask is disrupted 
and the target is perceived - i.e. the performance increases (“unmasking”). (C) Some 
authors (Corthout, Uttl, Walsh et al., 1999; Corthout, Uttl, Ziemann et al., 1999) have 
observed an early and a late disruption time window, possibly revealing two stages of 
processing in primary visual cortex (Lamme et al., 1998). 
 
The effect of the pulse has been shown to have a graded effect on perceived 
brightness and the disruption can be compensated by increasing stimulus intensity 
(Fig. 29A). There is strong evidence that the same mechanisms underlie disruptive 
effects and phosphenes induced by TMS and that both occur at a very early 
retinotopic level of processing. Typically phosphenes and transient visual field 
deficits co-occur. If the position of the coil is kept fixed and subjects are first asked to 
indicate the location of the phosphene in the visual field and then undergo perimetric 
threshold measurements it can be demonstrated that VFD and phosphenes share the 
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same locations in the visual field (Fig. 29B) (Kammer, 1999; Kastner, Demmer, & 
Ziemann, 1998). 
 
 
Fig. 29: Psychophysical data redrawn from two studies by Thomas Kammer 
(Kammer, 1999; Kammer & Nusseck, 1998). (A) The proportion of trials in which the 
orientation of a U-shaped target was correctly identified as a function of contrast. The 
identification threshold was clearly shifted upwards for targets followed after 120 ms 
by a magnetic pulse (dashed line) versus targets without pulse (solid line). This result 
shows that the TMS pulse has a graded effect on the neural representation rather than 
completely disrupting processing. (B) The co-location of perceived phosphenes (black 
and white dashed line) and threshold enhancement (“graded” scotoma) for a fixed 
position of the coil. The shading of the segments indicates the threshold increase by a 
TMS pulse for each position in the visual field. The dark shaded location with the 
highest increase in threshold is at the same position as the phosphene (HM = 
horizontal meridian; VM = vertical meridian). 
 
Summary 
Primary visual cortex has a subpopulation of cells that closely covaries with 
luminance changes and with a number of perceptual phenomena known to influence   
perceived brightness. This covariance is weak for early, transient phases of V1 single-
cell responses but strong for later, sustained phases. Responses of luxotonic cells also 
exhibit isomorphism with perceived brightness in the sense that stimuli that are 
perceived to be brighter also lead to higher response amplitudes in “bright” cells and 
reduced responses in “dark” cells. Furthermore V1 signals are the same when the 
same brightness perception is achieved with very different luminances, thus the 
mapping between brightness and responses in V1 luxotonic cells also exhibits single-
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valuedness. Little is known about the grain of brightness representation. V1 is 
strongly necessary for brightness perception, as shown by the visual field deficits 
following lesions and TMS pulses. The role of V2 in perceived brightness is not yet 
clear, because too few studies have attempted to record V2 responses to homogenous 
luminance changes. However the fact that electrocortical stimulation of V2 typically 
leads to more complex sensations implies that it does not represent the fine spatial 
grain of perceived brightness, whereas this is known to be the case for V1. 
 
Contrast perception 
Contrast is a low-level perceptual dimension of intensity that has been extensively 
studied. Contrast can be defined as the difference in luminance between the brightest 
and darkest regions in a visual stimulus divided by the mean luminance. This means 
that contrast defines the modulation depth as a proportion of background luminance 
(Fig. 30). A considerable body of data is available, both on the neural processing of 
contrast and on psychophysical aspects of contrast perception. Due to the receptive 
field organisation of cortical cells luminance contrast has received more attention than 
luminance. Especially cells in primary visual cortex are often modelled as indifferent 
to luminance and only responsive to luminance contrast59. The abundance of data 
available makes contrast a very suitable dimension for studying the representation of 
perceived magnitude. 
 
Physiological responses to luminance contrast 
Most visual areas respond to increases in contrast with monotonous increases in 
activity (Boynton et al., 1999), however with quite distinct profiles. Whereas 
magnocellular cells in LGN and cells in V3 and MT have a high contrast gain and 
saturate at low contrasts cells in parvocellular layers of LGN and in striate cortex have 
a low contrast gain and give incremental response changes right up to the maximum 
contrast of 1 (Fig. 31). 
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Fig. 30: Definition of luminance contrast: (A) Two pictures of a face with low 
contrast and high contrast. Note how only the luminance modulation depth but not the 
mean luminance changes. The two stripy pictures are obtained by plotting for each 
position the Gabor patch with an orientation that correlates strongest with the 
stimulus. (B) Luminance profile of a sine-wave grating. The top picture shows a 2-D 
image and the bottom picture shows the luminance profile of a horizontal line through 
it. The bold line shows a high contrast and the thin line a low contrast stimulus. 
Michelson contrast is defined as the difference between maximum and minimum 
contrast in the picture divided by the sum of the two. 
 
  
 
 
 
Fig. 31: (A) Responses of various macaque visual areas to stimulus contrast. Open 
circles, dotted line: LGN magnocellular layers; closed circles, dashed line: LGN 
parvocellular layers; filled squares, solid line: V1 simple cell; diamonds, dash-dotted 
line: MT (adapted from Sclar, Maunsell, & Lennie, 1990). R0 refers to baseline spike 
rate and Rmax to maximally saturated spike rate. (B) Responses of 3 human visual 
areas to stimuli of varying contrast. Filled squares, solid line: V1; diamonds, dash-
dotted line: MT; open squares, dashed line: area V3 (redrawn fromTootell et al., 
1998). 
 
Striate cortex shows a biphasic dependency on contrast, which is best visible when 
plotting the contrast responses on a linear axis (Fig. 32A and Fig. 32B, dashed line). 
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For low contrast levels (just above absolute threshold) the response increases very fast 
with changes in contrast. In this region the response can be described by a power 
function rising with an exponent above 1 (accelerating branch). In the high contrast 
range this gives way to a second phase where contrast responses increase to an 
exponent below 1 (compressive branch).  
 
Various model functions have been fitted to the contrast-response functions (Fig. 
32A), but the model that captures the two branches best is typically achieved using a 
variant of the so-called hyperbolic ratio function (Albrecht & Hamilton, 1982; 
Boynton et al., 1999; Boynton, Engel, Glover, & Heeger, 1996; Geisler & Albrecht, 
1997; Li & Creutzfeldt, 1984): 
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where R(C) denotes response at contrast C, Rmax is the maximum response and p, q 
are two parameters defining the slopes in the two branches. If C << σ the denominator 
is dominated by the constant σq and the function rises approximately to the power p + 
q. If C << σ the denominator is dominated by Cq and the function rises approximately 
to the power p. The constant σq is called the “semisaturation constant”. 
 
Fig. 32B compares the “average” striate single cell contrast response to a measure of a 
population response. The dashed line shows the hyperbolic ratio function obtained 
from monkey V1 by averaging the parameters of hyperbolic ratio function fits across 
98 cells (Albrecht & Hamilton, 1982). This standard V1 single cell contrast response 
function saturates around 50% above which it would not be possible to give graded 
responses to contrast. The dotted line on the other hand shows the response of one 
human subject’s V1 as measured using BOLD-fMRI. Clearly this response also shows 
compression in the high-contrast range but it still retains a graded response to 
contrast. This discrepancy between average single-cell and fMRI data can be 
explained by the considerable variability of single-cell contrast response functions. 
Fitted semisaturation constants vary between 1 and 40 and the exponent q varies 
between 0 and 8 (Albrecht & Hamilton, 1982). Thus, each cell has its dynamic range 
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(the steep part of the contrast response function) at a different contrast and can thus 
contribute with a graded response to different contrast ranges of the population 
response. Interestingly there is no difference between the contrast response functions 
of simple and complex cells (Albrecht & Hamilton, 1982). 
 
 
Fig. 32: (A) Fit of various model functions to the contrast response function of a 
striate simple cell (taken from Albrecht & Hamilton, 1982). The hyperbolic ratio 
function gave the best fit with the data. Note that the apparent difference between the 
responses of striate cells in Fig. 31A is due to the logarithmic versus linear scaling of 
contrast. (B) Contrast representation in V1 calculated as the hyperbolic ratio function 
with parameters averaged across 98 monkey cells (dashed line, data taken from table 
5 in Albrecht & Hamilton, 1982), the fMRI response of one human subject (dotted 
line, taken from table 1 in Boynton et al., 1999) and the hypothetical contrast 
transducer function obtained from behavioural data which is used to explain human 
contrast discrimination performance (solid line, taken from Legge & Foley, 1980). 
 
V1 can account for contrast discrimination 
It has long been noted that there is a close relationship between contrast 
discrimination and responses in V1. In the prototypical study an observer is 
confronted with two stimuli, one with a baseline or pedestal contrast and one with a 
slightly higher contrast. He has to judge, which of the two stimuli has the higher 
contrast (Fig. 33, top left). The contrast difference that is necessary for the observer to 
reach a criterion proportion of correct responses is called the increment threshold.  
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Fig. 33: Schematic relationship between neural response amplitude and 
discrimination performance. Two extreme models are shown: Top right: the increase 
in increment threshold (left) with contrast is accounted for by changing the slope of 
the nonlinear contrast transducer function but keeping noise constant (top right). 
Bottom right: The change in increment threshold is accounted for by a change in noise 
where the transducer has a constant slope. Most psychophysical models assume the 
constant noise model (Boynton et al., 1999; Foley, 1994; Legge & Foley, 1980; 
Zenger-Landolt & Koch, 2001).  
 
Weber was one the first to study increment thresholds and he postulated a constant 
ratio between increment threshold and baseline magnitude (Weber, 1834). The 
Weber-fraction  
 
k
C
C
=
∆  (2) 
 
was thought to be a constant (C denotes physical stimulus intensity). This is clearly 
not the case for contrast data. The increment threshold ∆C does not rise linearly with 
baseline contrast (as would be expected from transforming the equation to ∆C = kC), 
but slower and also has a “dip” in the range of low contrasts (Fig. 33, middle left). 
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Contrast discrimination performance can be explained by a very simple model. It is 
assumed that each stimulus (C and C+∆C) results in a physiological response and that 
a correct discrimination can be made if the two physiological responses differ by a 
criterion amount. The imperfection of not being able to discriminate infinitesimally 
small differences can be explained by assuming that the physiological response is 
obscured by additive noise resulting in two random response distributions with 
different mean (due to the contrast difference) but same dispersion. A criterion 
performance in discrimination is reached when there is a specific separation of the 
two distributions (Fig. 33, top right). The subject will make a certain number of errors 
due to the fact that in a fixed proportion of trials the weaker stimulus will evoke a 
stronger response because of the additive noise. By measuring discrimination 
thresholds at different contrast levels it is possible to construct a hypothetical 
nonlinear contrast transfer function (CTF) whose slope decreases with contrast in 
order to account for the increase in increment threshold with contrast. It is assumed 
that the luminance distribution of the stimulus is first linearly multiplied with the 
filter profile of each cell or psychophysical “channel”. Then the output of this linear 
stage is passed through this nonlinear CTF (reviewed in Olzak and Thomas 1999). If 
the slope of the CTF becomes shallower more contrast increment is required to 
achieve the same response increment. Thus the threshold rises with contrast because 
discrimination performance is proportional to one over the slope of the CTF. Under 
the assumption of constant noise it is thus possible to calculate the profile of the CTF 
from the discrimination data. 
 
If however the assumption of constant noise is dropped the problem becomes 
ambiguous. In the extreme case an increase in threshold can be interpreted as due to 
either a decrease in slope at constant noise or due to an increase in noise at constant 
slope (bottom right). All that can be known is that the response distributions have 
fixed overlap, which can be achieved by an infinite number of different combinations 
of mean and distribution. At the level of single cells response variance is roughly 
proportional to mean response (Geisler & Albrecht, 1997; Tolhurst, Movshon, & 
Dean, 1983) and not constant. Little is known about response variance at the 
population level. Despite this fact most psychophysical models assume that noise is 
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constant and additive (Boynton et al., 1999; Foley, 1994; Legge & Foley, 1980; 
Zenger-Landolt & Koch, 2001), which is partly supported by recent psychophysical 
evidence (Gorea & Sagi, 2001). 
 
The constant noise CTFs have striking similarities to contrast response functions 
recorded from monkey and human primary visual cortex that were presented above. 
The transducer is also modelled as a hyperbolic ratio function (equation 1). The 
parameters thus estimated show a very close match to striate contrast responses. 
Geisler and Albrecht (1997) investigated this issue in great detail and showed that 
behavioural performance could not well be explained by single cells but was best 
predicted by the entire population, either by the envelope of the most sensitive cells or 
by optimally pooled single cell responses. This comparison between psychophysical 
performance and single-cell data is partly limited because behavioural and 
physiological data were obtained in separate studies. The parameters p, q and σ 
depend on various stimulus features, such as spatial frequency, that are not matched 
between these studies. Contrast response functions measured with human fMRI also 
show great similarity to these transducers. Boynton and coworkers (1999) 
demonstrated that human contrast discrimination can be modelled by assuming that it 
is based on the fMRI contrast response of V1. Fig. 32B shows the close 
correspondence between the human fMRI contrast response function and a 
psychophysical contrast transducer function. Other studies have demonstrated that 
contrast discrimination performance can be accounted for by statistically pooling the 
responses of the entire population of single-cell responses in primary visual cortex 
(Geisler & Albrecht, 1997; Itti, Koch, & Braun, 2000). 
 
Perceived contrast 
In what follows the main question will be how a different perceptual measure, 
perceived magnitude of contrast, is related to these contrast transducer and contrast 
response functions. Whereas contrast discrimination is a purely local measure of 
perceived difference, perceived contrast is an absolute measure of perceived 
magnitude. Historically Fechner proposed a way to link increment thresholds to 
perceived magnitude (Fechner, 1860). He assumed that the difference in perceived 
magnitude between two stimuli differing by a single discrimination threshold or “just 
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noticeable difference” (JND) is equal, regardless of the baseline level at which it is 
studied. This can be stated as  
 
)()( CCC Ψ−∆+Ψ=∆Ψ  (3) 
 
where C denotes physical stimulus intensity, Ψ perceived magnitude and ∆C the 
increment threshold. Fechner assumed ∆Ψ to be constant. 
 
This provides a linking hypothesis between contrast discrimination and perceived 
contrast. Sensation is proportional to the number of JNDs above absolute threshold. 
However, it is known that discrimination performance is not always a good indicator 
of a subjectively perceived difference between two stimuli (Kolb & Braun, 1995; 
Stoerig & Cowey, 1997). For example under certain conditions subjects can perform 
well on discrimination without any subjective confidence in the correctness of their 
judgements (Kolb & Braun, 1995). This indicates that just noticeable differences do 
not necessarily correspond to single “quanta” of perceived magnitude, but possibly to 
less60. 
 
A different linking hypothesis could be provided by the contrast transducer function. 
In this view the perceived contrast would be proportional to the amplitude of the CTF 
(Xing & Heeger, 2001). If one assumes constant noise then the contrast transducer 
function and Fechner’s perceived magnitude have equal predictions. However, as 
shown above, the shape of the contrast transducer function strongly depends on the 
noise assumption. It is possibly to account for the increase in discrimination threshold 
with increased pedestal contrast either by assuming that the transducer function 
becomes shallower, or by assuming that noise increases. In the extreme case one 
could assume a linear contrast transducer function. 
 
Given that there is no obvious linking hypothesis it is necessary to study perceived 
contrast directly. There are several direct approaches to the relationship between 
physical contrast and perceptual magnitude (Fig. 34). These measures give either a 
direct measure of contrast (luminance matching) or a measure of the contrast ratio 
between two stimuli (contrast halving, direct scaling). There are considerable 
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differences between perceived magnitude functions even when estimated using 
similar methods (reviewed in Georgeson, 1991). The relationship between perceived 
contrast has been reported to be a linear (Cannon, 1979; Kulikowski, 1976), 
logarithmic (Fiorentini & Maffei, 1973) or a power function (Cannon, 1985; Franzen 
& Berkley, 1975; Gottesman, Rubin, & Legge, 1981; Hamerly, Quick, & Reichert, 
1977) with exponents varying as far as between 0.3 and 1.7. As Cannon has showed 
for direct scaling studies this may partly be due to range effects (Cannon, 1984). His 
more recent models of perceived contrast employ transducers which are also very 
similar to the contrast transducer functions and striate contrast responses mentioned 
above (Cannon & Fullenkamp, 1991b; Cannon, 1985). All have similar exponents in 
the high contrast range. A tempting view would be that perceived contrast depends on 
the mean and discrimination depends on the noise and slope of the same CTF.  
 
 
 
Fig. 34: Various methods used for direct estimation of perceived contrast. (A) 
Matching of perceived luminance of peaks and troughs with that of a standard 
stimulus with homogonous luminance (Bryngdahl, 1966; Fiorentini & Maffei, 1973). 
The peak and trough judgements are then plotted for different contrasts as shown in 
(B). For constant mean luminance the difference is a measure of perceived contrast 
(dashed line). (C) Contrast halving: The observer is required to set the adjustable 
lower grating to half the contrast of the top grating (Kulikowski, 1976). (D) Direct 
scaling using magnitude estimation (Stevens 1960): The observer is required to rate 
perceived contrast either by assigning a number (left) or by adjusting the finger span 
to the according value (right). The ratio between the judgements is believed to reflect 
the ratio between the perceived magnitude (Franzen & Berkley, 1975). 
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A few studies have directly assessed the relationship between neural response 
amplitude and perceived contrast. In a recent study Polonsky and coworkers (2000) 
studied binocular rivalry stimuli with gratings that differ in orientation and contrast 
between the two eyes. The subjects’ perception alternates between high-contrast 
gratings of one orientation and low-contrast gratings of an orientation orthogonal to it. 
Responses in primary visual cortex closely correlated with these changes in perceived 
contrast, rising when perception switched to the high-contrast grating and falling 
when perception switched to the low-contrast grating.  
 
Fiorentini and Maffei (1973) compared perceived contrast functions obtained using 
luminance matching (Bryngdahl 1966, see Fig. 34A,B) to steady-state VEPs taken 
from the literature (Campbell & Kulikowski, 1972). They found that both perceived 
contrast and steady state VEP amplitude showed a logarithmic dependency on 
physical contrast. Franzen and Berkley (1975) extended this using a direct scaling 
method. They fitted perceived contrast using power functions and found that the 
exponents of the power functions for perceived contrast and Campbell and Maffei’s 
(1972) steady-state VEPs closely matched. However promising these two studies are 
they both bring up serious questions. First they are limited by the fact that 
psychophysical and electrophysiological data were gathered from different subjects. 
Other studies have shown a considerable difference between exponents of perceived 
magnitude functions for different subjects (e.g. Cannon 1985, table 1). Second it is 
difficult to determine the cortical generators of Campbell and Maffei’s (1972) steady-
state VEPs, especially as the authors only used a single pair of electrodes. Thus it 
remains unclear if their contrast-response functions reflect activity of primary visual 
cortex. The third and weakest point is that Fiorentini and Maffei’s (1973) and Franzen 
and Berkley’s (1975) perceived magnitude functions are very different compared to 
more recent models of perceived magnitude that take range effects into account 
(Cannon 1984, 1985). Thus it is unclear if the psychophysical side of their correlation 
holds up to modern views of perceived contrast.  
 
To summarize, activity in V1 can explain contrast discrimination performance and 
there is some evidence that it might represent perceived contrast. Stimuli that are 
perceived to have a higher contrast also lead to higher response amplitudes in V1, 
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pointing towards an isomorphism between perceived contrast and V1 response 
amplitude. Furthermore V1 is strongly necessary for perceived contrast: The lesions 
to primary visual cortex discussed above that lead to complete blindness also lead to a 
loss of contrast perception. This has also been demonstrated for monkeys (Merigan et 
al. 1993; Cowey & Stoerig 1995). It has also been demonstrated above that TMS 
pulses over the occipital pole disrupt both luminance and contrast perception61. Other 
visual areas however do not seem to be strongly necessary for contrast perception. 
Extensive lesions to either ventral or dorsal stream can leave contrast sensitivity 
largely unaffected (Plant et al., 1993; Vaina, 1994). However to date there has been 
no demonstration that repeated occurrences of the same perceived magnitude of 
contrast lead to the same responses in V1, as has been shown for perceived brightness 
by the constancy studies of MacEvoy and Paradiso (2001). 
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Chapter 5 
An empirical study of perceived contrast 
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Lateral masking and perceived contrast 
Taken together there are several indications that V1 activity may represent perceived 
contrast, but the direct demonstration has not yet been made. Luckily there is also a 
direct route to assess whether striate activity correlates with perceived contrast that 
does not rely on the debated shape of perceived contrast functions. If one were able to 
dissociate physical contrast and perceived contrast one could test whether striate 
cortical responses are identical in situations where physically different stimuli appear 
to have the same contrast. Such an approach was followed by Goodyear and 
coworkers (2000). They studied one amblyopic patient with a monocular decrease in 
contrast perception62. The contrast of a stimulus presented to the pathological eye has 
to be increased for it to match the contrast of a stimulus presented to the normal eye. 
Using BOLD-fMRI they demonstrated that stimuli that were physically different but 
perceived to have the same contrast evoked the same responses in a region of interest 
spanning V1 and V2 (Goodyear, Nicolle, Humphrey, & Menon, 2000). Thus the 
mapping of perceived contrast to V1/V2 response amplitudes may exhibit single-
valuedness, at least in one amblyopic patient.  
 
One way to change perceived contrast independent of physical contrast in normal 
subjects is to use a phenomenon called “lateral masking” (Fig. 36). If a target grating 
is presented surrounded by a larger area of grating its perceived contrast is reduced 
(Cannon & Fullenkamp, 1991a, 1993; Chubb, Sperling, & Solomon, 1989; Ejima & 
Takahashi, 1985; Snowden & Hammett, 1998; Solomon, Sperling, & Chubb, 1993). 
This effect is known as “lateral masking” and it suggests that some mechanism for 
spatial pooling has to be incorporated to account for contrast perception.  
 
Most studies on contrast discrimination and perceived contrast reported above have 
studied simple grating or Gabor stimuli that were spatially confined and were 
presented in a background field of homogenous grey. In the classical psychophysical 
view these stimuli should trigger a single visual channel, defined as a filter with a 
specific tuning to orientation, spatial frequency, phase and position. The increment 
threshold and perceived contrast data are interpreted as shown in Fig. 35A. The 
 81 
 
spatial input pattern is multiplied with a filter profile to yield the response at the linear 
filter stage. This linear output is passed into a nonlinear contrast transducer function 
for each channel separately and then gaussian or poissonian noise is added (not 
shown). 
 
At an early stage these channels are believed to be independent, but it has long been 
known that at further processing stages interactions between these channels occur. 
When stimuli consist of a superposition of components that optimally drive different 
filters (i.e. two superimposed Gabor patches with orthogonal orientations) the filters 
interact leading to changes in detection and discrimination thresholds (Itti et al., 2000; 
Olzak & Thomas, 1991; Tolhurst & Barfield, 1978). The observer’s response can then 
not be explained by assuming that he has direct access to the independent low-level 
channels. Interactions occurring between superimposed stimuli mean that filters tuned 
to the same position in the visual field interact. This interaction is typically modelled 
as a broadband divisive inhibition, where each unit’s response is divided by a 
normalisation term that depends on a weighted sum of the responses of differently 
tuned filters (Fig. 35B)(Foley, 1994; Itti et al., 2000; Olzak & Thomas, 1999).  
 
Interactions are not restricted to filters at the same location in the visual field but also 
occur between filters that have no overlap but respond to nearby positions in the 
visual field. Detection and discrimination of Gabor patches can be modulated by 
placing other stimuli in their surround (Polat & Sagi, 1993, 1994; Snowden & 
Hammett, 1998; Zenger, Braun, & Koch, 2000; Zenger & Sagi, 1996; Zenger-Landolt 
& Koch, 2001). This effect can be modelled by including divisive inhibition from the 
immediate spatial surround into the model shown in Fig. 35A (Yu & Levi, 2000). It 
has also been shown that surround modulation may involve more than divisive 
inhibition and may also include subtractive inhibition (Zenger-Landolt & Koch, 
2001). 
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Fig. 35: (A) The “multiple channels, direct access model” (Olzak & Thomas, 1999). 
The input at a certain position in the visual field is multiplied with a set of 
independent linear filters tuned to different orientations, spatial frequencies and 
phases. The output is then independently transformed by a within pathway 
nonlinearity as shown in the previous chapter to account for differences in contrast 
discrimination at different pedestal contrasts. It was assumed that the observer’s 
response can be directly based on the outcome of these independent channels. (B) A 
simple model incorporating interactions between channels. To account for interactions 
between overlapping spatial filters the output of one channel (shown here for the 
channel on the left which has a horizontal orientation preference) is divided by a 
weighted sum (wi … wk) of the outputs of filters tuned to other orientations, spatial 
frequencies and phases. To account for surround interactions the inhibition pool has to 
be extended to include input from spatial filters tuned to surrounding positions in the 
visual field. 
 
Not just contrast discrimination but also perceived contrast is modulated by 
surrounding stimuli suggesting that it is also subject to surround normalisation 
(Cannon & Fullenkamp, 1996; Xing & Heeger, 2001)(Fig. 36). Numerous studies 
have revealed the key properties of this surround modulation of perceived contrast. 
The most important are: (1) Modulation depends on the contrast ratio between center 
and surround and not on absolute contrast although minor departures from this rule 
have been demonstrated (Cannon & Fullenkamp, 1993, 1996; Ejima & Takahashi, 
1985; Snowden & Hammett, 1998; Xing & Heeger, 2001). Suppression is strongest 
for high-contrast surrounds and low-contrast targets. If the contrast ratio is inverted 
(i.e. the surround has a lower contrast than the target) the effect can occasionally be 
inverted, resulting in enhancement rather than suppression (Cannon & Fullenkamp, 
1993; Ejima & Takahashi, 1985; Xing & Heeger, 2001). (2) Suppression is composed 
of a basic untuned effect and an effect tuned to a specific bandwidth of spatial 
frequencies, orientations and speeds (Cannon & Fullenkamp, 1991a; Solomon et al., 
1993; Takeuchi & De Valois, 2000). The perceived contrast of the grating that is iso-
oriented to the surround is lower than for that within an orthogonal surround. Thus by 
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varying relative orientation one has the possibility to modulate perceived contrast 
without locally varying stimulus contrast. (3) There is no binocular transfer when the 
target and surround are presented to different eyes (Chubb et al., 1989). The fact that 
the effect is on the one hand monocular and on the other hand orientation-selective 
seems to strongly suggest a role of layer IV in primary visual cortex (Solomon et al., 
1993). On the one hand V1 is the last processing stage with substantial populations of 
cells with monocular dominance in visual cortex (LeVay, Hubel, & Wiesel, 1975). On 
the other hand it is the first stage of orientation-selective processing (at least in the 
feed-forward sweep) which is necessary to account for the orientation tuning of lateral 
masking. 
 
Lateral masking allows one to perform a study similar to Goodyear et al. (2000) on 
normal patients and also introduce an additional constraint. It is possible to dissociate 
perceived contrast and physical contrast in a similar way as was done using the 
amblyopic patient. By choosing a target stimulus in a parallel surround and with fixed 
contrast as a “standard” stimulus, one can determine psychophysically how much 
contrast a stimulus in an orthogonal surround will require to match psychophysically 
(Fig. 36). The orthogonal matching stimulus will have a lower physical contrast 
because the reduction in perceived contrast is stronger for the parallel stimulus. This 
makes it possible to compare stimuli that either physically have the same contrast or 
are perceived to have the same contrast and assess whether V1 is a processing stage 
that correlates with physical or with perceived contrast.  
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Fig. 36: (Top) Demonstration of the effect of lateral masking on perceived contrast. 
The stimulus in the middle left (“no mask”) is a standard rect-wave grating with 
medium contrast. If the stimulus is surrounded by a high-contrast masking grating the 
contrast is perceived to be suppressed (see the 2 adjacent stimuli). The suppression is 
stronger for iso-oriented (“parallel mask”) than for orthogonal surrounds (“orthogonal 
mask”). (The effect had to be artificially enhanced here due to the fact that the 
luminance transfer characteristics of the print are uncontrolled. This has several 
disrupting effects. First, the print does not provide a grey-scale resolution that is 
sufficient. Second, the mean luminance cannot be kept constant for the different areas, 
which introduces additional perceived baseline luminance changes due to the effect of 
simultaneous contrast. If the observer squints the eyes and views the stimulus at a 
certain distance the whole surface should appear in a homogenous grey, which it does 
not. The stimuli in the current study were presented with an LCD video projector and 
its luminance transfer characteristics were precisely controlled using a spot-
photometer to calibrate the gamma correction). (Middle) This schematically shows 
the physical distribution of luminance in a section between the two arrows shown in 
the top stimulus. The physical contrasts (luminance modulation amplitudes) of the left 
three targets are equal. The rightmost stimulus shows an orthogonal target whose 
physical contrast has been reduced so that it perceptually matches the parallel target. 
(Bottom) Despite being physically identical the perceived contrasts are highest for the 
unflanked central stimulus, lower for the orthogonally flanked stimulus and lowest for 
the target with parallel surround.  
 
Here a combined EEG and MEG study will be performed. This will allow comparing 
the individual components of the evoked responses for physically matching and for 
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perceptually matching stimuli. The responses from an area representing perceived 
contrast should be the same for perceptually matching stimuli. When comparing 
responses to the physically matching stimuli, the orthogonal targets should evoke 
larger responses because they appear to have higher contrast. On the other hand, if an 
area encodes physical contrast, the response to the parallel and orthogonal stimuli 
with equal physical contrast should be the same, and the response to the perceptually 
matching (but physically reduced) orthogonal stimulus should be reduced.  
 
Several reasons have lead to the choice of EEG and MEG rather than functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) for physiological recording63. First EEG and 
MEG are direct measures of neural activity. Both measure electrical and magnetic 
properties of currents that follow excitatory and inhibitory postsynaptic potentials (see 
below). Second, EEG and MEG allow to separate individual stages of processing in 
the various areas. In the review of perceived brightness it has been shown, that there 
could be two striate response phases, where the later phase correlates better with 
perception. To test this requires a temporal resolution that is not available in 
functional magnetic resonance imaging64. 
  
Brief review of EEG and MEG technology 
Electroencephalography (EEG) and magnetoencephalography (MEG) both measure 
different electromagnetic consequences of excitatory and inhibitory postsynaptic 
potentials. Release of an excitatory neurotransmitter by the presynaptic cell into the 
synaptic cleft will lead to a local inflow of cations into the postsynaptic cell. This 
locally depolarises the postsynaptic cell from its resting potential of approx. –70 mV 
(relative to the extracellular space) and creates an excitatory postsynaptic potential 
(EPSP). Fig. 37A shows schematically the current flow after an EPSP in a spine on 
the apical dendrite of a typical cortical pyramidal cell. Within the immediate vicinity 
of the synapse there is an intracellular current source and an extracellular current sink. 
Because the cell membrane dividing source and sink has a high resistance and the 
intracellular fluid has a low resistance the current follows the path of lowest resistance 
and the EPSP spreads along the length of the dendrite down into the soma. There the 
intracellular space has a large cross-section and the membrane has a large surface 
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both contributing to an overall low resistance. Depending on the characteristic length 
of the cell65 and its geometry (especially the distance between soma and synapse) a 
large part of the current takes the longer low-resistance path and flows back to the 
synapse via the soma. In the extracellular space the current flows in a more extended 
fashion and spreads over a larger volume. The circuit in Fig. 37A can be modelled in 
a simplified fashion as an electrical current dipole with a positive pole at the soma and 
a negative pole at the synapse (Fig. 37B, top)(de Munck, van Dijk, & Spekreijse, 
1988; Sarvas, 1987).  
 
The surface recorded EEG measures the electric potential between a small area on the 
scalp and a reference that should be chosen to be electrically “neutral”66. If one were 
able to measure the electric scalp potential generated by a single EPSP it would be 
strongly spatially blurred by the high resistance of the skull. This means that even if 
the surface of the electrode was reduced to a single point it would still record the 
activity averaged over of a large number of neurons in the underlying cortex. The 
typical scalp electrode measures the space-averaged activity of more than 107 neurons 
(Nunez, 1981). If the synaptic events in these neurons occurred randomly in time and 
with random polarity the surface recorded potential would be zero due to this spatial 
averaging. Thus some degree of synchronicity of the occurrence of EPSPs or IPSPs is 
necessary for a “population potential” to build up and exceed the noise level created 
by background synaptic events. 
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Fig. 37: Idealised model of cortical generators of surface EEG and MEG signals. (A) 
The surface recorded EEG and MEG is believed to be largely generated by EPSPs or 
IPSPs occurring synchronously in large populations of cortical pyramidal cells. 
Pyramidal cells are oriented orthogonal to the surface of the cortex, have long apical 
dendrites with few branches and thus dendritic EPSPs and IPSPs can lead to an 
optimum separation of current source and current sink. (B) Top left: Schematic view 
of A with the intracellular “primary” current density Jp and the extracellular “volume” 
current density Jv. Extracellularly the soma acts as a current source and the synaptic 
region acts as a current sink. Bottom: The intracellular primary current generates a 
concentric magnetic field B. The local magnetic fields generated by extracellular 
currents are largely cancelled out. Top right: The circuit can be modelled by an 
equivalent current dipole (de Munck et al., 1988; Hamalainen, Hari, Ilmoniemi, 
Knuutila, & Lounasmaa, 1993; Sarvas, 1987) which gives a good approximation of 
the main electric and magnetic properties of the real circuit and can also be used to 
model small cortical areas with adjacent, co-aligned neural dipoles (Nunez, 1981). If 
the electric and magnetic properties of the individual brain compartments are known 
and also the position, orientation and strength of the dipole, the surface recorded 
electric and magnetic fields can be uniquely calculated. The current dipole model 
consists of an intracellular current that is shielded from extracellular space by 
electrical insulation (infinite resistance). It has a current source on one end and a 
current sink on the other end. 
 
MEG measures a different biophysical property of the circuit shown in Fig. 37A. 
Each current flow is accompanied by a magnetic field the direction of which is 
tangential to the current and can be estimated by the right hand thumb rule (Fig. 37B, 
bottom). The sensory evoked magnetic fields recorded at the scalp measure around 5 
to 500 femtotesla (10-15 T) and are thus very weak. The earth’s static magnetic field is 
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stronger by a factor of around 109 and the dynamic environmental noise is stronger by 
a factor of around 106 (Hamalainen et al., 1993; Hari, 1993; Malmivuo & Plonsey, 
1995). Thus, the measurement of neuromagnetism is confronted with two severe 
problems: The low signal strength and the low signal to noise ratio.  
 
Extremely weak magnetic fields can be recorded by superconducting quantum 
interference device sensors (SQUIDs) which transform magnetic flux into voltage and 
have a very high sensitivity (Brenner, Williamson, & Kaufman, 1975). They are kept 
below their critical superconducting temperature by liquid helium at –269°C. The 
cerebral magnetic field is not directly picked up by the SQUIDs but by a set of 
superconducting induction coils (flux transformers) whose axes are roughly 
orthogonal to the surface of the head and each of which have a second coil coupled to 
a SQUID (Brenner et al., 1975; Hamalainen et al., 1993). In the BTI MEG system 
used for the current study 148 such induction coils (“sensors”) are fitted into a 
“helmet” into which the subject’s head is inserted (Fig. 38A).  
 
The severe background noise problem is encountered by using magnetically shielded 
recording chambers (Fig. 38A, MS). It is also possible to use reference sensors placed 
at a distance from the receiving coil in the recording chamber that can be used to 
subtract magnetic fields generated by distant sources. Magnetic field strength falls off 
as the square of distance. Distant magnetic fields induce virtually identical currents in 
the recording and reference coils giving no net output when both are subtracted. 
Magnetic fields due to sources near to the recording coil will induce a considerably 
larger current in the recording than reference coil leading to a net output. This 
procedure reduces the noise from distant irrelevant sources67.  
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Fig. 38: (A) Recording set-up of the BTI Magnes 148 channel MEG system in 
Magdeburg. The subject’s head is positioned within an array of sensors (SA) oriented 
roughly orthogonal to the surface of the skull. The sensors are fitted into a large 
cryostat (CRYO) where they are cooled to –269°C by liquid helium. Subject and cryo 
are placed within a magnetically shielded recording chamber (MS) to reduce artefacts 
due to external noise sources. Stimuli are projected from an LCD projector (LCD) 
through a small hole in the chamber and reflected by two mirrors (M1, M2) onto the 
back of a rear-projection screen (S), which can be viewed by the subject. (B) Only 
fields generated by current sources tangential to the surface of the head generate 
magnetic fields outside the head. Thus in most cases only sources in the sulci of the 
neocortex can be recorded. Radial sources on the surface of the brain are invisible to 
the MEG and have to be detected by concurrent recording of EEG (I=current; 
H=magnetic field strength). 
 
Magnetic fields have the advantage over electrical fields that the magnetic 
permeability of the different compartments of the head is close to that of vacuum 
which means that they are not distorted as electric fields are by the high resistance of 
the skull (Lounasmaa, Hamalainen, Hari, & Salmelin, 1996). Also, the magnetic field 
recorded at the scalp is mainly generated by the highly localised intracellular current 
in the dendritic tree (primary current) whereas the surface-recorded electric potential 
is a consequence of the spread of electric current over a large volume. However, in a 
spherical symmetrical volume conductor (which can be used as a model of the head) 
only a dipole oriented tangentially to the surface can generate an external magnetic 
field. Thus, all dipoles oriented radially to the surface will not be recordable. This 
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means that MEG can only record signals from generators buried in the sulci, whereas 
surface dipoles are invisible to magnetic recording (Malmivuo & Plonsey, 1995)(Fig. 
38B). 
 
Even after noise reduction the amplitudes of evoked electric and magnetic fields 
generated by neural processing of single visual stimuli are typically too weak to be 
detected. This is not only due to the uncontrolled external noise but also to neural 
background noise generated by the majority of neurons that are not involved in 
processing of the stimulus. There is a solution that allows separation of signal and 
noise, the so-called method of “selective averaging”. This exploits the fact that the 
background noise is not correlated with the evoked signal and will thus cancel out if 
repeated samples are averaged. The evoked signal on the other hand will not be 
cancelled as long as its individual deflections occur at a constant latency after each 
stimulus (Fig. 39). The result is an averaged evoked electric and magnetic signal for 
each electrode and sensor, which can be used to interpolate the scalp topography of 
the electric and magnetic fields generated by the neural process.  
 
 
Fig. 39: Selective averaging procedure: The response evoked by a contrast reversal of 
a checkerboard stimulus is not detectable in the raw EEG. If repeated samples of the 
EEG time-locked to the reversal are averaged the background EEG is averaged out 
and the evoked signal becomes visible, here with a biphasic negative-positive 
deflection. 
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This scalp topography can be used to infer the underlying generators. If the position, 
orientation and amplitude of a neural generator is known and also the electromagnetic 
properties of the different compartments of the head then the electric and magnetic 
fields recorded at the scalp can be be uniquely calculated (Hamalainen & Sarvas, 
1989). The simplest way to model the electromagnetic properties of the head is as a 
sphere that demarks the boundary between scalp and air. This is adequate for 
magnetic fields, but for electric fields the model will also have to take into account the 
different conductivity of brain, skull and skin. This is typically achieved by modelling 
four compartments based on their mutual boundary surfaces (boundary element 
model, BEM)(Fuchs, Wagner, & Kastner, 2001; Hamalainen & Sarvas, 1989)68. 
These compartments are (1) brain and cerebrospinal fluid, (2) skull, (3) skin and (4) 
air. Boundary-element models are reconstructed for individual subjects on the basis of 
anatomical T1 MR images. 
 
Although the forward solution from a neural generator to a scalp recorded field is 
uniquely solvable there is no unique solution to the “inverse problem” of inferring the 
generator from a given scalp-recorded field (Hamalainen et al., 1993). The same 
recorded field could have in theory been generated by an infinite number of 
intracerebral dipole constellations69. Luckily the solution space can be highly 
constrained by allowing only physiologically and functionally plausible dipole 
solutions (Hari, Levanen, & Raij, 2000; Ilmoniemi, 1993; Scherg & Berg, 1991). 
First, the solution space can be restricted to the grey matter, owing to the fact that 
macroscopically recordable fields are believed to be generated mainly by cortical 
pyramidal cells. A second restriction of the solution space can be made by functional 
considerations. For example the main evoked signals by visual stimuli should be 
located in the visual rather than in the auditory cortex. 
 
Two main factors may be taken as evidence for a higher spatial resolution of MEG 
source analysis: The small distortion of magnetic fields by the skull and the fact that 
the signal is based upon the intracellular primary current rather than the volume 
current. Recent results however show that depending on dipole position and 
orientation, number of recording channels and accuracy of the volume conductor 
model either EEG or MEG can give the better estimate when recorded alone (Barth, 
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Sutherling, Broffman, & Beatty, 1986; Cohen & Cuffin, 1991; Cohen et al., 1990; 
Cuffin, 2001; Cuffin, Schomer, Ives, & Blume, 2001; Fuchs et al., 1998; Huizenga, 
van Zuijen, Heslenfeld, & Molenaar, 2001; Leahy, Mosher, Spencer, Huang, & 
Lewine, 1998; Liu, Dale, & Belliveau, 2002; Lopes da Silva, Wieringa, & Peters, 
1991; Mosher, Spencer, Leahy, & Lewis, 1993; Rose, Sato, Ducla-Soares, & Kufta, 
1991). For this reason the method used in the current study employs a co-registration 
of EEG and MEG, which jointly contribute to improve the quality of source 
estimation which under optimal conditions can have an error of less than 5 mm. 
 
Methods 
 
Subjects 
8 right-handed subjects (2 male, 6 female, age range 21 to 27) with normal vision 
(uncorrected) participated in the experiment. All subjects had prior experience with 
EEG/MEG recordings. The experimental procedures were in conformity with the 
Declaration of Helsinki. 
 
Visual stimuli 
Masking background stimuli were two large (9.8° x 9.8°) square areas of high contrast 
grating (0.79 Michelson luminance contrast) oriented at either 45° or 135° (Fig. 40, 
bottom left) into which 16 small squares of grey were simultaneously inserted (Fig. 
40, top left). Target stimuli were 16 square patches of rectangular-wave grating (6 
cpd, 1.1° x 1.1°) oriented at 45° or 135° with variable Michelson luminance contrasts 
of 0.13, 0.20, 0.32 and 0.50. The 16 targets were presented simultaneously within the 
masking background. Mean luminance was 194 cd/m2 over the entire display. In 
accordance with most previous studies of lateral masking the parallel targets were 
chosed to be in-phase with the surround. In order to decrease border effects an 
isoluminant band of 0.1° was inserted between targets and masks. The border was not 
smoothed following the results of Cannon and Fullenkamp showing that the 
“sharpness” of the edge had no influence on masking (Cannon & Fullenkamp, 1991a). 
All displays contained a central fixation spot. The high spatial frequency of 6 cpd was 
 93 
 
chosen after extensive pilot experiments. It was found to be the best trade-off between 
a high response amplitude and a maximisation of the striate contribution to the evoked 
responses. 
 
Stimuli were generated using an XG-SV1E LCD projector (SHARP Electronics 
Europe, Hamburg, Germany) that projected via two mirrors onto a rear projection 
screen in the shielded recording chamber. This was necessary to prevent electrical 
interference in the electromagnetic recordings. A hardware gamma correction was 
calibrated using an LS 110 spot photometer (Minolta Europe, Langenhagen, 
Germany) to ensure linear luminance transfer characteristics.  
 
Procedure  
The subject triggered each trial with a keypress (Fig. 40, right). A trial began with the 
presentation of the mask alone for 2000 ms. The mask remained present throughout 
the entire duration of a trial. A sequence of 8 identical stimuli, either parallel or 
orthogonal, was flashed into the holes in the background, each for 250 ms with a 
(uniformly distributed) random inter-stimulus interval of 650-850 ms. After a gap of 
2000 ms a second sequence was presented with the same timing but using the other 
orientation. Two thousand ms later the mask disappeared and the subject was required 
to give a response indicating which of the two stimulus trains had had the higher 
contrast. In this modified 2-alternative forced choice paradigm the parallel stimuli 
were “standard” stimuli against which orthogonal stimuli of different contrasts were 
tested, allowing one to estimate the orthogonal stimulus which was a subjective 
“match” to a given parallel stimulus. Our design departs from previous studies on 
lateral masking in two ways. Normally targets and masks are presented 
synchronously, which was changed in our case in order to reduce the interference 
between transient mask and target responses. Second, the stimuli were presented in 
groups of 8, a change which was made in order to increase the number of stimuli 
recorded for each condition. The design was optimised in pilot experiments to yield 
an optimum trade-off between number of events available for physiology and for 
psychophysics. 
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Fig 40: Bottom left: masking background. Middle and top left: a blown-up view of 
the area indicated by the dashed white square with superimposed orthogonal and 
parallel targets. Right: timing of an individual trial. S indicates the keypress starting 
the trial and R the subject’s response. 
 
Following preliminary studies the high contrast parallel stimulus (0.50) was paired 
with (compared to) orthogonal stimuli with contrasts 0.20, 0.32 or 0.50 (high contrast 
condition). The low contrast parallel stimulus (0.32) was paired with orthogonal 
stimuli with contrasts of 0.13, 0.20 or 0.32 (low contrast condition). Due to this 
design the total number of presentations was different for each stimulus category (600 
for the two parallel stimuli, 400 for the middle two contrast levels of the orthogonal 
stimuli and 200 for the lowest and highest orthogonal stimuli). Conditions, contrast 
levels and orientations were randomly intermixed. Subjects were instructed to 
maintain fixation throughout each trial. Fixation was monitored during the sessions 
using an infrared camera. 
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EEG/MEG data acquisition 
148 channel MEG and 32 channel EEG were simultaneously recorded at a sampling 
rate of 254 Hz filtered with a bandpass of 0.1-100 Hz. MEG was acquired with a BTI 
Magnes 2500 whole-head MEG system with 148 magnetometers (Biomagnetic 
Technologies, San Diego, USA). EEG was recorded using a 32 channel Synamps 
amplifier (NeuroScan, Herndon, USA) with an electrode cap (Electrocap 
International, Eaton, OH) covering the channels Fz, Cz, Pz, Oz, Iz, Fp1, Fp2, F3, F4, 
F7, F8, T7, T8, C3, C4, P3, P4, O9, O10, P7, P8, FC1, FC2, CP1, CP2, PO3, PO4, 
PO7, PO8 plus extra electrodes for right horizontal EOG, right vertical EOG and left 
mastoid. EEG channels were referenced to right mastoid and re-referenced offline to 
the average of right and left mastoid. MEG was subjected to an online noise reduction 
process that removed a weighted sum of environmentally induced magnetic noise 
(first order spatial gradients of the field) recorded by eight remote reference channels 
that do not pick up brain activity. Locations of EEG electrodes and MEG sensors 
were registered using a 3Space Fastrak system (Polhemus, Colchester, USA) with a 
common reference system defined relative to three anatomical landmarks (nasion, 
left/right preauricular points). These were coregistered with the individuals’ 
anatomical T1 magnetic resonance scans. In order to further enhance the individual 
peaks and remove contribution of low-frequency noise the data were digitally 
highpass-filtered at 3 Hz which does not significantly alter amplitudes of the early 
visual evoked components (Skuse & Burke, 1990). Then data were sorted into 
stimulus-locked epochs of 600 ms length with 100 ms pretrigger and subjected to 
artefact rejection which removed epochs with peak-to-peak amplitudes exceeding a 
criterion of 3.0×10-12 T for MEG or 100 µV for EEG data. 
 
Recording of transient rather than steady-state visual evoked responses (VERs) was 
chosen for several reasons: (1) Transient VERs have the advantage of minimizing the 
contribution of motion processing, which is typically observed for counter-phase 
reversing gratings used in steady-state designs (Murray & Kulikowski, 1983). (2) 
They allow segregation of time-courses into separable components corresponding to 
different processing stages. (3) They allow more straightforward equivalent current 
dipole modelling. 
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Results 
Behavioural data 
The orthogonal contrast which matches the parallel standard was estimated by 
interpolating the data with a Weibull cumulative distribution function (Weibull, 1951) 
for each condition and subject. The matching contrast can be found where the Weibull 
function takes a value of p = 0.5, which is where it is equally likely that the subject 
will judge either stimulus to be stronger. 
 
 
Fig. 41: Psychophysical equality threshold estimation for high contrast condition: A 
high contrast standard parallel target S is paired with 3 different levels of orthogonal 
stimuli. The filled circles indicate the proportion of trials in which the subject (ka81) 
chose the orthogonal stimulus to have higher contrast than the parallel standard 
stimulus as a function of the orthogonal contrast level tested. The point M where the 
probability that either of two stimuli is chosen is equal is interpolated by fitting a 
Weibull function to the data. If lateral masking were not orientation-tuned S would be 
equal to M and the judgements would be predicted by the hypothetical dashed line. 
 
Although our stimulus design departed from the literature a strong masking effect was 
measured. Fig. 41 shows psychophysical results for one subject in the high-contrast 
condition. The proportion of trials in which an orthogonal stimulus train of a certain 
contrast level (either 0.20, 0.32 or 0.50) is judged as stronger than the parallel 
stimulus train of 0.50 is plotted on the ordinate. The data show that for physically 
equal stimuli the orthogonal stimulus is judged as higher than the parallel stimulus in 
80 % of the trials. An orthogonal stimulus of about 0.33 is judged as equal to the 
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parallel standard in this subject. This occurs at porthogonal=0.5 where both stimuli are 
chosen equally often and neither of the two stimuli appears to have a higher contrast. 
The difference between parallel standard and matching contrast indicates a reduction 
in perceived contrast of the parallel stimulus due to the orientation tuning of lateral 
masking. This reduction is present for both contrast levels and all subjects. Across all 
subjects matching orthogonal grating contrasts are 0.18 for the 0.32 standard stimulus 
(one sample t-test: t[7] = -7.5, p < 0.001) and 0.33 for the 0.50 standard stimulus (one 
sample t-test: t[7] = -9.1, p < 0.001)(Fig. 42). Thus in both high and low contrast 
conditions an orthogonal stimulus requires only approx. 60 % of the contrast of a 
parallel stimulus to match. 
 
 
 
Fig. 42: Threshold reduction averaged across all 8 subjects. The dashed line shows 
the orthogonal matching contrasts that would be expected if there were no effect of 
orientation on perceived contrast. Error bars show +/- 1 SEM. 
 
Waveforms and topographies 
Electrical and magnetic responses followed a similar 3 phase waveform (Fig. 43A, 
left): The posterior EEG channels showed a sequence of positive-negative-positive 
deflections: (I) A positive component with onset latency around 80 ms and peak 
latency 100-150 ms (P100); (II) a negative component with onset latency 120-180ms 
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and peak latency 150-200 ms (N150); (III) a positive component with onset latency 
180-220 ms and peak latency 210-280 ms (P250). The MEG channels showed highly 
similar temporal profiles, but with opposite polarities for left and right hemisphere 
channels resulting in bipolar fields. The MEG components will be labelled in analogy 
to their electric counterparts with “M” (M100, M150, M250). All 3 major deflections 
show a reduction of amplitude for the parallel compared to the orthogonal stimulus 
with the same physical contrast.  
 
Fig. 43A also shows the electric and magnetic field topographies interpolated from 
the raw evoked signals for the time point 110 ms after stimulus onset, which is the 
peak of the early deflection. The electric field over the scalp shows a strong positivity 
centred on the occipital pole. The magnetic field shows a bipolar field distribution that 
is orthogonal to the electric field as would be expected if both fields were generated 
by the same source. The topographies are shown for both orthogonal and parallel 
stimuli of the same contrast (0.50). The scale has been individually set to demonstrate 
that both topographies are strikingly similar, except for a linear scaling factor. This 
topographical similarity is further demonstrated by the results of a cluster analysis 
(Everitt, 1993). Cluster analysis has been used by other groups in order to provide a 
segmentation of event-related brain topographies (Michel et al., 2001; Pascual-
Marqui, Michel, & Lehmann, 1995). Here it will be used to assess the similarity of 
topographies for the different stimulus conditions. 
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Fig. 43: (A) Left: Evoked electric and magnetic brain responses to orthogonal (red) 
and parallel stimuli (green) of same contrast (0.50) over occipital pole (subject ka81). 
EEG and MEG response are highly similar and left occipital and right occipital 
magnetic responses are mutually inverted as would be expected for a single dominant 
generator. Parallel responses are clearly reduced for all 3 major components 
(P100/M100 (I), N150/M150 (II), P250/M250 (III)). Stimulus onset was at 0 ms. 
Right: response topographies for the time indicated by the dashed vertical line (110 
ms). The top shows EEG and the bottom MEG data. The figures are individually 
scaled to demonstrate that the topography is similar for both conditions. The circle, 
box and diamond symbols indicate the scalp location of the channels shown on the 
left. (B) Results of cluster analysis for the same subject shown between 50 and 250 
ms. Each cluster is coded with a colour, each row is a stimulus category c and each 
column is a sample point t. This demonstrates that the topographies of the evoked 
responses of the 6 stimulus types (P 0.50, P 0.32, O 0.50, O 0.32, O 0.20 and O 0.13) 
are very similar at similar latencies. This means that the topographies evoked by the 
different stimuli are all similar except for a scaling factor. 
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A 177-dimensional topography vector was calculated for each time-point sampled 
between 0 and 300 ms. This vector consisted of the amplitudes of the 148 magnetic 
plus 29 electric channels (excluding the 2 eye-channels and the left mastoid) scaled to 
a unit length of 1 (Fig. 44).  
 
 
Fig. 44: Construction of a 177-dimensional topography vector for each time point (t), 
condition (c) and subject (s). 
 
The 450 topography vectors from all 75 time points and 6 conditions of one subject 
are then fed into a single cluster analysis. In a first step the distance between all 
possible pairs of the 300 vectors is computed using a Euclidian distance metric: 
 
∑
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where di,j denotes the Euclidian distance between topography vectors xi and xj and k 
runs through the 177 channels. Based upon the Euclidian distance the 450 vectors 
were segmented into 10 clusters based upon the average distance D(r,s) between all nr 
vectors xri in cluster r and all ns vectors xsj in cluster s: 
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Analyses were performed using the MATLAB statistics toolbox (Mathworks, Natick, 
USA). For further information on the clustering algorithms see Everitt (1993). The 
cluster analysis procedure is very different compared to analysing topography with 
principal component analysis (PCA)(Maier, Dagnelie, Spekreijse, & van Dijk, 1987; 
Skrandies, 1989) or independent component analysis (ICA)(Makeig, Jung, Bell, 
Ghahremani, & Sejnowski, 1997), because the topography for each time point is 
assigned to exactly one cluster. PCA and ICA on the other hand reconstruct the 
topography for each time point by a superposition of several weighted “basis 
topographies”, which are either orthogonal (PCA) or statistically independent (ICA). 
Cluster analysis was preferred to PCA and ICA because it requires only a minimal set 
of assumptions. PCA assumes that different basis vectors (topographies) are 
orthogonal, a requirement that is problematic for evoked electric and magnetic brain 
responses, because different sources can produce non-orthogonal fields. ICA requires 
a number of observations that is larger than the number of dimensions, which is not 
given for our data, where the topography vector is 177-dimensional and the number of 
samples during the main deflections of the evoked response is 75. 
 
The results for one subject are shown in Fig. 43B beneath the original waveforms and 
topographies. Before the first major deflection (I) the clusters are distributed 
randomly. During the first two major components (I,II) the responses for all 
conditions are assigned to the same topography cluster at a fixed latency. This means 
that the topographies are highly similar at a given latency, except for a possible linear 
scaling factor. The minor latency differences are presumably an effect of stimulus 
contrast, which is known to affect latency (Vassilev & Manahilov, 1986). Beginning 
with the last major deflection (III) the clusters are again distributed randomly. The 
results for all subjects are shown in Fig. 45 and confirm this pattern. 
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0 50 100 150 200 250 300
de17
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
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0 50 100 150 200 250 300
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0 50 100 150 200 250 300
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0 50 100 150 200 250 300
bz66
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
rg45
P 0.50
P 0.32
O 0.50
O 0.32
O 0.20
O 0.13
Fig. 45: Results of cluster analysis for all subjects. Each of the 10 clusters is coded 
with a colour, each row is a stimulus category c and each column is a sample point t. It 
can be seen that in most cases the topographies evoked by different stimuli are highly 
similar at the same time points, as is indicated by the fact that colour (cluster) does not 
change in a vertical section across each diagram. All subjects show cross-stimulus 
topographical similarity around the time of main deflections whereas before 100 ms 
and after 250 ms topographies are randomly distributed and the cross-stimulus 
similarity only holds for a few subjects (kd83, nn22).
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Source localisation 
There is considerable disagreement in the literature on the striate and extrastriate 
contributions to the early deflections of evoked electric and magnetic fields (Aine, 
Supek, & George, 1995; Aine et al., 1996; Foxe & Simpson, 2002; Ikeda et al., 1998; 
Jeffreys & Axford, 1972a, 1972b; Maier et al., 1987; Portin, Salenius, Salmelin, & 
Hari, 1998; Schroeder, Mehta, & Givre, 1998; Schroeder, Tenke, Givre, Arezzo, & 
Vaughan, 1991; Seki et al., 1996). This can be mainly attributed to differences in 
spatial and temporal stimulus parameters (quadrant, eccentricity, spatial frequency, 
onset versus reversal versus offset responses) to which early components respond 
sensitively. Studies of action potentials, local field potentials and current source 
densities in multiple visual areas and cortical layers reveal that synaptic activity is 
temporally extended, occurs synchronously in multiple areas, shows signs of feedback 
and polarity inversion at different processing stages and depends critically on spatial 
and temporal stimulus properties (Bullier, 2001; Creutzfeldt & Kuhnt, 1973; Lamme 
& Roelfsema, 2000; Lamme et al., 1998; Maunsell & Gibson, 1992; Schroeder et al., 
1998; Schroeder et al., 1991). Thus when using novel stimuli it is impossible to infer 
the generators by simply referring to the literature. Instead it is necessary to localise 
the dominant generators by using equivalent dipole modelling. According to its 
receptive-field tuning V1 should contribute strongly to early deflections for stimuli 
with high spatial frequencies as in our case.  
 
As the anatomical representation of a stimulus in V1 can be well estimated using 
retinotopic considerations (Aine et al., 1996; Horton & Hoyt, 1991b) two dipole seed 
points were placed to the lateral side of the calcarine sulcus of either hemisphere at a 
depth of 2 cm from the occipital pole (Fig. 46). Then two equivalent current dipoles 
(ECD) with fixed orientation and fixed location were fitted using a Nelder-Mead 
simplex minimisation algorithm (Nelder & Mead, 1965). Dipoles were constrained 
within a radius of 5 mm of the seeds and fitted using software package CURRY 
(Neuroscan, El Paso, USA) to the whole time period between 0 ms and 300 ms. A 3-
sphere boundary element model (BEM) was used and dipoles were fitted to EEG and 
MEG data concurrently. In order to reduce noise due to contributions of non-visual 
areas the MEG channels were restricted to a circular set of 72 sensors centred on Pz.  
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Fig. 46: Bounding spheres of the two-dipole fit in the calcarine sulcus shown on top 
of an anatomical T1-weighted MR-image. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 47: Measured (“data”) and fitted (“fit”) response topographies for the peaks of 
the two striate components (subject ka81). The left shows P100/M100 (“early”), the 
right N150/M150 data (“late”). The quality of fits is striking, especially regarding that 
dipoles (orange arrows) were placed on a-priori retinotopical assumptions. The 
N150/M150 is an inversion of the P100/M100 response. Data are shown as 2-D 
projections with posterior right at the bottom right. 
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The variance accounted for by two striate dipoles is 87.7 % (6.39 std) for the 
P100/M100 peak, 88.1 % (4.21 std) for the N150/M150 peak and 70.1 % (15.74 std) 
for the P250/M250 peak. Thus the early two components are dominated by striate 
responses, whereas the later component seems to have significant influences from 
other areas. The good fit between data and our model-guided forward solution for the 
striate dipoles for the early two components is shown for one subject in Fig. 47.  
 
 
 
Fig. 48: Normalized dipole strengths (NDS) and variance explained (VE) by the two-
striate dipole forward solution for all eight subjects studied. The theoretical dipoles 
give a good explanation of the two early peaks. The Roman numbers indicate the 
locations of the 3 major deflections in the raw data. The peak V1 dipole strength 
coincides closely with these peaks. 
 
Fig. 48 shows the time courses of normalized dipole strengths and percentages of 
variance explained for each subject. The quality of the fit is surprising given the 
complex stimulus shown and the fact that dipole locations were chosen on a-priori 
anatomical assumptions. It is also surprising that the N150/M150 component was so 
clearly an inversion of the P100/M100 component (Fig. 47)70. Similar results have 
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been reported by other authors and may point to re-entrant processing effects (Aine et 
al. 1995). The third component P250/M250 also had significant striate contributions, 
but the decrease in quality of fit suggests strong contributions from extrastriate visual 
areas. Besides the main effects the data also point towards the existence of an earlier 
striate effect (around 30-80ms), which is rather weak (as can be seen from the dipole 
strength) but nonetheless explains a considerable amount of variance for four of the 
subjects (nn22, nt68, kd83 and rg45). This effect did not show any difference between 
parallel and orthogonal stimuli. 
 
Contrast response functions 
For quantitative analysis of contrast responses peak amplitudes of the major evoked 
electric and magnetic responses were measured for each contrast level, stimulus type 
and subject. For MEG components left and right hemisphere deflections were 
averaged across the peak negative and peak positive channels. For EEG components 
the peak left and right hemisphere channels were averaged. In order to combine data 
across subjects the response amplitudes were normalised for each subject and 
component individually by dividing the data by their mean. These data were then used 
to plot contrast response functions (CRFs) for parallel and orthogonal stimuli (Fig. 
49). The data show the typical profile increasing monotonously with contrast 
(Boynton et al., 1999; Campbell & Kulikowski, 1972; Gopfert, Muller, Breuer, & 
Greenlee, 1998; Murray & Kulikowski, 1983; Tootell et al., 1998)71. For all electric 
and magnetic deflections the responses to collinear stimuli were reduced as compared 
to orthogonal stimuli. For two subjects (kd83, nn22) the electric and magnetic P250 
were too weak to be measured so for this component the results will be based on the 
data of only 6 subjects.  
 
CRFs were also computed for the peaks in the time-courses of estimated dipole 
strengths for the orthogonal stimuli in order to obtain a more pure estimate of striate 
cortical activity. These data were fit using the hyperbolic ratio-function, which is a 
standard model of contrast-dependent responses in primary visual cortex as mentioned 
in the previous chapter (Albrecht & Hamilton, 1982; Boynton et al., 1999; Geisler & 
Albrecht, 1997; Li & Creutzfeldt, 1984; Sclar et al., 1990). 
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Fig. 49: Contrast response functions for all components normalized and averaged 
across subjects. Error bars = +/- 1 SEM. 
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Prediction of psychophysics by physiology 
In order to assess the degree to which striate activity predicts perceived magnitude of 
contrast it was necessary to compare the striate responses for the parallel standard 
stimuli with the according orthogonal matching stimuli. The responses to the 
orthogonal matching stimuli were interpolated using the hyperbolic ratio model fitted 
for each subject. In order to assess how well perceived contrast is predicted by 
activity in primary visual cortex the analysis was restricted to the striate dipole time-
courses of the first two deflections that had a dominant origin in V1. Fig. 50 shows 
the CRFs of peak dipole amplitudes for the early striate component for parallel and 
orthogonal stimuli for one subject. The filled circle and filled square show the 
respective responses for two stimuli S (parallel) and M (orthogonal) matching in 
perceived contrast.  
 
 
Fig. 50: Dipole contrast response functions (subject ka81): Peak dipole amplitudes for 
the early striate component (P100/M100) as a function of contrast shown for parallel 
(open and filled circles) and orthogonal stimuli (open diamonds). The neural response 
to the perceptually matching orthogonal stimulus (filled square) of a high contrast 
parallel standard is interpolated from the contrast response data of the orthogonal 
stimuli for each subject by fitting a hyperbolic ratio function (equation 1). In the case 
of a perfect match between response amplitude and perceived contrast the normalized 
dipole strengths for the standard and matching stimuli should be identical (filled circle 
and the filled square). 
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If striate activity correlates with perceived contrast the responses to these two 
perceptually matching stimuli should be identical. For early and late striate 
components and both contrast levels the response amplitudes to the two physically 
identical stimuli are different and the responses to perceptually matching stimuli are 
similar (Fig. 51). Thus stimuli that are perceived to have the same contrast generate 
similar V1 responses. This holds especially for the late striate component, whereas the 
early striate component shows a slight deviation at high contrasts. Further analysis 
shows that there is a strong correlation for individual subjects between the reduction 
of perceived contrast and the reduction of the response to the parallel standard 
stimulus (P100/M100, low contrast: Pearson’s r = 0.87; P100/M100, high contrast: 
Pearson’s r = 0.77; N150/M150, low contrast: Pearson’s r = 0.87; N150/M150, high 
contrast: Pearson’s r = 0.62).  
 
Tab. 2 shows the parameters estimated for equation (1) collapsed across subjects 
which can be used for a further comparison with previously published psychophysical 
data (Boynton et al., 1999; Cannon, 1985; Legge, 1981; Legge & Foley, 1980). The 
exponent p that governs the response behaviour for mid to high-contrast stimuli 
(C>>σ) is similar for both response components (about 0.3) and comparable to those 
found in previous studies on contrast discrimination (Legge & Foley, 1980) and 
magnitude scaling (Cannon, 1985). It is also similar to the exponents fit to single cell 
responses in cat and monkey striate cortex (Geisler & Albrecht, 1997), as well as to 
fMRI contrast-response functions in human striate cortex (Boynton et al., 1999). In 
psychophysical models the inflection point in the contrast representation function is 
used to explain the dip of the threshold versus contrast (TvC) function which occurs at 
low contrasts around 0.01 (Fig. 33, middle left)(Legge, 1981; Legge & Foley, 1980). 
Also the inflection point max (R’(C)) of our contrast-response functions was 
computed. For the late striate component (0.03 for N150/M150) the estimate is in a 
similar range as human psychophysics, but not for the early striate component (0.13 
for P100/M100). 
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Fig. 51: Mean response amplitudes averaged across subjects of striate components to 
parallel standard stimuli (P), orthogonal stimuli with same physical contrast (O) and 
same perceived contrast (OM). Response amplitudes are different for physically 
identical stimuli (P, O) and similar for perceptually matching stimuli (P, OM). 
Especially the N150/M150 component closely parallels perception. The dotted line 
shows the location of the mean for the parallel stimulus. Statistics were computed to 
test for an overall effect of stimulus category and single tests were performed for the 
pairs (P - O) and (P - OM): (A) ANOVA F[1;7] = 33.6, p < 0.001; paired-samples t-test 
for comparison O-P t[7] = -5.8, p < 0.001; comparison O-OM t[7] = -0.8, p = 0.454; (B) 
F[1;7] = 88.1, p < 0.001, comparison O-P t[7] = -9.4, p < 0.001, comparison O-OM t[7] = 
2.8, p = 0.028; (C) F[1;7] = 13.8, p = 0.007, comparison O-P t[7] = -3.7, p = 0.008; 
comparison O-OM t[7] = -0.743, p = 0.482; (D) F[1;7] = 12.7, p = 0.009; comparison O-
P t[7] = -3.5, p = 0.010, comparison O-OM t[7] = -1.2, p = 0.288. Error bars display +/- 
1 SEM. 
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 p Q σ max (R’) RMS (fit) 
P100/M100 0.36 1.36 0.23 0.13 0.06 
N150/M150 0.29 1.06 0.13 0.03 0.03 
 
Tab. 2: Parameters of the fitted hyperbolic ratio functions collapsed across 8 subjects. 
 
Discussion 
Using a lateral masking paradigm that allowed the dissociation of physical and 
perceived contrast, it has been demonstrated that activity of primary visual cortex 
correlates closely with perceived contrast but not with physical contrast. Target 
stimuli that were perceived to have the same contrast but whose physical contrasts 
differed as much as 40 % lead to the same response amplitude in V1. The data also 
demonstrate a temporal development in the rescaling process. The first striate 
deflection already predicts perceived better than physical contrast. The second 
deflection fits the perceptual data even better, and also extrapolates well beyond the 
range of contrasts measured to predict the dip in the contrast discrimination data for 
low contrasts shown in previous studies (Boynton et al., 1999; Legge, 1981; Legge & 
Foley, 1980). Both components also allow good prediction of individual differences 
in perceived contrast reduction.  
 
Previous results showing a lack of binocular transfer in lateral masking (Chubb et al., 
1989) despite its orientation selectivity have been used to argue for a strong role of 
primary visual cortex in the representation of perceived contrast. On the one hand V1 
is the last processing stage with substantial populations of cells with monocular 
dominance in visual cortex (LeVay et al., 1975). On the other hand it is the first stage 
of orientation-selective processing and can thus account for the orientation tuning of 
lateral masking. Subcortical visual neurons in the lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN) are 
not orientation selective, so targets with the same physical contrast should be masked 
in a similar manner by parallel and orthogonal flanks, at least in the feed-forward 
sweep of processing. Likewise, a lower contrast orthogonal stimulus matched in 
perceived contrast to the parallel stimulus should evoke less LGN activation. If the 
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stimulus representation in V1 were similarly based on physical contrast responses, 
evoked V1 responses should also follow this pattern. Our results, however, show 
similar responses for the contrast metamers and different responses for physically 
identical stimuli. 
 
Numerous studies at the level of single cells and populations have demonstrated that 
primary visual cortex exhibits surround-effects that can account for the current data 
(Blakemore & Tobin, 1972; Grinvald, Lieke, Frostig, & Hildesheim, 1994; Kapadia et 
al., 2000; Levitt & Lund, 1997; Nelson & Frost, 1978; Polat, Mizobe, Pettet, 
Kasamatsu, & Norcia, 1998; Sengpiel et al., 1997; Walker et al., 1999). Specifically, 
several studies have directly shown the influence of surround effects on contrast 
transfer functions (Polat et al., 1998), and the dependency of surround effects on the 
relative contrast between centre and surround (Levitt & Lund, 1997; Polat et al., 1998; 
Somers et al., 1998; Toth, Rao, Kim, Somers, & Sur, 1996). It is possible that the 
anatomical substrate of this surround modulation is feedback from higher visual areas. 
Mutual feed-forward and feedback connections are known to exist between V1 and 
many extrastriate visual areas (Bullier, 2001; Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000; Lamme et 
al., 1998; Salin & Bullier, 1995). However the most detailed study so far showed that 
inactivation of V2 has no effect on the surround modulation of responses in V1 
(Hupe, James, Girard, & Bullier, 2001). A second candidate is the rich plexus of 
horizontal connections in primary visual cortex. These connections have a range of up 
to 8 mm and tend to preferentially link iso-oriented orientation columns (Gilbert, 
1992; Gilbert & Wiesel, 1979; Malach et al., 1993; Martin & Whitteridge, 1984; 
Mitchison & Crick, 1982; Rockland et al., 1982; Schmidt et al., 1997). This 
orientation anisotropy is of special interest because it may be able to account for the 
orientation tuning of lateral masking. The temporal dynamics observed in our study 
may provide a further clue as to the mechanisms. Horizontal connections are slow (ca. 
0.1-0.3 m/s, cf. Bringuier, Chavane, Glaeser, & Fregnac, 1999; Girard, Hupe, & 
Bullier, 2001; Grinvald et al., 1994) whereas feed-forward and feedback connections 
are fast (ca. 3.5 m/s, cf. Girard et al., 2001). Based on estimates by Bullier (2001) a 
feed-forward-feedback cycle between V1 and V2 could be completed within 4 ms. 
Horizontal propagation across a distance of half the size of our targets (0.55°) should 
take approx. 55 ms. The fact that our second component predicts perception better 
thus fits in with a slow horizontal integration process. 
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It should be noted that some other masking paradigms can produce an opposite effect 
of cross-orientation inhibition (Burr & Morrone, 1987; Morrone, Burr, & Maffei, 
1982; Morrone, Burr, & Speed, 1987) when using superimposed targets and masks. 
These effects can be explained by models of local divisive inhibition (Carandini, 
Heeger, & Movshon, 1997). Our results also differ from those of Polat and Norcia, 
who observed facilitation for collinear and suppression for orthogonal target-flank 
combinations (Polat & Norcia, 1996, 1998). However these authors used steady-state 
visual evoked potentials, rendering it difficult to judge whether they recorded 
predominantly striate activity. They also found their collinear facilitation effects at far 
lower contrasts than used here. A subsequent single-cell study of the same authors 
revealed a biphasic dependency of surround interactions on contrast, with the 
interaction being facilitatory for low and inhibitory for high target contrasts (Polat et 
al., 1998). In their earlier studies Polat and Norcia  presumably recorded from the 
low-contrast end, while here recordings were taken from the high-contrast end of this 
biphasic function. 
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Chapter 6 
General discussion 
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Perceived contrast and primary visual cortex 
The present study has for the first time demonstrated a close relationship between 
perceived contrast and response amplitudes in primary visual cortex in a population of 
normal subjects. Several visual areas respond to monotonous increases in contrast 
with monotonous increases in their response amplitude (Boynton et al., 1999) and 
could thus be counted as possible candidates to represent perceived contrast. The few 
previous studies directly investigating the relationship have relied on controversial 
assumptions about the shape of the perceived contrast function, which limits their 
ability to link neural responses to perception (Fiorentini & Maffei, 1973; Franzen & 
Berkley, 1975). They also relied on steady-state VEPs that bear no simple relationship 
to underlying visual areas. The current study has demonstrated that even stimuli 
whose physical contrast differs by as much as 40% but that are perceived to have the 
same contrast evoke responses of the same amplitude at a late stage of processing in 
V1. Furthermore, the study has for the first time concurrently recorded psychophysics 
and physiology in such a constancy paradigm. The studies on brightness constancy in 
V1 on the other hand have relied on general assumptions on the similarity between 
perception in humans and cats (MacEvoy & Paradiso, 2001)72. 
 
The experiment can now be interpreted within the framework formulated in chapter 2. 
It presents evidence that two important criteria are fulfilled. First, when two stimuli 
are physically identical but one is perceived to have a higher contrast then the 
response amplitude for that stimulus is higher. This presents evidence for the 
isomorphism requirement: 
 
 
))(),((),(:, 212121 qfqfBqqAQqq ⇒∈∀ . 
 
This means that the perceptual relation A (“q1 is perceived to have higher contrast 
than q2”) is preserved at a late stage of processing in V1 by the relation B (“the late 
striate response to q1 has a higher amplitude than the response to q2”). Furthermore 
the study provides evidence for single-valuedness since the same perceived magnitude 
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corresponds to the same response amplitude even when using very different physical 
contrasts: 
 
)()(:, 212121 qfqfqqQqq =⇒=∈∀ . 
 
The study has also revealed that the close correspondence between perceived contrast 
and V1 response amplitude holds best for later stages of processing (the “late” striate 
component). This temporal unfolding of the response might even give a further 
explanation as to why several studies failed to find a correlation between V1 
responses and perceptual experience. It suggests that in some cases this correlation 
may only be present for the late temporal stages of V1 processing. Supporting this 
idea, Kinoshita and Komatsu (2001) showed that representation of the luminance of 
large homogenous fields is present at late (sustained) but not at early (transient) 
phases of striate processing. Likewise, Super and coworkers (2001) demonstrated that 
conscious perception of texture-defined figures critically depends on late rather than 
early striate responses. They believe this is a consequence of feedback processes from 
extrastriate visual areas. Several other authors have stressed the role of re-entrant 
processing for visual awareness (Bridgeman, 1975, 1980, 2001; Di Lollo, Enns, & 
Rensink, 2000; Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000; Lamme, Super, Landman, Roelfsema, & 
Spekreijse, 2000; Stoerig, 2001). 
 
A considerable body of further evidence has been presented that adds to these results 
and shows that V1 also fulfils other criteria formulated in chapter 2. On the one hand 
striate cortex is strongly necessary for contrast perception, which does not hold for 
other visual areas except V2 (and possibly V3). The clearest points of evidence for 
this being that lesions to V1 always lead to blindness, and it is not possible to elicit 
phosphenes by stimulating extrastriate cortex in these patients (Cowey & Walsh, 
2000). V1 is also the cortical site at which the injectivity criterion is most closely 
fulfilled: 
 
)()(:, 212121 qfqfqqQqq ≠⇒≠∈∀ . 
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To recapitulate, this states that different perceived contrasts will always have to be 
mapped to different response amplitudes. It was proposed in chapter 2 to assess 
injectivity by testing for its consequences.  
 
The first consequence is covariance, which has been shown to hold above for the 
relationship between perceived contrast and V1 responses. V1 correlates with changes 
of perceived contrast in binocular rivalry (Polonsky et al., 2000) and shows a similar 
scaling with contrast as single-cell and population responses in V1 (Boynton et al., 
1999; Cannon, 1985; Geisler & Albrecht, 1997; Georgeson, 1991; Sclar et al., 1990).  
 
The second consequence is that the V1 would have to have the resolutional grain to 
represent differences in perceived contrast. It can be assumed that V1 has this grain, 
simply because V1 can account for contrast discrimination (Boynton et al., 1999; 
Geisler & Albrecht, 1997) and that requires at least the same resolution as perceived 
differences, if not an even higher resolution. In this respect perceived contrast is one 
of the only dimensions for which the grain requirement has been demonstrated at all. 
 
Future studies may help further elucidate the role of extrastriate visual areas in 
contrast perception. This would need to be studied using single-cell recording in 
animals or using fMRI, which can give a detailed resolution of the different 
extrastriate visual areas (DeYoe, Bandettini, Neitz, Miller, & Winans, 1994; DeYoe et 
al., 1996; Engel, Glover, & Wandell, 1997; Engel et al., 1994), however with a lack of 
temporal resolution. Preliminary fMRI studies performed by the author in Magdeburg 
have confirmed the possibility of recording contrast response functions in fMRI, as 
has been shown by other authors (Boynton et al., 1999; Tootell et al., 1998). However 
the logic of the current study was not applicable because it proved impossible to 
separate target and mask responses. First, the spatial resolution of fMRI was not high 
enough to enable one to construct stimuli, where target and mask would activate 
different volume elements (voxels). Stimuli that were large enough to do so were 
constructed according to the known human cortical magnification factor (Horton & 
Hoyt, 1991b), but in these stimuli the masking effect was strongly reduced. A 
different strategy would be to separate target and mask transients in time, as in the 
present study. However, due to the temporal extension of the BOLD response the 
targets and masks would have to be separated so far in time, that eye movements 
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could not be prevented during individual trials. However, a different route is available 
and will be approached in a future study. Perceived contrast can also be modulated by 
the adaptation state of the visual system. Thus, orientation selective adaptation can be 
used to reduce the perceived contrast of targets in a similar manner as in the present 
study (Georgeson, 1991). This will again enable the separation of physical and 
perceived contrast and will allow the comparison of responses evoked by various 
visual areas to stimuli that are perceived to have the same contrast. A further route 
will be to compare the shape of the perceived contrast function using direct magnitude 
estimation (Cannon, 1985) to the shape of contrast response functions in various 
visual areas. Together with the present study this should provide a very detailed 
picture of the representation of perceived contrast in the visual system. Furthermore, it 
will be attempted to compare the degree of brain state coherency between the first and 
the second striate components. It could be hypothesized, that the degree of coherency 
may be higher during the late striate process, reflecting an integrated stage of 
processing (Rodriguez et al., 1999; Varela, Lachaux, Rodriguez, & Martinerie, 2001; 
von der Malsburg, 1997). A set of spectral and non-spectral measured to this ends has 
recently been developed and is currently being applied to neuromagnetic data (Ernst, 
Haynes, Heinze, & Pawelzik, 2002). 
 
Refutation of some counter-arguments 
The current study has delineated the watershed between exogenous representation of 
physical stimulus properties and the perceptual level of representation. The results 
demonstrate that the watershed might be as early as primary visual cortex, thus 
putting into question claims that V1 cannot directly encode a subdimension of 
conscious perception (Crick & Koch, 1995, 1998; Koch & Braun, 1996a, 1996b; Rees 
et al., 2002). The counter-examples that have been forward to support this claim will 
now be discussed. Most of these were aimed to show a failure of correlation between 
V1 response properties and certain properties of our conscious experience.  
 
V1 does not correlate with perception 
On the one hand are arguments based on data that V1 does not represent certain 
features such as perceived depth or perceived colour. However important these data 
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are in identifying the cortical representation of these specific features, they do not 
imply that other features such as perceived brightness and contrast could not be 
represented in V1. The above discussion of high-level features has shown that they 
are most likely to be represented in a distributed fashion in extrastriate visual cortex. 
Crick and Koch (1998) for example argue that the fact that responses of colour-
selective cells in V1 do not exhibit colour constancy means that we cannot be aware 
of activity in these striate cells. However, as pointed out above, there are only 2 areas 
that could fulfil the necessity and mapping requirements that would be needed for an 
area to represent perceived colour, namely V4 and V8. V1 certainly does not 
represent perceived colour, simply because stimulation of V1 rarely leads to coloured 
phosphenes, whereas stimulation of the fusiform gyrus does. 
 
Depth perception 
Crick and Koch (1998) have also argued that primary visual cortex does not correlate 
with depth perception. Neurons in V1 respond to stereoscopic depth cues that do not 
lead to depth perception. Early studies suggested an important role of primary visual 
cortex for stereoscopic depth perception (Barlow, Blakemore, & Pettigrew, 1967; 
Pettigrew, Nikara, & Bishop, 1968) and some single neurons in V1 are known to 
respond to disparity as precisely as psychophysical depth judgements (Prince, 
Pointon, Cumming, & Parker, 2000). However, V1 responds equally to correlated 
(contrast matched) as to anti-correlated (contrast reversed) stereoscopically displaced 
dots, only the former of which lead to a percept of depth. Thus V1 processing is most 
likely a stage prior to the solution of the correspondence problem (Cumming & 
Parker, 1997, 2000). V1 also responds to absolute (or retinal) disparity but not to 
relative disparity, which refers to the difference in absolute disparities between two 
points in different depths (Cumming & Parker, 2000). Perceptual measures however 
have been shown to be highly sensitive to relative disparity (Westheimer, 1979). Thus 
V1 is unlikely to represent perceived depth.  
 
There are however plenty more candidates: It has been shown that also various other 
visual areas (V2, V3, V3A, V4, IT, MT, MST) respond more or less vigorously to 
disparity (extensively reviewed in Gonzalez & Perez, 1998). Two of these areas (V3A 
and MT+) have been demonstrated to be closely related to psychophysical 
measures73.  
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Binocular rivalry 
There was a large and still ongoing debate on the locus of perceptual alternation in 
binocular rivalry. At first sight the lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN) and monocular 
cells in layer 4 of primary visual cortex would seem highly suitable candidates to 
account for binocular rivalry. Inter-ocular suppression is known to exist in LGN but it 
occurs also for stimuli that do not lead to rivalry74. The role of V1 in binocular rivalry 
is somewhat inconclusive: some authors find evidence for rivalry75 and others do not. 
In a number of experiments recording from single cells in monkey visual cortex 
Logothetis and co-workers found that V1 only slightly correlated with the dominant 
percept in rivalry, but that specialised extrastriate areas showed strong correlation 
depending on the features involved (reviewed in Blake & Logothetis, 2002; Leopold 
& Logothetis, 1999; Logothetis, 1998). This was supported by several human fMRI 
studies involving playback (Lumer, Friston, & Rees, 1998), autocorrelation (Lumer & 
Rees, 1999) and category tagging paradigms (Tong et al., 1998). 
 
However two recent experiments specifically designed to assess the participation of 
V1 in rivalry have lead to a different picture. In most earlier studies one of the two 
rivalling inputs is a complex shape or object, stimuli for which inferior temporal lobe 
structures are known to be highly selective. Thus there is not only a local change in 
spatial pattern but also in the mapping to an object category (see chapter 2). The study 
by Polonsky and coworkers (2000) used conflicting orientation stimuli “tagged” with 
the low level feature contrast (Fig. 52). This rivalry was purely based on low level 
features and did not permit complex semantic interpretation. The authors could 
demonstrate that the V1 signal was high during dominance of the orientation that was 
tagged with the high contrast and low during dominance of the orientation tagged 
with the low contrast. A study by Tong further investigated the role of inter-ocular 
switching by comparing BOLD fMRI responses from the monocular region in V1 
representing the blind spot (Tong & Engel, 2001). For the blind spot representation 
BOLD fMRI activity is higher during phases of ipsilateral eye dominance than 
contralateral eye dominance. Using event related potentials it was recently 
demonstrated that bottom-up processing of visual stimuli presented to the suppressed 
eye are significantly attenuated (as compared to the dominant eye) as early as striate 
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cortex (de Labra & Valle-Inclan, 2001; Valle-Inclan, Hackley, de Labra, & Alvarez, 
1999). 
 
How can this lack of correlation in single unit recordings from V1 be reconciled with 
the findings of Polonsky et al. (2000) and Tong et al (2001)? One possible 
explanation could be found in the data of Fries. They recorded from the primary 
visual cortex of awake strabismic cats during inter-ocular rivalry. Using optokinetic 
nystagmus as an indicator of perceptual dominance they could show that neurons 
coding a currently dominant percept increased their synchrony as measured by cross 
correlation whereas non dominant percepts decreased their synchrony (Fries, 
Roelfsema, Engel, Konig, & Singer, 1997). This is in accord with a model by Lumer. 
Perceptual rivalry between input from both eyes may be due to a lack of 
synchronisability between monocular inputs (Lumer, 1998). If the relative timing of 
spikes is what leads to perceptual dominance then perceptual alternation could 
possibly be achieved with only small changes in spike rates. 
 
 
Fig. 52: Binocular rivalry between gratings of orthogonal orientations that bear no 
complex object interpretation. The two orientations are tagged with a “contrast 
marker”: When the low contrast stimulus (green) gives way to the high contrast 
stimulus (red) there is an increase in activity in primary visual cortex and vice versa 
(Polonsky et al. 2000). The contrast difference alone does not lead to rivalry. 
 
 
No perceptual effects of changes in single-cell responses 
If there were cases where perception changes along a certain low-level feature 
dimension but not the response in V1 this would mean a violation of the covariance 
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criterion and would mean V1 cannot account for this perceptual difference by 
adopting a different state. As discussed just now, the cases that have been brought 
forward either relate to visual features that are far more likely to be represented in 
other visual areas, or to cases where closer scrutiny does actually show a covariance 
of V1 if the appropriate stimuli are chosen and if the right response property of the 
neural population is chosen (e.g. spike synchronisation). A different type of argument 
against representation of a feature dimension in V1 would be the demonstration that 
perception does not always follow response changes in V1. If the neural population 
that hypothetically encodes a feature dimension changes its state then one would 
expect that the perceptual state also changes76. This has been supported by two 
empirical paradigms, orientation selective adaptation without awareness and flicker 
fusion. 
  
Selective adaptation without visual awareness 
In a series of behavioural experiments Sheng He and others (He, Cavanagh, & 
Intriligator, 1996; He & MacLeod, 2001) demonstrated that orientation-specific 
adaptation is possible with grating stimuli even when observers cannot perceive their 
orientation. To achieve this the adapting grating had to be either (a) presented at great 
eccentricities and surrounded by masks (He et al., 1996) or (b) have such a high 
spatial frequency that it was beyond the resolvability threshold, which was achieved 
using laser interferometer patterns (He & MacLeod, 2001). The unperceived 
orientations of the gratings nonetheless lead to adaptation, which was measured 
indirectly as a reduced contrast sensitivity and by tilt aftereffects on gratings 
presented after the adaptation. As orientation selective adaptation can not occur before 
V1 this ingenious study suggests that it is possible to activate cells in primary visual 
cortex selectively (i.e. differentially) without awareness of the stimulus, thus 
questioning if V1 responses really correlate with awareness of low-level visual 
features (here spatial pattern). 
 
One way to respond to this argument would of course be to drop the assumption that 
V1 represents any dimension of visual awareness, because our perception does not 
correlate with these V1 responses leading to orientation selective adaptation. This 
would mean sacrificing the established body of evidence presented above (showing 
that necessity and mapping requirements are fulfilled in V1), and switching to a 
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hypothetical different neural population. However other neural populations fail to 
correlate with low-level perception in far more serious ways, such as not being 
necessary at all for low-level visual perception. Maybe a revisit of the mapping 
requirements could point towards a different solution. Possibly the problem is one of 
choosing the right subset of cells in V1. Not every neuron in V1 must necessarily 
correlate with a given perceptual dimension. V1 has a vast number of functionally 
distinct cells, so that it may have subsets of cells for different feature dimensions (Fig. 
53). The simple cell model used in many studies that has a tuning varying in 
orientation and spatial frequency and that can be used to account for elementary 
contrast and spatial pattern perception is certainly a strong simplification. One further 
functional distinction may exist between cells representing perceived contrast and 
perceived brightness. 
 
Orientation selectivity can be found as early as the first recipient layers 4Cα and 4Cβ 
in primary visual cortex (Hawken & Parker, 1984). Thus, it could be hypothesized, 
that the high-resolution adapting stimuli of He and MacLeod (2001) selectively adapt 
the input layer, but do not get passed on to the output stages of primary visual cortex. 
Also, it has been shown in the present study that lateral masking occurs as early as the 
first responses in primary visual cortex. Thus, the fact that He and Cavanagh’s lateral 
masking stimulus is invisible could be due to an early bottom-up filtering process, 
preventing the stimulus from participating in the late stages of representation, which 
correlate with conscious perception.  
 
 
 124 
 
 
Fig. 53: Major feed-forward routes through primary visual cortex taken by projections 
from parvocellular (P), magnocellular (M) and koniocellular (K) cells in lateral 
geniculate nucleus. The connections are ordered by source layer (Callaway, 1998; 
Casagrande & Kaas, 1994; Kuljis, 1994; Lund, Yoshioka, & Levitt, 1994; Merigan & 
Maunsell, 1993; Peters, 1994; Preuss, Qi, & Kaas, 1999). The separated 
retinogeniculate streams project to separate layers of primary visual cortex77. The 
magnocellular layers project to layer 4Cα78, and from there the main projections go 
via 4B to MT and the thick stripes of V2. The parvocellular layers of LGN project in 
their majority to layer 4Cβ and from there the main projections pass blob and 
interblob regions of layer 2/3 and project to different subdivisions of V2. The 
koniocellular layers project in their majority to the cytochrome-oxydase blobs in layer 
2/3. Furthermore at least two within-area feedback loops have been identified within 
V1 (Callaway, 1998). The complexity of layers and connectivities is paralleled by a 
multitude of response profiles with different selectivity profiles (DeValois & 
DeValois, 1990; Lennie, 1998).  
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V1 responds to flicker beyond flicker fusion frequency 
The most discussed piece of evidence within this category is the fact that activity in 
primary visual cortex can follow stimulus changes that occur at far higher frequencies 
than we are able to perceive (Crick & Koch, 1998; Gur & Snodderly, 1997; Rees et 
al., 2002). If the luminance of a uniform field is modulated at a mid range frequency 
(say 5 Hz) the EEG potential recorded over the occipital pole will show a strong 
oscillatory contribution at precisely the frequency of the stimulus along with weaker 
responses at the subharmonics and at higher harmonics (Herrmann, 2001; Lyskov, 
Ponomarev, Sandstrom, Mild, & Medvedev, 1998; Maier et al., 1987; Regan, 1968; 
Spekreijse, Estevez, & Reis, 1977; Sternheim & Cavonius, 1972; Van der Tweel & 
Lunel, 1965). Interestingly the frequency of the fundamental can be recorded even 
beyond typical frequency values for flicker fusion (Herrmann, 2001; Lyskov et al., 
1998; Spekreijse et al., 1977; Van der Tweel & Lunel, 1965), where the perception of 
flicker gives way to the perception of a uniform grey surface. This can be interpreted 
to indicate that primary visual cortex has information about stimulus features that we 
do not perceive.  
 
As with most visual thresholds the flicker fusion border is not fixed but strongly 
dependent on stimulus properties such as size or modulation depth (Spekreijse et al., 
1977; Van der Tweel & Lunel, 1965; Watson, 1986). Modulation depth refers to the 
luminance difference between the bright and dark phases of the flickering stimulus. If 
modulation depth is increased, flicker is perceived at higher frequencies. This can be 
seen in Fig. 54A. In order to perceive a flicker at 10 Hz one has to choose a 
modulation depth of more than approx. 5 % (dashed line). In order to perceive a 
flicker of 20 Hz one has to choose a modulation of over approx. 50 % (dotted line). In 
this case a very small surface was modulated. Using different stimulus parameters 
values of above 50 Hz can be obtained.  
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Fig. 54: (A) Left axis, circles: Flicker fusion thresholds modified from Spekreijse et 
al. (1977). The critical modulation depth is plotted as a function of flicker frequency 
for a stimulus of 22’ (dashed and dotted lines: threshold modulation depths for 10 Hz 
and 20 Hz respectively). Right axis, stars: Amplitude of the steady state fundamental 
in the frequency range where the perceptual transition from flicker to a uniform 
surface occurs (data estimated visually from Herrmann 2001 figures 2 and 3). (B) 
Concurrent measurement of flicker fusion threshold (o) and steady state VEP 
thresholds (+) using small grating stimuli (Sternheim & Cavonius 1972). 
 
Recordings in cat and monkey primary and secondary visual cortex (Gur & 
Snodderly, 1997; Rager & Singer, 1998) have confirmed that both these areas show 
steady state responses up to approx. 50-60 Hz (as shown using single cell recordings, 
multi-unit recordings and local field potentials)79. The fact that steady state VEPs, 
single cells and local field potentials follow stimulus frequencies beyond flicker 
fusion should not obscure the fact that the amplitude of the response in most cases 
does show a strong decrease in the range of flicker fusion (Fig. 54A, right axis). Due 
to the dependency of thresholds on other stimulus parameters it seems necessary to 
record the critical fusion frequency and the steady state VEP amplitude concurrently. 
This was done in a study by Sternheim & Cavonius (1972). They used phase 
reversing gratings that have an additional advantage of keeping overall retinal 
illumination constant throughout a cycle. After measuring the response amplitudes for 
various modulation depths they extrapolated the data to obtain the physiological 
threshold modulation depth. Using this procedure the perceptual and physiological 
thresholds closely match (Fig. 54B). An interesting result regarding the temporal 
resolution of perception and responses in V1 comes from Brindley and Lewin’s 
(1968) studies using direct cortical stimulation of the primary visual cortex. 
Surprisingly there was no flicker fusion at high frequencies. The flicker rate was 
directly related to the frequency of the pulsed stimulation (see Fig. 9C) even far above 
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100 Hz80. This points to a close correlation between V1 response modulation and 
perceived brightness. 
 
A recent study by Rager and Singer (1998) may help towards understanding the fact 
that high frequency responses can often be recorded from V1 despite our inability to 
perceive flicker. They stimulated with frequencies between 2 and 50 Hz and recorded 
multi-unit activity and local field potentials from primary and secondary visual cortex 
in anaesthetised cats (Fig. 55). An inspection of their data reveals that multi-unit 
activity in V2 is actually stronger than in V1 at higher frequencies (compare their 
figures 4C, 5C) bringing into question whether the high frequency steady state EEG 
response is actually mainly generated in V1. Also multi-unit activity and local field 
potentials show a strong decrease in the range of critical fusion frequency, especially 
when stimulated with stimuli confined to their receptive fields. The authors were also 
able to demonstrate that the responses to high-frequency flicker are not monotonous 
functions of frequency but show prominent strong peaks existence of resonance 
frequencies at multiples of certain low fundamentals. Herrmann (2001) showed the 
same for steady-state EEG. These are interpreted to reflect resonance phenomena 
related to endogenous rhythms around 40 Hz which have been brought in connection 
with feature binding and visual awareness (Basar-Eroglu, Struber, Schurmann, 
Stadler, & Basar, 1996; Crick & Koch, 1990; Eckhorn et al., 1988; Engel, Fries, 
Konig, Brecht, & Singer, 1999; Engel & Singer, 2001; Gray & Singer, 1989; 
Metzinger, 1995; Treisman, 1996; von der Malsburg, 1997).  
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Fig. 55: High frequency responses as resonance phenomena. The power spectrum is 
shown as a function of stimulation frequency for (A) multi-unit activity (MUA) and 
(B) local field potential (LFP). Power is indicated as the diameter of the filled circle 
for each position on the stimulation frequency / response frequency grid. A power 
spectrum for a single stimulation frequency can be viewed by selecting a vertical line 
in the plot. The f, 2f and 3f symbols indicate responses at the fundamental frequency 
and the first two harmonics. It is clear that the response amplitude strongly declines 
for both MUA and LFP between 20 and 50 Hz. Multi unit activity was obtained by 
bandpass filtering the electrode signal from 1-100 Hz. Local field potential was 
obtained by bandpass filtering the signal from 1-3 kHz. Modified plots from Rager 
and Singer (1998), figures 11 C, E. 
 
Lack of connectivity 
One popular defining criterion of visual awareness is that to be aware of 
representations means to have them under executive control for arbitrary action 
patterns, especially for verbal report (Crick & Koch 1995, 1998; Chalmers 1996). 
Crick and Koch (1995, 1998) argue that this means that the neural population has to 
have a direct projection to “the planning stages of the brain”, i.e. to prefrontal cortex. 
They support this by the fact that complete ablation of the frontal lobes in monkeys 
leads to complete blindness, despite response properties in primary visual cortex 
remaining largely normal (Nakamura & Mishkin, 1986). This position is then used to 
argue that V1 could not represent any feature dimension, because it lacks a direct 
projection to the prefrontal cortex and to the frontal lobes in general, and thus 
processes in V1 could not be accessible in the same way as our conscious perception. 
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Other authors have criticised this notion that neurons in decision space must 
necessarily have a direct connection to those in perceptual space (Block, 1996; Pollen, 
1995). A different substrate that could be used for executive access could be the 
extensive feedback projections that most visual areas have onto V1 (Fig. 56). Bullier 
(2001) for example has estimated that a feedback projection from V2 to V1 could be 
completed within 2 ms. V2 in turn has mutual projections to several areas in the 
frontal lobes (Felleman & Van Essen, 1991). The feedback projections from V2 to V1 
are slightly more branched than the feed-forward projections, but nonetheless largely 
preserve retinotopy (Rockland, 1994, 1997). This means that there is a suitable neural 
candidate that could account for executive access to V1, namely via fast V2 to V1 
connections. 
 
 
Fig. 56: Feed-forward and feedback connections to and from visual area V1 (based on 
data by Bullier et al., 1994; Casagrande & Kaas, 1994; Felleman & Van Essen, 1991; 
Kuljis, 1994; Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000; Merigan & Maunsell, 1993; Rockland, 
1994, 1997)(PUL=pulvinar; SC=superior colliculus). 
 
Modularity and binding 
In the preceding chapters it has been demonstrated that some dimensions of conscious 
perception are most likely to be represented in primary visual cortex, whereas others 
are most likely to be represented in a number of other visual areas. There is obviously 
a clear “multiple dissociation” between the sites representing different features. As 
has been shown above perceived high-velocity motion is most likely to be represented 
in the human MT+ complex, whereas perceived colour hues are represented in the 
fusiform gyrus and representation of high-level object properties occurs in lateral 
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occipital cortex and in the fusiform gyrus. This goes beyond the previously postulated 
dissociation between areas that are specialised for processing different visual features 
and demonstrates that our conscious perception of these features is also modularly 
represented. This naturally brings up the question of why perceptual experience is that 
of a coherent “whole”, rather than of a fragmented set of different feature dimensions.  
 
The search for a mechanism of integration is also known as the “binding problem”. 
This refers to the question of how the brain achieves the integration of representations 
that are processed by different neural populations into a coherent percept. These 
neural populations can be separated within visual areas, such as in cases where objects 
in different parts of the visual field are grouped according to Gestalt laws such as 
proximity, similarity, common motion or common fate (Wertheimer, 1923). It has 
been demonstrated that the brain may use time as an additional dimension to separate 
neural representations belonging to different objects (Engel, Roelfsema, Fries, Brecht, 
& Singer, 1997). Spike cross-correlation between neurons processing spatially 
separated stimuli that are perceived as belonging to the same object is enhanced and 
shows marked peaks pointing towards a phase-coupling of their responses (Engel, 
Konig, Kreiter, & Singer, 1991; Freiwald, Kreiter, & Singer, 1995). This within-area 
integration is the simplest case of the binding problem. If binding is to be achieved 
between different feature dimensions a mechanism has to be devised that can provide 
functional integration between the neural populations representing these different 
features. As some different feature dimensions are represented in different visual 
areas (such as luminance contrast and colour hue), the synchronisation account would 
predict spike synchronisation between different visual areas, which has been 
demonstrated (Engel, Kreiter, Konig, & Singer, 1991).  
 
Other authors have proposed similar temporal correlation mechanisms based on re-
entrant processing, which have been shown to be able to account for Gestalt grouping 
(Sporns, Tononi, & Edelman, 1991). If re-entrant processing is not only necessary for 
feature binding but also for visual awareness, as proposed by several authors 
(Bridgeman, 1971, 2001; Damasio, 1989; Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000; Super et al., 
2001; Tononi & Edelman, 1998), this would give a natural account of why the closest 
match between conscious perception and evoked responses occurs only at later stages 
of processing. This has been demonstrated for contrast in the current study, where the 
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second striate response matches perceived contrast better than the first. As reported 
above, the better match between perception and late responses has also been shown 
for perceived brightness (Kinoshita & Komatsu, 2001), metacontrast masking 
(Bridgeman, 1975, 1980; Macknik & Livingstone, 1998) and texture segmentation 
(Super et al., 2001). Furthermore, disruption of feedback can render stimuli invisible 
(Pascual-Leone & Walsh, 2001). All of these studies have demonstrated a close 
correlation between perception and late processing stages in primary visual cortex81. 
 
Final remarks 
An eliminativist position states that the “temperature of a gas is nothing else than the 
mean kinetic energy of its molecules”. If one were an eliminativist one may interpret 
the results of the present study to mean that “perceived contrast is nothing else than 
the mean response amplitude of a subpopulation of cells in striate cortex”. On the 
other hand, if one were a property dualist one may now argue that “perceived contrast 
is a phenomenal property of the response amplitude of a subpopulation of cells in 
striate cortex”. The results of the current study do not allow deciding between the 
various metaphysical positions that have been proposed for the relationship between 
conscious experience and brain states. However, it does present a first step in the 
reduction of a dimension of conscious perception onto a physiological property of a 
population of cells in primary visual cortex.  
 
Our everyday models of perceptual processes are specified at a number of different 
levels of resolution. A psychophysicist who is not interested in the neural basis of 
perception may interpret an experiment on perceived contrast as follows:  
 
The subject is presented with visual stimuli varying along the 
dimension of luminance contrast. He perceives each as a spatial 
pattern with a certain contrast determined by a non-linear contrast 
transducer function, recalls which numbers he has assigned to 
other perceived contrasts, maps the current sensation on this scale 
and responds with the according number.  
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A different view may now be offered, where subjective perceptual and cognitive 
concepts have been replaced by the neural processes taking the same causal roles:  
 
The subject’s retina is presented with visual stimuli varying along 
the dimension of luminance contrast. These lead to a cascade of 
events in the visual system, one of which is a response of varying 
amplitude in a subset of cells in primary visual cortex at a late 
stage of processing. A set of distributed representations is 
reactivated that associates response amplitudes of this population 
with an activation vector in the parietal representation of the 
“number line” (Dehaene & Cohen, 1995; Pinel, Dehaene, Riviere, 
& LeBihan, 2001), which is the basis for the subject’s differential 
response. 
 
In a neural theory of contrast perception every occurrence of a percept with a 
particular magnitude of contrast will be replaced by a certain response amplitude in 
this neural population, to which the perceived magnitude is mapped. In every case 
when a percept changes along this dimension, the neural response will adopt a 
different state, and the percept can be mapped to this neural state, which further on 
inherits its causal role. 
 
Of course, by following this research program, the “explanatory gap” (Levine, 1983) 
— or “hard problem” (Chalmers, 1996) — remains unsolved, in the sense that even if 
we had established a perfect neural substitute for perceived contrast, we would still 
fail to know why it is that these brain-processes are accompanied by just these 
qualitative experiential states. This problem holds for the same reason that we do not 
have an answer to the question of why the world is such that gravitation decreases as 
the square of the distance between two masses increases. “That’s the way it is” is all a 
scientist can answer, and several ontologies may be constructed upon the same set of 
empirical data (Smart, 1959). It is however possible to follow a nomological research 
strategy (investigating which laws govern the behaviour of qualitative states) even if 
the ontological problem (of what qualitative states “are”) is principally unsolvable. 
The search for the neural representation of dimensions of conscious perception can 
thus be viewed as the search for bridge laws (Nagel 1961) that map phenomenal onto 
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physiological concepts. If such bridge laws were known, one would be able to predict 
a subject’s conscious perception by a measurement performed on his brain. In the 
current study it has been shown that this is possible, for the low-level dimension of 
perceived contrast. 
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Footnotes 
 
1 Even if perceived brightness and contrast at a position in the visual field depend on spatial context 
(Adelson, 1999; Ejima & Takahashi, 1985) the effect of this surround modulation is nonetheless a 
change in perceived brightness or contrast at a specific local position in the visual field, thus justifying 
calling perceived brightness and contrast “local” aspects of conscious perception. 
2 The term “perception” rather than “experience” was chosen because of its greater familiarity, 
although experience is the more adequate term. Perception implies an external object that is being 
perceived. In the case of visual imagery, hallucinations, direct cortical stimulation, etc. there is no 
external object being perceived, but the observer has an experience of certain visual features, often 
giving rise to his belief that they were evoked by an external object. The term “visual features” was 
used to allow for the modular representation of the various dimensions of conscious perception. 
3 The importance of the brainstem reticular formation for control of arousal was demonstrated by 
showing that its stimulation in lightly anaesthetised animals had a desynchronising effect on the EEG, 
which is typically observed when animals and humans wake up (Moruzzi & Magoun, 1949). Also brain 
transsections at the level of the midbrain, that separate the reticular formation from thalamus and 
cortex, lead to irreversible sleep whereas transsections below the reticular formation at the lower 
brainstem leave the animal awake but largely immobile with spared ability to respond to auditory and 
visual stimuli by eye and face movements (Bremer, 1935). In humans lesions of the brainstem at the 
level of the upper reticular formation can lead to coma, whereas this is not necessarily the case for 
lower lesions at the level of the medulla (Plum & Posner, 1980). 
4 These structures are also involved in arousal changes in waking subjects (Kinomura, Larsson, Gulyas, 
& Roland, 1996; Portas et al., 1998). 
5 Anecdotal reports mention opening doors and taking streetcar rides (Young & Wijdicks, 1998). 
6 In PVS patients cortical cerebral metabolism as assessed with fluorodeoxyglucose-PET is below 50% 
of normals and matches that encountered during deep barbiturate anaesthesia (Plum, Schiff, Ribary, & 
Llinas, 1998; Schiff et al., 2002). Similarly post-mortem studies have found extensive neocortical and 
thalamic degeneration (Kinney et al., 1994; Kinney & Samuels, 1994; Zeman, 1997). 
7 Vertical eye-movements and movement of upper eyelids are controlled by cranial nerve III 
(oculomotor nerve), which originates from the oculomotor nucleus in the midbrain at the level of the 
superior colliculus. Horizontal eye-movements however are controlled by cranial nerve VI (abducens 
nerve) originating from the nucleus abducens in the caudal pons. This explains why vertical but not 
horizontal eye-movements are often spared in locked-in syndrome, which occurs mostly after brain 
stem lesions at the level of the pons. 
8 See the discussion in the New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 331 (20), pp. 1378. 
9 Under certain circumstances hemineglect can be falsely classified as hemianopia (Kooistra & 
Heilman, 1989), but visual neglect can occur even when there is no blind region in the visual field 
(Halligan, Marshall, & Wade, 1990). 
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10 When the term “state” is used it is not meant to imply a single physiological state of the system, 
defined down to the microphysical level, but to a state defined as a function over a neural population, 
such as “mean activity” or “coherency”. 
11 Some possible states of the neural system may simply be irrelevant for conscious perception. 
12 Cases of lesions are the only cases where the neural state is not defined. A perceptual dimension can 
trivially not be represented by a neural population if it can still occur when the neural population is 
lesioned. 
13 Mostly the low-level feature statistics are not kept constant in a satisfactory way. This is due to the 
method used, where a grid is applied to the image and then the positions of individual cells are 
randomised. This of course changes the spectral composition of the image, leading to the alternative 
interpretation that visual areas found in these studies do not differ in their selectivity to high-level 
features but in their spatial-frequency selectivity. 
14 Visual imagery is a different paradigm that can be used to study changes in perception without 
changes in stimulation. A subject is asked to imagine a spatial pattern without any exogenous stimulus 
(reviewed in Kosslyn, Ganis, & Thompson, 2001). Visual imagery is interesting because it allows one 
to correlate a perceptual change that occurs purely intentionally, to a change in brain state. However 
the imagined spatial pattern is largely uncontrollable and thus the perceptual state is only weakly 
defined. Perceptual illusions also fall into this category. If a stationary stimulus is perceived to move 
then motion perception can be studied independent of motion stimulation (Zeki, Watson, & 
Frackowiak, 1993). This can also occur in the form of aftereffects. If a moving stimulus is viewed for a 
certain time visual motion detectors are adapted. A subsequently presented stationary stimulus is 
perceived to move. This can also be used to study motion perception without motion stimulation (Huk, 
Ress, & Heeger, 2001). 
15 However this can only be positive evidence. If a neural population is unable to account for 
discrimination, it cannot be ruled out that it might have sufficient grain for perceptual representation. 
16 This does not hold for example for perceived orientation. 
17 An example may make this clear. Consider a forest fire “caused” by a short circuit. Was the short 
circuit a necessary condition for the fire to occur? No, because the fire could have been caused in other 
ways, for example by a burning cigarette. The short circuit is also not sufficient for the fire to occur 
because the same fire would not have been caused if the forest had not been dry. But the short circuit 
can be interpreted as a “cause”, because it is a necessary part of one sufficient set of conditions.  
However this sufficient set of conditions is not necessary, because other sets of sufficient conditions 
can exist which do not make the cause “short circuit” necessary (e.g. a burning cigarette plus a dry 
forest). So the short circuit is an insufficient but necessary part of a condition that is itself unnecessary 
but sufficient for the result (hence INUS). 
18 A note of caution should be added here when interpreting results from lesion studies. After lesions of 
primary visual cortex for example more is lost than simply activity in V1. As V1 is the main route of 
signal flow into visual cortex, many visual areas show strongly reduced activity after V1 lesions. Early 
extrastriate visual areas V2 and V3/VP, as well as areas in the temporal pathway (V4, IT) are largely 
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silenced after V1 lesions, whereas V3A and MT still show activity (Bullier, Girard, & Salin, 1994; 
Milner & Goodale, 1995; Rocha-Miranda, Bender, Gross, & Mishkin, 1975). A lesion in V1 will leave 
responses in the superior colliculus and pulvinar largely unchanged but will lead to retrograde 
destruction of parts of LGN and even retina (Cowey & Stoerig, 1989; Cowey, Stoerig, & Perry, 1989). 
19 Transcranial electrical stimulation on the other hand has the disadvantage of being strongly obscured 
and blurred by the high resistance of the skull (Merton & Morton, 1980; Nathan, Sinha, Gordon, 
Lesser, & Thakor, 1993). 
20 These “figure-of-eight” coils induce the most focal intracerebral currents. 
21 Studying V1 with TMS has problems. Electromagnetic modelling using three layer brain models of 
brain, skull and scalp predicts that current drops to 75 % within the first 10 mm of tissue (Roth, Cohen, 
& Hallett, 1991) and thus only reaches cortex on the surface of the brain. The parts of V1 representing 
peripheral vision are buried in the depth of the calcarine sulcus and are separated from the scalp by V2. 
Thus V1 cannot be disrupted without at the same time disrupting activity in V2 and the representation 
of the most peripheral visual field can possibly not be studied at all. 
22 Direct cortical stimulation can be interpreted to allow statements about the direction of “causality” 
between neural and mental states. However direct cortical stimulation is no different in this respect to a 
distal stimulus, which can also be thought of as a cause of a sensation. The real advantage of cortical 
stimulation is that it allows setting the starting point of a chain of neural events with much greater 
precision. 
23 Due to the immense reciprocal feed-forward and feedback connectivity in visual cortex stimulation 
of one visual area cannot be expected to be restricted to the site of stimulation (Callaway, 1998; 
Casagrande & Kaas, 1994; Felleman & Van Essen, 1991; Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000; Lamme, Super, 
& Spekreijse, 1998; Lennie, 1998; Merigan & Maunsell, 1993; Rockland, 1994). Effects will also 
certainly depend on the layers stimulated. So the conclusion that areas V1 to Vn-1 can be ruled out in 
this way is slightly optimistic. Co-recordings of EEG and TMS have shown that activity does spread 
significantly from the site of stimulation (Ilmoniemi et al., 1997). 
24 Intracranial stimulation is available from three main patient populations: (1) Patients in neurosurgical 
operations for removal of tumours and epileptogenic foci (Penfield & Rasmussen, 1950). (2) Blind 
patients participating in studies on artificial implants for visual prostheses (Brindley & Lewin, 1968; 
Dobelle, Mladejovsky, Evans, Roberts, & Girvin, 1976). (3) Patients with temporarily implanted 
electrodes for diagnostics of epileptogenic foci over the lateral and medial surfaces of the occipital and 
temporal lobes (Lee et al., 2000). 
25 They confirmed that the second colour area V8 contains a representation of the entire contralateral 
visual hemifield. There are divergent results and interpretations as to whether “ventral V4” contains a 
complete representation of the visual field (Bartels & Zeki, 2000) or only an upper quadrant 
(Hadjikhani et al., 1998), with the corresponding lower quadrant in dorsal occipital cortex (Tootell & 
Hadjikhani, 2001). 
26 Penfield and Rasmussen claim to have produced colour sensations by stimulation of primary visual 
cortex. They even claim that the “calcarine image was more often coloured while images produced 
 181 
 
 
from the secondary visual zone more often consisted of colourless light” (p. 142 in Penfield & 
Rasmussen, 1950). However Penfield and Rasmussen never stimulated the calcarine region inside the 
interhemispheric fissure, where the major part of V1 is located. It cannot be clearly reconstructed from 
their data whether stimulation leading to colour sensations really did occur in V1, or possibly rather in 
extrastriate visual cortex. Furthermore, their data contradict most results of direct cortical stimulation 
studies performed using chronically implanted electrode grids directly covering a large extent of V1 
(Brindley et al., 1972; Brindley & Lewin, 1968; Dobelle et al., 1974; Lee et al., 2000). 
27 The spectral composition of light that is reflected by an object is a joint function of the invariant 
reflectance properties of its surface and the spectrum of the illuminating light. Colour constancy refers 
to the fact that an object’s perceived colour is not determined by the reflected spectrum, but by the 
invariant reflectance properties of the object, which is achieved by discarding for the illuminant (Judd, 
1940; Land, 1959a, 1959b). To achieve this our visual system is able to take into account complex 
properties such as local and global context (Kraft & Brainard, 1999), overall scene statistics (Brown & 
MacLeod, 1997; Golz & MacLeod, 2002) and even physical knowledge of mutual illumination (Bloj, 
Kersten, & Hurlbert, 1999). 
28 Some human lesion studies suggest that colour constancy in V4 may only be computed by 
interaction with other areas. Patients with selective colour constancy deficits that were still able to 
discriminate and name colours typically had lesions around the superior and medial temporal gyrus, but 
not in fusiform gyrus (Ruttiger et al., 1999). 
29 In monkeys a complete ablation of area V4, which some authors believe to be the monkey colour 
area, does not severely affect colour discrimination (Heywood et al., 1992). However this only 
questions whether V4 is really the major monkey colour area, especially as there are several failures to 
find an abundance of colour-selective cells in V4. Recently some authors have reported that in a rare 
case of a blind patient with spared colour vision colour stimuli only activated area V1 but not V4, 
whereas in a normal subject both V1 and V4 were activated (Zeki, Aglioti, McKeefry, & Berlucchi, 
1999). The patient lacked colour constancy and his colour perception was purely wavelength-based. 
Zeki et al. interpret this as evidence that V1 alone can provide for conscious colour perception, albeit 
only in its native wavelength-based format of representation. However careful analysis of this study 
reveals that if the threshold criteria for control subject and patient are matched then also the patient 
shows activation of V4. 
30 Although in some animals motion selectivity can be found as early as in the retina (Barlow, Hill, & 
Levick, 1964) motion processing in primates is a cortical phenomenon (Culham et al., 2001). 
31 MST differs from MT mainly in its response to complex flow patterns such as rotation, contrast and 
expansion (Graziano, Andersen, & Snowden, 1994; Tanaka, Fukada, & Saito, 1989). 
32 Similar to monkey MT human MT+ contains a complete representation of the contralateral visual 
field and even extends up to 20° into the ipsilateral visual field (Tootell, Mendola, Hadjikhani, Liu, & 
Dale, 1998; Tootell, Reppas, Kwong et al., 1995). There is some evidence that human MT+ may also 
be retinotopically organised (Kansaku et al., 2001). However, it is not clear if these authors provide 
evidence for retinotopic organisation or for the functional subdivision between MT and MST. MST is 
 182 
 
 
believed to be specialised for more complex motion patterns such as rotation or expansion (Graziano et 
al., 1994). 
33 The activity assigned to dorsal visual area V3 by the authors of this study could possibly reflect 
V3A. This fine-grained distinction is impossible to make based on PET data, for which no retinotopic 
mapping is available. V3A is also strongly involved in processing of stereoscopic depth (Gonzalez & 
Perez, 1998) 
34 Due to the proximity of MT+ and KO it is actually possible that many supposedly selective 
neurological or experimental MT lesions in fact involve both areas (Beckers & Homberg, 1992; 
Beckers & Zeki, 1995; Plant, Laxer, Barbaro, Schiffman, & Nakayama, 1993; Zihl et al., 1983). 
35 Sensitivity to motion-defined texture and shape was also demonstrated as early as V1 by other 
authors (Reppas, Niyogi, Dale, Sereno, & Tootell, 1997). 
36 This is paralleled by the fact that macaque monkeys do not completely lose motion vision after 
MT/MST ablations (Rudolph & Pasternak, 1999). 
37 One patient reports to see motion as “a black shadow moving on a black background” (Zeki & 
Ffytche 1998, p. 30). 
38 Zeki and Ffytche (1998) could even show for their Riddoch patient G.Y. that MT+ was activated by 
motion. Awareness versus unawareness of motion in Riddoch patients was correlated with increased 
activity in MT+. Other authors even found stronger activation of superior colliculi in the same patient 
G.Y. in the unaware mode suggesting a shift from cortical to subcortical processing (Sahraie et al., 
1997). Surprisingly this residual motion vision can even occur for isoluminant chromatic stimuli (Guo, 
Benson, & Blakemore, 1998). However, it was not possible to elicit motion phosphenes in G.Y. by 
application of TMS anywhere over visual cortex of his lesioned hemisphere (Cowey & Walsh, 2000). 
39 Possibly it is necessary to subdivide motion perception into a number of smaller feature classes. The 
massive redundancy and parallel processing of motion in the visual system (Culham et al., 2001; 
Greenlee, 2000; Sunaert, Van Hecke, Marchal, & Orban, 1999) may not be surprising given that 
motion is closely tied to the general problem of temporal integration. First there seems to be a 
subdivision dependent on speed and cue-type. Some authors (Gegenfurtner & Hawken, 1995, 1996; 
Rieger, Gegenfurtner, Tempelmann, & Heinze, 2002) have provided evidence for a dissociation 
between slow motion of chromatic stimuli processed by the parvo-stream and in V3A, V7 and V4 and 
of fast motion of luminance-defined stimuli processed by the magno-stream and in MT+. This fits to 
the fact stated above that MT+ lesions selectively impair processing of fast motion stimuli. KO and 
LOC may not represent so much motion itself but rather shapes and objects defined by motion borders. 
There is also evidence for a double dissociation between first and second order (contrast-defined) 
motion perception (Vaina & Cowey, 1996; Vaina, Cowey, & Kennedy, 1999; Vaina, Makris, Kennedy, 
& Cowey, 1998). 
40 It is not yet clear how the functional subdivisions of monkey temporal cortex map onto human 
cortex. 
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41 The latter two have been studied in a rare case of single neuron recording from awake human brain 
(Kreiman, Koch, & Fried, 2000) and seem to be involved in memory retrieval and emotional analysis 
respectively. 
42 Contrast plays a strong role in surround effects. Sometimes complete reversions of the direction of 
effects are found at different contrast levels (Levitt & Lund, 1997; Polat, Mizobe, Pettet, Kasamatsu, & 
Norcia, 1998). 
43 It is not clear if single cells in these areas represent even more complex objects such as specific 
categories of animals. One has to be careful in interpreting the fact that a neuron can be driven strongly 
by a complex object such as a “tiger” to mean that the neuron is a “cardinal cell” (Barlow, 1995) for 
this specific object. Often the cell can just as well be driven by simplified versions of the stimulus, such 
as a striped area plus two circles (Tanaka, 1996). An alternative model is that categories are 
represented as population vectors over many cells encoding different complex shape primitives. In the 
latter sense monkey IT could provide a “dictionary of complex shapes” (Riesenhuber & Poggio, 2000; 
Tanaka, 1996). 
44 There has been a strong debate about possible confounds in studies demonstrating specialised object 
category modules (Gauthier, Behrmann, & Tarr, 1999; Humphreys & Forde, 2001; Ishai, Ungerleider, 
Martin, & Haxby, 2000). On the one hand prosopagnosia is mostly correlated with deficits in other 
object classes, such as animals, foods or plants (Farah, 1995) putting into question its pure face-
selectivity. An alternative interpretation could be a deficit in a specialised cortical area for living (as 
compared to non-living) objects. But this is difficult to reconcile with the fact that recognition of 
automobile models is also often disrupted together with face recognition (Farah, 1995). Possibly other 
incidental differences between the object categories play an important role: the degree of similarity or 
confusability between members in a subcategory (or the degree of crowding in the local surround of an 
objects’ activation vector in some high-dimensional feature space), structural complexity and degree of 
familiarity or overlearning. Furthermore certain objects typically call for certain types of processing. 
While we are often in a situation of having to make and remember fine discriminations between faces 
this is not the case for birds, cows or automobiles. Given all these possible confounds the hypothetical 
categorical selectivity of certain regions could be a mere artefact due to uncontrolled covariates. 
45 Position and size invariance can be largely attributed to the large size of receptive fields in inferior 
temporal cortex (Logothetis & Sheinberg, 1996; Logothetis, Pauls, Bulthoff, & Poggio, 1994; Tovee, 
Rolls, & Azzopardi, 1994). 
46 The minor response generalisations observed can mostly be attributed to invariance to mirror 
inflection rather than to viewpoint (Fig. 4 in Logothetis & Sheinberg, 1996). 
47 Little is known about the processing of brightness in the visual system. After the initial 
demonstrations that receptive fields of cat retinal ganglion cells were organised into concentric 
excitatory and inhibitory rings (Kuffler, 1953) it was believed that luminance contrast rather than 
absolute luminance was the basic achromatic representational unit in the visual system. Subsequently it 
was shown that also cells in lateral geniculate nucleus and visual cortex are composed of excitatory and 
inhibitory zones and respond only weakly to homogenous illumination across their entire receptive 
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fields (Hubel & Wiesel, 1959). This preference of contrast (along with neural adaptation) is important 
to account for the ability of our visual system to discard the influence of overall illumination level, 
which can vary by a factor of up to 108 between different viewing conditions such as weak starlight and 
strong sunlight (Hood & Finkelstein, 1986). 
48 Luminance is an objective measure of the power within the visible spectrum projected per steradian 
in a given direction per unit area of a surface. The subjective sensation evoked by this luminance 
varying between “dark” and “bright” is termed “brightness”. The relationship between luminance and 
brightness is complex, because it depends on dynamic factors such as the adaptation state of the 
photoreceptors, and (as shown below) on the luminance of the spatial context. Because we are 
interested in subjective perception we will be looking for the neural representation of (perceived) 
brightness, not luminance. 
49 The authors recorded peri-stimulus time histograms (PSTH) during extended phases after changes in 
luminance. Many luxotonic cells responded in such a sustained fashion showing only minor effects of 
light adaptation. A subpopulation of cells maintained their enhanced discharge rate to a light increment 
even up to the longest time measured (one hour). 
50 The remaining 8 % of cells showed a “V”-shaped response profile with the minimum response 
obtained when the luminance was the same as that of the background (“V-shaped type”). 
51 Brindley and Lewin (1968) also found that perceived brightness rose monotonously with the duty 
cycle of electrocortical stimulation pulses demonstrating a close relationship between perceptual 
magnitude and total current flow (see Fig. 9 C). 
52 Several controversial theories still co-exist: Inhibitory influences of transient on sustained visual 
channels (Breitmeyer & Ganz 1976; Breitmeyer & Ogmen 2000), retinocortical feedback loops 
(Purushothaman et al. 2000), co-occurrence of specific geniculostriate projections and unspecific 
thalamocortical arousal (Bachmann 1997), filling-in from edges (Macknik et al. 2000) and models 
combining feedback and lateral inhibition (Bridgeman 1971, 1977; Francis 1997). The diversity of 
positions is due to the fact that each theory postulates a complex network mechanism that goes far 
beyond currently available single-cell data. 
53 At a level of single cells the effects of metacontrast masking have been studied in various subcortical 
and cortical areas of both cats and monkeys. Retinal ganglion cells and cells in the lateral geniculate 
nucleus (Bridgeman, 1975; Gruesser, Petersen, & Sasowski, 1965; Schiller, 1968) exhibit surround 
masking, but with different temporal profiles than those for which metacontrast masking occurs. 
Macknik et al. (2000) demonstrated that in conditions where stimulus and mask are cyclically repeated 
single cell responses in LGN do exhibit suppression, which is strongest for small target-mask distances 
and decreases with increasing distance, as in metacontrast masking. This may point towards a partial 
account of metacontrast masking by LGN mechanisms. However the fact that dichoptic stimuli, where 
target and mask are presented to different eyes, also lead to strong masking effects points towards a 
predominantly cortical locus of suppression. When one records from later visual area V4, surround 
masking can still be observed, but again with different temporal parameters (Kondo & Komatsu, 2000). 
Early physiological studies on the neural basis of metacontrast masking used visual evoked potentials. 
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These have led to somewhat diverging results, some authors finding no differences between target 
responses for masked and unmasked stimuli (Schiller & Chorover, 1966), some authors finding 
differences in mid-latency components around 200 ms (Vaughan & Silverstein, 1968). Besides 
physical differences such as luminance and contrast level and physiological differences such as dark 
versus light adaptation these diverging results may be attributed to the difficulty of isolating the evoked 
responses to the target mask. Because they occur in close temporal succession the evoked potentials 
show substantial overlap. 
54 Similar results were obtained in macaque V1 by Kinoshita and Komatsu (2001) who found three 
classes of surround modulation: Type I (response independent of surround luminance), type II 
(decreasing response with increasing surround luminance) and type III (increasing response with 
increasing surround luminance). The type II cells are in accord with the surround normalisation of 
perceived brightness. 
55 Texture filling-in on the other hand may have its earliest correlates in areas V2 and V3 (De Weerd, 
Gattass, Desimone, & Ungerleider, 1995). 
56 The role of V2 in brightness representation is currently not clear. Using optical imaging and single 
unit recording it has been demonstrated that single cell activity not only in V1 but also V2 follows 
border-induced brightness modulation in the Craik-O’Brien-Cornweet illusion (Hung, Ramsden, Chen, 
& Roe, 2001). In the same study it was also demonstrated for the first time that V2 responds strongly to 
homogenous changes of luminance across large parts of the visual field. 
57 Visual field defects can be classified as absolute and relative, the latter referring to cases where 
perception is not completely disrupted but severely changed with reduced sensitivity and acuity. There 
is controversy as to the mechanisms of this residual vision which some authors believe to be purely 
extrastriate (Kleiser, Wittsack, Niedeggen, Goebel, & Stoerig, 2001) and others believe to rely on 
residual islands of intact cortex in V1 (Fendrich, Wessinger, & Gazzaniga, 1992). Even in absolutely 
blind parts of the visual field some capacity for discrimination may remain despite lack of any 
awareness of the stimuli. This phenomenon is known as “blindsight” and has also been demonstrated in 
monkeys where lesions can be set with much greater precision (Cowey & Stoerig, 1995; Stoerig & 
Cowey, 1997). 
58 A temporal lobectomy will not lead to visual field deficits only as long as the optic radiation is 
spared. The optic radiation cannot take a direct route from LGN to calcarine sulcus but has to loop 
around the lateral ventricle meaning it has to pass through the white matter of the temporal lobe. 
59 This is of course a doubtful practice in the light of the results on luminance processing in V1 
reported above. 
60 It would possibly be more appropriate to speak of “just discriminable differences”. 
61 The stimuli studied in TMS are a mixture of luminance and contrast stimuli, because on the one hand 
they increase overall luminance and on the other hand they increase contrast by introducing a 
luminance border. 
62 The authors also studied contrast perception in normal subjects, but the dissociation was only 
available for the amblyopic patient. 
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63 Positron-emission tomography (PET) was not considered because it employs substances marked by 
positron-emitting radioactive isotopes, such as 2-deoxyglucose to measure regional metabolism or 
H215O to measure regional blood flow. This procedure exposes the subject to radioactivity and should 
only be used in clinically justified circumstances and when no other method is available. 
64 FMRI signals are only indirectly related to neural activity. Blood oxygenation level dependent 
contrast (BOLD) fMRI signals measure local inhomogeneity of magnetic fields in small volumes of 
tissue via the dephasing rate of proton spins. The inhomogeneity changes with the level of blood 
oxygenation because the magnetic susceptibility of oxygenated haemoglobin is low and that of 
deoxygenated haemoglobin is high. An increase in deoxygenated haemoglobin leads to an increased 
inhomogeneity of the local magnetic field, which leads to a faster dephasing of proton spins. The blood 
oxygenation level first shows a very small decrease after neural activity due to increased metabolic 
demand, followed by a strong increase, presumably as a consequence of pre-emptive vascular auto-
regulation. The initial decrease in blood oxygenation is too small to be measured in most studies, but 
the temporally extended increase in blood oxygenation has a high signal to noise ratio and can be 
measured with MRI scanners. 
65 The characteristic length of a dendrite is the distance along the membrane after which a local EPSP 
or IPSP has fallen to 1/e of its value. The characteristic length is a measure of electrotonic spread in the 
dendritic tree and depends on several parameters such as the membrane resistance and the axial 
intracellular resistance, which in turn depends on the cross-sectional area of the dendrite (Shepherd, 
1999). 
66 “Neutral” refers to the fact that the reference electrode should pick up as little as possible of the 
evoked responses and should not pick up any other signals systematically related to the stimulus. 
67 In the current study the magnetic field strength is measured with single coils that measure magnetic 
flux caused by both local and distant sources (magnetometer). A different technology uses double-coils 
where one coil is equivalent to the magnetometer and the other coil is wound inversely and thus 
effectively subtracts the distant field that is constant for both coils (gradiometer). 
68 The boundaries are modelled using triangular mesh surfaces, i.e. surfaces approximated by (typically 
several thousand) triangles. 
69 To put it differently: The function mapping dipole space onto topography space is single-valued but 
non-injective. 
70 This was not evident in the cluster analysis, which does not exploit symmetry in the data, but 
interprets the vectors A and –A as belonging to two different clusters. 
71 The typical biphasic shape of CRFs is not visible here because the data are presumably only recorded 
from the region above the inflection point in the CRF.  
72 No behavioural data were recorded, simply because the cats were anaesthetised. 
73 When applying electrical stimulation to disparity selective cells in MT it is possible to apply a bias to 
depth judgements of awake and behaving rhesus monkeys suggesting a role for MT+ in perceived 
depth (DeAngelis, Cumming, & Newsome, 1998, 2000). However lesions of MT+ (and V4) did not 
lead to any deficit in stereopsis in rhesus monkeys (Schiller, 1993). In a human fMRI study area V3A 
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(however not MT) matched psychophysical performance very closely (Backus, Fleet, Parker, & 
Heeger, 2001). Area V3A is distinct from V3, is located on the superior occipital cortex and contains a 
compete representation of the visual field (Tootell et al., 1997). Transcranial magnetic stimulation over 
V3A has been shown to disrupt stereopsis in humans (Takayama & Sugishita, 1994). Monkey V3A 
response properties have also been shown to be dependent on direction of gaze, thus V3A is possibly 
on the border between retinotopic and spatiotopic processing (Galletti & Battaglini, 1989). This is 
supported by the vicinity of V3A to parietal cortex which is the main cortical site of spatiotopic 
representation in egocentric and possibly also allocentric coordinates (Duhamel, Bremmer, BenHamed, 
& Graf, 1997; Landis, 2000; Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 1997). The discrepancy on the role of MT 
in depth processing can be explained by specialisation of V3A and MT to fine and coarse stereopsis 
respectively (DeAngelis et al., 2000). 
74 In LGN representations for each eye are separated but lay in adjacent laminae. Thus corticofugal 
feedback onto LGN - which is known to derive from various visual areas (Lin & Kaas, 1977) - could 
selectively gate or suppress input from one eye by suppressing input passing through individual 
laminae. Inhibitory inter-ocular interactions are known to exist in LGN (Schroeder, Tenke, Arezzo, & 
Vaughan, 1990; Sengpiel, Blakemore, & Harrad, 1995). The spike rate of an LGN cell that is 
stimulated by a grating presented to its dominant eye is modulated by a grating presented to the non-
dominant eye. But in contrast to stimuli that lead to perceptual rivalry this inhibition is not specific to 
gratings of orthogonal orientations (as one would actually expect at a stage prior to orientation 
selectivity). So far no evidence for rivalry in LGN was found - neither in anaesthetised cats (Sengpiel 
et al., 1995) nor awake monkeys (Lehky & Maunsell, 1996). 
75 In recording from layer 4 of cat area 17 Sengpiel et al. (1995) found no evidence for binocular rivalry 
in monocularly driven cells, but strong rivalry in binocularly driven cells suggesting a locus of rivalry 
at or beyond striate cortex. This was observed when a grating of preferred orientation was presented to 
one eye and an orthogonal (non preferred) grating was presented to the other eye a few seconds later. 
The tuning properties of the suppression effect in cat area 17 show great similarity to human 
psychophysical data on binocular rivalry (Sengpiel, 1997). 
76 To be precise, this does not necessarily violate the mapping criteria formulated in chapter 2. It is 
highly unlikely that every cell in V1 participates in encoding every low-level feature. Luxotonic cells 
for example only make up a subset of V1 cells, but they nonetheless can account well for perceived 
brightness. Thus, this issue may be resolved by splitting V1 into subpopulations that represent different 
feature dimensions, such as perceived contrast or brightness.  
77 Even the most comprehensive reviews of primary visual cortex, which is the visual area for which 
the greatest body of data exists, admit that the true complexity of axonal and dendritic arborisation of 
real visual neurons can only be approximated in current models (Callaway, 1998; Casagrande & Kaas, 
1994; Kuljis, 1994; Lund et al., 1994; Peters, 1994). This is further complicated by the fact that most 
connectivity data is only available for monkeys and not fur humans. Although for example macaque 
and human visual cortex show a high degree of similarity there are also some clear differences (e.g. in 
layer 4A of V1, Preuss et al., 1999) the functional implications of which are currently unknown. 
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78 This nomenclature refers to the classical numbering of striate cortical layers by Lund and Boothe 
which is derived from Brodman (Brodman, 1909; Lund, Lund, Hendrickson, Bunt, & Fuchs, 1975). 
Although revised labelling systems have been proposed recently (Boyd, Mavity-Hudson, & 
Casagrande, 2000; Kaas & Collins, 2001; Kuljis, 1994) the Lund and Boothe system is still dominant 
in the literature. 
79 Gur and Snodderly (1997) also showed in monkeys that V1 colour opponent cells followed 
chromatic flicker of isoluminant stimuli up to 30 Hz which is beyond the typical chromatic flicker 
fusion threshold. However as discussed above the hypothetical representation of perceived colour is not 
in V1 but in the fusiform gyrus. Also it can be questioned whether the authors’ use of a photometer 
with human Vλ calibration can reliably indicate isoluminance for macaque monkeys, which are known 
to have a slightly different wavelength sensitivity (Dobkins, Thiele, & Albright, 2000; Jacobs & 
Deegan, 1997). 
80 The authors took great care to ensure that the patient really experienced flicker at these high 
frequencies and not slower fundamentals as could have arisen from technical artefacts or a 
misunderstanding of the term “flicker”. 
81 Synchronisation is not only a possible way to integrate disparate neural representations belonging to 
the same perceptual object. It has also been proposed as a mechanism of perceptual selection in 
multistable perception and binocular rivalry (Basar-Eroglu et al., 1996; Engel & Singer, 2001; Fries et 
al., 1997; Lumer, 1998). For humans this has been most impressively studied with the so-called 
“frequency tagging” paradigm (Srinivasan, Russell, Edelman, & Tononi, 1999; Tononi, Srinivasan, 
Russell, & Edelman, 1998). Two stimuli that lead to binocular rivalry when presented dichoptically can 
each be tagged by a different fundamental flicker frequency. This enables one to compare how widely 
activity evoked by each stimulus is disseminated in the brain, by comparing the power in the according 
stimulus’ fundamental frequency in the steady state EEG/MEG under conditions of perceptual 
dominance and suppression. With this paradigm Tononi and co-workers have shown that perceptual 
selection of one of two percepts leads to wide dissemination of activity deriving from that area across 
many brain areas, including many non-visual areas of the parietal and frontal lobes. Also, the 
interhemispheric phase coherency at the selected stimulus frequency is largely increased. This points 
towards synchronisation and coherency as two fundamental mechanisms of functional integration and 
selection. Information from selected percepts may be made globally available to other areas by 
exploiting the neurocomputational advantages of synchronous activation. Global availability has been 
suggested by many authors as a fundamental property of conscious representations (reviewed in Baars, 
2002). However it is not clear, whether this “global availability” of “information” means that the 
activation pattern of a selected representation is re-represented in other visual areas. If an observer is in 
two different perceptual states that only differ in a slight change of perceived contrast, a “global 
distribution of information” would mean that this difference is reproduced in every brain area that has 
this information. Alternatively, the information could be represented in only one cortical area and other 
areas would be able to access it. One is again confronted with the functional mapping problem and one 
has to account for the “information” available to these areas in terms of different states. Thus all areas 
 189 
 
 
in which the information is reproduced have to fulfil the mapping requirements outlined in chapter 2. 
Current evidence says, that this information is not globally distributed. A simple counter-example is 
that a change in contrast does not differentially activate non-visual areas (Boynton et al., 1999). Thus, 
even in a global workspace individual dimensions of conscious perception are still locally represented. 
